Deliberation and structure

This post is a transcript of a discussion that has been going on in email over the last few days. I suggested that we continue this on Equality-by-Lot so more people can respond if interested, and so that a public record is produced which can later be referred to. All are invited to continue the discussion in the comments thread.

The discussion was part of a longer thread, but the transcript starts with the following message from Chris Forman:

I’m leaning to the premise that it’s the sum of the daily interactions between people that adds up to the behavior of society writ large. The purpose of lotteries and deliberation is to build connectivity and relationships from which good policy flows.

A simple plan to transform US society is to hold social events with a lottery element in them. I think simply connecting random people in local communities and supporting those connection meetups with well structured events and follow up activities could be a recipe that many many civic organizations could get behind.

Could be a really useful tool for organizations trying to reach broader demographics while training people in the value of lotteries, and building up support for lotteries through direct experiences.

Could transform society.

I replied:

Meeting with random people could be fun (although it could also be tedious). But the notion that mass participation is by itself a path to democracy is unconvincing. It ignores the fact that governance takes structure. Our current non-democratic government is based on structure, and democratic government would also require structure.


Chris:

I’m not ignoring the structure question. Quite the opposite. […] Lotteries alone are pointless.

You need structure for lotteries to work. That’s why I think [we need] to advocate for deliberative democracy rather than lotteries per se.

Such social events based on lotteries would need structure! You would learn lots about what works and what doesn’t work.

Surely a government structure based on lotteries would be more readily accepted if a large subset of the population has had a personal positive experience associated with a lottery?

Another way to generate such experience could include a CA making a major law change.

Erm. Why not both the social and the national event to normalize the experience of a lottery?

I think a structure would emerge naturally.

I see the structures created by braver angels [https://braverangels.org] as giving people the skills to make lottery based decision making work.

Social lottery events + up skilling from Braver Angels + a number of high profile CAs

Is a multi layered, practical strategy to shift an entire population to understand and accept lottery driven processes.

Yoram:

We may be thinking of different things when we say “structure”. In my mind, “deliberation” is just a feel-good buzzword, not structure.

What I meant by “structure” is having some clear way in which society-scale decisions are made rather than “everybody talking to everybody” and democracy happens. “Everybody talking to everybody” seems democratic on the surface, since it does not privilege anybody formally. But in fact it inevitably leads to oligarchy, where a small unrepresentative group of people talks to large audiences and wields a lot of power at the expense of everybody else.

Another discussant “I am Sortitia’s Broken Heart” wrote:

Yoram, I am caught between these two statements:

“But the notion that mass participation is by itself a path to democracy is unconvincing. It ignores the fact that governance takes structure”

“Everybody talking to everybody seems democratic on the surface… But in fact it inevitably leads to oligarchy”

What kind of structure, then, might you propose that would stand the highest chance or likelihood of not devolving into oligarchy? If not deliberative, then what? What if the CAs are not the ones directly impacting policy but are simply the first step in the process … if they reach consensus on an issue, then it moves forward as a referendum to be voted on by The People.

I have time-stamped this clip (though the whole video is worth watching if you have the time…) Specifically, what I find interesting (in relation to this conversation) is Brett’s description of subsidiarity, a concept I was previously unfamiliar with. He describes it as such: “everything must be governed at the lowest useful level”.

To me, that sounds like a reasonable description (if not an endorsement) of how a CA model should ideally function. Interestingly : the conversation also touches on higher levels of governance (at a global scale) which is kind of funny, given my hopes/fears about what a global CA might look like.

“we should think carefully about things and be willing to change our minds and our actions as things change and as more information becomes available” Agreed. That is an ideal mixture of conservative and progressive … pausing long enough to weigh the pros and cons, and then being willing to take the risk that it is worth it. Again, I think this is an argument for CAs … because you are gonna have folks who are gungho to change something and others who will be hesitant/uncertain. The CAs provide a beneficial space in which these things can be discussed at length.

Also, come to think of it: in Iceland, they added an extra layer of participation for those who were not selected; they published the transcribed audio from the CA meetings for anyone else to listen to, thus giving the entire community being impacted a chance to ask questions and submit feedback of their own to the CA members before the next time their assembly met.

Yoram:

> What kind of structure

Initially the structure would be essentially what we have today, except that the decision makers would be allotted rather than elected. Once this is set up, the allotted would be able to keep evolving the structure as they learn what works and what doesn’t. But the point is that there has to be a clear decision making process that doesn’t pretend that decisions can emerge spontaneously from mass participation (mass “deliberation”) in a democratic matter. Any process that involves nominally symmetrical power sharing between a large number of people is bound to be de-facto controlled by an elite. Getting to a small group situation without ceding power to an elite is exactly what sortition is all about.

> If not deliberative

I am not sure what “deliberative” means. As I wrote, to me it seems like a feel-good buzzword that academics and activists can throw around in order to avoid saying something concrete.

> if they reach consensus on an issue, then it moves forward as a referendum to be voted on by The People.

Again, this seems rather vague and unpromising. Referenda are a very blunt tool that is quite unsuitable for democratic decision making except in exceptional circumstances. But also, what about this consensus requirement? Why does an allotted body have to reach a consensus? If a majority wants to make a change, why should a minority that enjoys the status quo have the right to overrule the majority?

> I think this is an argument for CAs.

Once more, this is quite ambiguous. We all agree, I believe, that decisions have to be made by allotted bodies. The question is about structure: How those bodies are set up and how they work. My point is that relying on a multitude of bodies, each with a short term of service and a limited mandate implies that quite a lot of power – in fact most power – remains outside this system of fragmented allotted bodies in the hands of those who determine the agendas of those bodies, the procedures they use, the information they use, the way they interact, details of implementation, etc. It is crucial that at bottom there is a high powered allotted body that underpins the entire system. If that body decides to convene additional, ad hoc allotted bodies, so be it. But the system would be democratic not because of the ad-hoc bodies but because of the powerful allotted body that runs the show.

> “everything must be governed at the lowest useful level”.

Who decides what’s the lowest useful level? There is no way to avoid a powerful body that would decide that. I personally suspect that the notion that we are dramatically too centralized and that things would be much better if a lot more is decided at the local level is false. But maybe I am wrong and there can be much more decentralization and maybe that would help, but even if that is true, we need an allotted centralized powerful body to decide what things are decided at what level.

In general, we need to be very careful in our theory. There is a lot of tendency among reformers to be very optimistic about various ideas for change, and presume that we should experiment with many things and that many of those ideas will turn out to be useful. It seems to me that this approach is very wrong, and in fact dangerous. Most reform proposals are superficial and would either not change much or change things for the worse. Sortition is not just one more thing among many. It is one of a very small set of ideas that have a promise for major improvement of our society. In fact, the only other promising idea that comes to my mind right now is UBI.

Chris:

Regarding the word deliberative:

Hurling rocks/missiles at each other has no deliberation.

Yelling across the aisle/filibustering to prevent others from speaking in congress is not deliberative.

Braver angels workshops encourage active listening but do not seek to change peoples opinions. The goal is to discover what other people think and to recognise our own short comings. This is somewhat deliberative.

Academics often measure the deliberative quality of an event by the “number of prior dissenters”. (the number of people who change their mind based on new arguments)

So my intuition of the word “deliberative” in regards to a conversation is: the more deliberative the conversation the more participants are willing to learn about and adopt alternative points of view to reach the optimal conclusion. People are not punished for changing their mind.

The less deliberative the more participants are trying to suppress other perspectives.

Strong deliberative democracy holds that the legitimacy of a process itself is derived from the deliberative quality of a decision making process. It is far from whimsical. It is the basis of power!

A group of humans who listen to each other and develop a single cohesive argument would have greater legitimacy than a group of humans who used e.g. stones to make their point. To achieve this legitimacy the argument needs to be set up in a specific way to enable quality deliberative methods to be effective.

You can’t just pick a group of people at random and expect them to make a good decision. There has to be guidelines and procedures for how those people interact and how the discussion is set up and managed. The goal is to achieve a process that doesn’t punish people for changing positions. That’s what I personally think is meant by the word: deliberative.

129 Responses

  1. Chris,

    I don’t accept the notion that the problem with the current system is that it is not deliberative. Of course politicians deliberate. They may do this in private rather than in public, but they deliberate – within parties and across parties. There is no way to pass bills, to promote agendas, to rule, without deliberation.

    The problem with the current system is that all the deliberation involved in ruling is internal to elite groups and is aimed at promoting their ideas and interests. This is what sortition is about – obtaining a body that is small enough to allow deliberation, without having that body represent elite ideas and interests.

    The notion that the problem with elected government is that it lacks deliberation is an elitist – academic, activist – idea, at whose center is the notion that other – the politicians, or more fundamentally, the public – need to be educated into accepting the good points of view of those elites.

    > You can’t just pick a group of people at random and expect them to make a good decision. There has to be guidelines and procedures for how those people interact and how the discussion is set up and managed.

    And who will set up those procedures? Why can’t the allotted set up the procedures for themselves? Are you, or is some expert body, better qualified than the allotted to set up the procedures? This is exactly the elitist mindset I am referring to above.

    But, again, all of this does not address the main question: What is the structure of decision making? Saying “we should deliberate” seems to be a substitute to actually saying something clear about how decisions are to be made. It is implying that if “we just talk to each other”, we will reach a utopia where we all agree and decisions will be by consensus, so the decision making process does not matter. This is a recipe for disillusionment and for maintaining the oligarchical status quo.

    To conclude: Can you, Chris, specify, what is the structure for decision making that you think should be established? (I am not asking for a detailed design, but for a clear sketch.)

    Liked by 2 people

  2. To me, deliberation is both—structure and procedure, seen as a learning circle: structure changes procedure changes structure…

    I think that double-loop learning is at the core of deliberation: learning by questioning and maybe modifying your mental models and convictions, transformative learning. That’s the point of deliberation, as I see it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-loop_learning?wprov=sfti1

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  3. I think you have the better of this debate, Yoram, but I’m dubious about your claim that the only thing that can underpin a real sortitional-democratic system is a single, powerful sortitionally-appointed body. It seems to me that such a sovereign body introduces a single point of failure into the system, with all the weaknesses of a citizens’ assembly and much higher stakes, because the points you raise about structure apply equally to this body. Who decides the procedures for this sovereign assembly? What are their sources of information? Corrupt those and you capture the whole system.

    A sturdier foundation for sortitional democracy would be a set of rules robust and transparent enough for their application to be decided upon by allotted bodies.

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  4. Thanks, Oliver.

    To clarify, there may be more than a single powerful body. There could be a handful. For example, it could be something similar to the familiar “separation of powers” arrangement with two legislative chambers and a supreme court (but all allotted). But it cannot be an arrangement of a multitude of nominally equal allotted bodies.

    > A sturdier foundation for sortitional democracy would be a set of rules robust and transparent enough for their application to be decided upon by allotted bodies.

    Who would set those rules (and modify them if necessary, presumably)? Not an allotted body?

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  5. Jurgen Habermas’ rules for ethical discourse might be helpful to gain an understanding of what deliberation is. It is a process-oriented, rather than a result-oriented definition:

    1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.

    2  a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.

    b.  Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.

    c.  Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.

    3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2).

    These rules were devised to ensure that only the “force of the better argument” determines the decision.

    Lance Hilt

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  6. Lance,

    > These rules were devised to ensure that only the “force of the better argument” determines the decision.

    Those rules are standard liberal dogma, but like so much of the standard liberal dogma, they are a fantasy (or a lie, if you are less charitable).

    If one person (the average person) gets to speak to an intimate audience of, say, 10 or 100 people, while another (a member of the elite) has an audience of millions, then clearly the latter person has dramatically more power than the former, a difference in power which completely drowns the “force of the better argument”.

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  7. Hi Yorum,

    Your example violates rule 1. Furthermore, it really has nothing to do with deliberation, or discourse, at all, it’s merely the dissemination of propaganda.

    I’m quite surprised to read your description of egalitarian decision-making as a liberal fantasy. I thought that was the goal of this movement. If not, I am in the wrong place.

    I don’t believe such decisión-making, and the deliberation that takes place during it, is a fantasy, liberal or otherwise. In fact, I believe it has been the most dominant form of decision-making in hunter-gatherer tribes, which comprise 99% of human history. Even now it is being employed among indigenous peoples. The form you have described, where a few get an outsized voice, is the aberration, and a dystopian one at that.

    Lance Hilt

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  8. Hi Lance,

    No – rule 1 says nothing about size of audience, so it is not violated in the situation I describe. In this situation (which is not hypothetical but is the reality in what is conventionally called “our democracies”), everybody is allowed to say whatever they want, but a select few get to say it to a mass audience while most people say it to a handful of people.

    Of course, I fully support people saying what they want. What I am against is the notion that freedom of speech as defined by Habermas’s rules is a good starting point for democracy. This notion is just an endorsement of the status quo. Note how any notion of substantive equality is absent from Habermas’s rules – this could hardly be a chance omission.

    In fact, the formal symmetry of “free speech” is a recipe for de-facto hierarchy. I can’t believe that Habermas did not realize this fact, because he can see it all around him. Presumably Habermas sees this hierarchy as a natural hierarchy of merit – those who make the better arguments get to be heard, and those who make the best arguments (Jefferson’s natural aristocrats) get to be heard by a mass audience.

    In fact, of course, this is an elitist conception of society, the same conception that is embodied in elections. Sortition, on the other hand, gives normal people – those whom Jefferson and Habermas would probably see as being unable to provide forceful arguments – as much say as it does to their betters, because it is the deliberation inside the small group of the allotted that matters, and the deliberation there is specifically designed to be egalitarian and so that all the members of the allotted group have the same impact on opinion and on decisions.

    Hunter-gatherer societies were intimate societies rather than the mass societies we have now. In those societies the question of the size of audience didn’t arise. Any member of the group could, and probably did, talk regularly to every other member. This is not the situation in a modern mass society.

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  9. Hi Yorum,

    Your example is a violation of rule 1 because, as you stated the example, not everyone is allowed to address the audience. Habermas would view this as a distortion of communicative action enabled by and furthering capitalist accumulation.

    Here is another explanation of Habermas rules for ethical discourse. Habermas is the diametric opposite of an elitist. He most definitely does not see normal people as incapable of making forceful arguments. In fact, he is trying to clear the way of coercive institutions, and restrictions of access, so that they will have the opportunity to do so.

    1) the parties should regard each other as equals; equal regard should be given to the interests of all participants; 2) there should be an absence of direct constraint or force and of indirect, institutionalised or structural pressure; 3) the only admissible form of persuasion should be rational argument; 4) no assumptions should be immune to inquiry; 5) assumptions can be taken as accepted only if all the parties agree; 6) the communication should be open-ended in the sense that no authority could declare an issue settled for ever.

     The example of hunter-gatherers was just to show that egalitarian communication is not a fantasy. Of course, as you point out, the scale differs. However, there are current indigenous communities that employ egalitarian methods that are much larger than small tribes, most notably the Zapatistas. Properly structured it can scale. I think that sortition can be scalable.

    Lance Hilt

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  10. Hi Lance,

    > not everyone is allowed to address the audience

    The rule as you wrote it doesn’t talk about “the audience”. It merely says that “every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse”. This says nothing about a single audience that everybody addresses, or about equal access to all audiences. As long as you can open your mouth and address some audience you “take part in the discourse” and the rule is satisfied.

    Neither the liberal rules, nor the participative-deliberationist doctrine address the fundamental issue. As long as there are mass media, there are going to be privileged discursive situations, namely the situations of having access to a mass audience via those mass media. These situations must be privileged because there are too few of those situations to be shared equally.

    Thus, unless we have a society without mass media, we need to manage access to these privileged positions. This “management” implies the use of force. Some people will not have access despite the fact that they want it. It doesn’t matter if we cloak this use of force by reference to “private ownership” or to “public ownership” or any other formula. The fact is that if I try to walk into the studios of national TV, or into the editor’s room of a wide circulation newspaper, or any other media channel with a mass audience, I will be stopped by force. This will happen in any society. It is completely unavoidable.

    Thus, Habermas, and other promoters of the liberal doctrine or of the participative-deliberationist doctrine, are either unconsciously or consciously manipulative when they talk about the “absence of direct constraint or force”. I give them the credit that they know what they are doing.

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  11. Hi Yoram,

    Since the original intent of my comment was to shed some light on what deliberation was, I took it for granted that the deliberative body, whether that be a CA, legislature, school board, etc, would be the audience. I agree, and so does Habermas with your critiques of the mass media and it’s debilitating effect on deliberation. One aspect of sortition-selected deliberative bodies I find hopeful is that they cordon the participants from the immediate influence of such forces and allow for the equal sharing of multiple perspectives. Of course, all the damage of years of propaganda will not be undone by this structure.

    Here is one of the more clear and succinct accounts of Habermas’ views on mass media. The first half of the article addresses most of your concerns, which Habermas pointed out in his first work in 1962, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. The media plays a large role, in his opinion, for this transformation, one that he deplores.

    https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1280/1200

    That this transformation is unavoidable I am not yet willing to acknowledge. More democratic structures in the work place, most obviously in mass media organizations, could lessen its pernicious effect. It’s an enormous problem, not one we have time to even understand within this discussion.

     I apologize for taking the discussion off on this tangent. Please return to your normal programming.

    Lance Hilt

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  12. Hi Lance,

    I don’t see this discussion as tangential at all. The question of whether symmetric, unstructured “deliberation” on a mass scale is a democratic pattern was the main focus of the discussion transcribed in the post.

    But if the rules proposed by Habermas are about discussion in a small group, then they are not only uncontroversial, they are banal and irrelevant. The question is how to run a large society, not how to deliberate in a small group. The non-trivial, indeed revolutionary, answer is using sortition to map the large society to a small decision making body. (Of course, within that body discussion has to be egalitarian. But that’s the easy part.)

    > More democratic structures in the work place, most obviously in mass media organizations, could lessen its pernicious effect. It’s an enormous problem, not one we have time to even understand within this discussion.

    I don’t think the situation is very complicated and I don’t think the general structure of the solution is very complex. If they were, then democracy would be infeasible, since it would mean that normal people, people who do not devote their lives to studying politics, cannot figure out what’s going on and what should be done.

    Like for democratization of government, the tool for democratization of mass media is sortition. The opportunities and resources to have one’s voice broadcast on mass media must be allotted among the population rather than distributed according to various elitist criteria such as wealth, electoral success, or institutional credentials.

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  13. But if the rules proposed by Habermas are about discussion in a small group, then they are not only uncontroversial, they are banal and irrelevant. The question is how to run a large society, not how to deliberate in a small group. The non-trivial, indeed revolutionary, answer is using sortition to map the large society to a small decision making body. (Of course, within that body discussion has to be egalitarian. But that’s the easy part.)

    You have been luckier than I, as I have been in many small groups where those trivial and banal rules were routinely violated. I have also had people object to the rules, so they are not uncontroversial to some. And no, egalitarian discussion is not as easy as you seem to believe, it’s why good facilitators will be necessary ingredients in any sortition body. I’d say selecting the body by lot is the easiest part, and even that is work. Convincing the public to accept it as a decision-making body is, of course, the biggest hurdle to clear.

    You said:

    Neither the liberal rules, nor the participative-deliberationist doctrine address the fundamental issue. As long as there are mass media, there are going to be privileged discursive situations, namely the situations of having access to a mass audience via those mass media. These situations must be privileged because there are too few of those situations to be shared equally.

    Thus, unless we have a society without mass media, we need to manage access to these privileged positions. This “management” implies the use of force. Some people will not have access despite the fact that they want it. It doesn’t matter if we cloak this use of force by reference to “private ownership” or to “public ownership” or any other formula. The fact is that if I try to walk into the studios of national TV, or into the editor’s room of a wide circulation newspaper, or any other media channel with a mass audience, I will be stopped by force. This will happen in any society. It is completely unavoidable.

    I responded to this by saying: More democratic structures in the work place, most obviously in mass media organizations, could lessen its pernicious effect. It’s an enormous problem, not one we have time to even understand within this discussion.

    Then you responded thus:

    I don’t think the situation is very complicated and I don’t think the general structure of the solution is very complex. If they were, then democracy would be infeasible, since it would mean that normal people, people who do not devote their lives to studying politics, cannot figure out what’s going on and what should be done.

    Are you gas-lighting me? I feel I’m trapped in that Monty Python skit where the fellow paid to argue simply disagrees with everything the customer says.

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  14. > good facilitators will be necessary ingredients in any sortition body

    As you expected, I disagree. The allotted should be the managers of their own discussion. They do not need others telling them what to do or how to do it. Attempts to manage them are undemocratic meddling. (Of course, the allotted may decide to hire various kinds of assistants, but which assistants and for what functions are decisions that should be made by the allotted themselves rather than imposed from the outside.)

    > Convincing the public to accept [an allotted body] as a decision-making body is, of course, the biggest hurdle to clear.

    With this I very much agree. The reason that this is difficult is because it is such an unfamiliar idea. The idea of egalitarian discussion in the decision making group, on the other hand, is conventional.

    > gaslighting

    Sorry. It seems I didn’t make myself clear.

    I am saying that the notion that deliberation in a mass society can occur without a structure involving enforced rules is false. There must be a structure with enforced rules which grants privileged positions – decision making positions, discursive positions. For that structure to be democratic the privileged positions should be granted via sortition.

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  15. >I don’t think the situation is very complicated and I don’t think the general structure of the solution is very complex. If they were, then democracy would be infeasible

    Lance, you should be aware that Yoram’s approach to the implementation of democracy is definitional/axiomatic. I played the role of the customer in the Monty Python skit for over ten years and then decided it was a lost cause. My principal concern now is that we will end up with a deceased parrot.

    My own view is that ensuring that a deliberative minipublic reflects the informed beliefs and preferences of the target population is an extremely difficult problem (both in theory and practice). Democracy is feasible, but requires a lot of work to successfully implement.

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  16. Hello again, Yoram,

    As you expected, I disagree. The allotted should be the managers of their own discussion. They do not need others telling them what to do or how to do it. Attempts to manage them are undemocratic meddling.

    I didn’t make any claims as to where the facilitators would be drawn from, so you aren’t disagreeing with my statement. I guess you are assuming good facilitators would not necessarily be found within the allotted and that’s OK, the sortition-selected body could proceed with deliberation and make a worth-while democratic decision even with poor facilitation, or perhaps none at all. You go even further than that and apparently are against any established guidance unless sought by the allotted.

    Lance Hilt

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  17. I have a huge amount to say, but will instead just hit a few points and refer people to a key paper of mine on why we need multiple allotted bodies (multi-body sortition) https://delibdemjournal.org/articles/abstract/10.16997/jdd.156/

    Effective deliberation among a highly diverse and representative sample of a participants of a citizens’ assembly is desirable, and completely unlike the fake deliberation with elected chambers (where it is all a performance), or within the partisan leadership (where it is consulting with lobbyists and other elites). Yet I agree that too many sortition advocates have elevated “deliberation” to a panacea and key value of sortition. Allotted bodies could hire and fire department heads or chief executives of jurisdictions as part of a democratic government, where such beautiful “deliberation” is barely a factor. I have one full chapter devoted to the issue of deliberation in my book I am currently releasing on Substack for free here: https://democracycreative.substack.com/p/the-trouble-with-elections?r=cvh3h&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

    However, I think it is crucial that there NOT be a single all-powerful sortition body, as was said above, it becomes the point of failure and corruption… (like deciding that they need more power, and longer terms in office, and more money, etc.) Any decision proposed by ONE allotted body needs to be approved by a DIFFERENT allotted body as a check and balance. As I describe in my multi-body sortition paper, a separate RULES Council (selected by lot of course) would propose procedures for all other allotted bodies to use… but those proposed revisions would need to be ratified by an independent sortition jury.

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  18. Terry,

    > unlike the fake deliberation with elected chambers (where it is all a performance), or within the partisan leadership (where it is consulting with lobbyists and other elites).

    I agree that the speeches made on the podium of an elected chamber are mere public relations. But deliberation does occur, because it must occur, elsewhere. Bills do not write themselves, and elected officials do not vote for the bills without getting something for themselves and for their backers. All this happens as a product of substantive communication. “Consulting with lobbyists and other elites” is deliberation – information is exchanged and interests and ideas are coalesced into a course of action. The problem with this is not that “it is not deliberation”, the problem with it is that this deliberation represents the ideas and interests of a narrow elite rather than the interests of the public.

    Regarding single body vs. multiple bodies. As I indicated above (and as we’ve discussed before), the question of single all-powerful body vs. several bodies sharing power in one way or another is secondary and arguments can be made for various arrangements. What cannot happen in a democracy is a multitude of bodies that share power nominally symmetrically. This inevitably leads to power concentrating in unofficial power centers.

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  19. Terry: “Any decision proposed by ONE allotted body needs to be approved by a DIFFERENT allotted body as a check and balance.”

    This is an interesting idea and echoes a similar argument I made (many moons ago, on a now-defunct website) when someone asked: “How would you hold this randomly-selected group accountable if there was some contention and/or controversy from the public about what this group was recommending or how they had gone about reaching such a suggestion/conclusion?” And I said: “Spin another jury and have them look at the accusations. It’s turtle-shaped assemblies, all the way down…”

    I wonder, though, along these lines…how might you (and Yoram) feel about the following compromise, or at least as a stepping stone to what you are ultimately describing: why not have allotted bodies for signing off on any laws that Congress attempts to pass? That way, you still have the formal structure in place (which Yoram appears to be arguing for…unless I’ve totally botched his suggestion, in which case: apologies!) but would also empower an allotted body to speak on behalf of those citizens whose lives are going to be directly impacted.

    Yoram: “The problem with this is not that “it is not deliberation”, the problem with it is that this deliberation represents the ideas and interests of a narrow elite rather than the interests of the public”

    This reminds me of a suggestion I have seen floated about, which could also potentially be incorporated into the conversation above about checks and balances: everyone involved in such deliberations (both the s/elected folks and the lobbyists and anyone else being consulted or conferred upon during the deliberative process) would need to wear tracksuits that are covered in all of the company logos to which they are financially beholden to and/or benefiting from. When a conflict of interest arises (during an argument being made or a suggestion being put forth) then someone else in the room could slap a button which causes the offending/conflicting logo to light up on that person’s tracksuit, thus forcing them to either concede the point or perhaps to argue why the public benefit would outweigh any personal benefit they might also receive.

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  20. > How would you hold this randomly-selected group accountable

    This question can be asked about a group of bodies as well. Having nominally separate bodies does not prevent the bodies from colluding in one way or another so it is always possible to image a grand conspiracy where all powerful bodies collude.

    While a conspiracy is always imaginable, such a conspiracy is rather far-fetched when dealing with large (say, more than a few dozen people) allotted bodies. However, since all elected bodies are necessarily made of elite members they are in fact structurally colluding to promote elite interests without any need to conspire or to coordinate explicitly.

    (BTW, Terry’s argument for multiple bodies is not about corruption but about bodies being positively biased when assessing the quality of proposals they generated. I find this argument unconvincing, and I think that the disadvantages of splitting off a final up-or-down decisions outweigh significantly any advantages. Instead, we should rely on the ability of future bodies to revisit issues and change policy as more information is gathered.)

    > wear tracksuits that are covered in all of the company logos to which they are financially beholden

    While this is a fun idea, it is a mistake to think of government corruption is being primarily about explicit financial ties. The issue is that even if no direct financial interests are involved (via some magic regulations including public finance of parties, etc.), membership in elite groups is a necessary characteristic of elected officials. Thus, the elected may not think of themselves as beholden to anyone and may even be from a safe seat where they don’t need financial backing, and yet they would still represent narrow interests at the expense of the general interest, simply by being who they are, perceiving the world as they do, having the values they have.

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  21. Three points:

    “Deliberation” has a more specific meaning within the field of political theory. Sharing information and ideas can occur within mere “negotiation,” which is based on finding the balancing point of relative power, regardless of the value of arguments. “Negotiation,” and seeking favors from the powerful, positioning for public relations opportunities, threatening, etc. are NOT “deliberation” in the sense it is used in political theory. But negotiation rather than deliberation is the essence of what elected politicians and lobbyists do. Even if you reject the definition of deliberation that political theorists use, I assume we can at least agree there is better and worse deliberation (the giving of reasoned arguments, compared to threatening). Real democracy (using sortition) can thrive because it fosters real (or high quality) deliberation among diverse people that are descriptively representative of the community, and treat each other as equals. Lots of research has shown that such diversity allows for superior problem solving, even if both the diverse and the homogeneous groups are well-intentioned (even if neither is serving an elite).

    Secondly, my multi-body sortition design IS partly about anti-corruption, in ADDITION to the benefit of genuinely representative decision-making compared to elite decision-making. I pull from the writings of Oliver Dowlen, who sees the anti-corruption potential of sortition as one of its greatest advantages. But even without corruption, any single group of people can go astray, due to information cascades, groupthink, a variety of cognitive biases, or simply having an unusually convincing member, etc. NO single group of people can be trusted to not go off track. Every group making important decisions needs one other independent group as a check (there isn’t any endless repetition problem), both against corruption, but also against honest bad decisions.

    Finally, a word about money/lobbyists and influence in elected legislatures. Yoram is correct that the stereotype that the problem is politicians doing the bidding of wealthy influencers is too simplistic. The corruption actually goes both ways. Yes, powerful interests with money can threaten or “buy” some politicians. But ALSO, sometimes politicians threaten and extort money from wealthy interests, with the threat of legislation that would penalize those special interests unless they pay up. That side of the corruption game gets no media attention, but is real. In addition, as Yoram noted, many elite politicians are promoting harmful legislation, simply because it is in their interest, and campaign money plays no part.

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  22. Terry,

    > “Deliberation” has a more specific meaning within the field of political theory.

    Since you didn’t actually explicitly specify what this meaning is, I take it that your “the giving of reasoned arguments, compared to threatening” is what this meaning is. But then, what makes a reasoned argument is subjective. One person’s “reasoned argument” is another person’s “despicable sophism”. And positive and negative incentives are a natural part of deal-making that is an essential and laudable part of politics.

    Indeed, the Socratic notion that people disagree because they are mistaken and can always be made to come to agree by having “high quality deliberation” where “reasoned arguments” prevail is not only false but manipulative. It pretends that there are no conflicts of interest between individuals and between groups (conflicts that are not due to someone failing to understand something). This is a stupid pretense that can only be taken seriously by someone who has something to gain by it, like the elite groups for whom it serves as a way to promote their careers and to avoid any real discussion of meaningful reform.

    > NO single group of people can be trusted to not go off track.

    Yes, but this is a truism. As I pointed out, no set of groups “can be trusted not to go off track” either. There are no guarantees in politics (as in life in general). Yes, splitting power in various ways has advantages, but it also has disadvantages.

    As I see things, splitting off a final yes-or-no decision has more disadvantages than advantages. Instead of reinforcing the status quo by making changes more difficult (as splitting of a final yes-or-no vote inevitably does), it would be better to make it easy to update and revise past decisions as new information becomes available or as more thought is put into the matter.

    But more to that point than how I or you see things, is that it should be up to the allotted themselves to design the political system on an ongoing basis. It should be up to them to decide what the decision making process would look like (and to change their minds if they see fit). If they decide to split off a final up-or-down decision, let it be so (until they decide not to). Deciding in advance, and in an irrevocable way, that this is the way to make decisions is an undemocratic presumption.

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  23. I guess we just won’t be able to agree on these points. Yes, sometimes there are incompatible interests, and deal-making negotiation is the best hope of the minority. But if there isn’t a process that at least promotes real deliberation, actual opportunities for finding common ground and even consensus are forfeited. To flesh out the concept of deliberation just a bit, I’ll quote from one political theorist (Jennifer Eagan) on the political theory definition of deliberation.

    “In deliberation, citizens exchange arguments [as equals] and consider different claims that are designed to secure the public good. Through this conversation, citizens [may] come to an agreement about what procedure, action, or policy will best produce the public good. Deliberation is a necessary precondition for the legitimacy of democratic political decisions. Rather than thinking of political decisions as the aggregate of citizens’ preferences, deliberative democracy claims that citizens should arrive at political decisions through reason and the collection of competing arguments and viewpoints.” This rarely occurs in un-democratic, power-balance negotiation or deal making that you seem to prefer.

    As for having an all-powerful chamber that can also act quickly… It barely matters how they are selected if power is that concentrated. A representative sample selected by lot ceases to be representative as soon as they have that much power, and the tendency toward corruption is massive. As in the classic analogy of two children dividing a cookie fairly. One child splits the cookie, and the other child gets to decide who gets which part. Checks and balances are an essential part of a sustainable democracy.

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  24. Terry,

    > But if there isn’t a process that at least promotes real deliberation, actual opportunities for finding common ground and even consensus are forfeited.

    This implies that people are unable to represent their own best interests (by finding common ground with others) unless they are guided by processes enforced by other people. This is an anti-democratic position that elites assert without proof because it allows them to demand a privileged position as those who design and enforce those processes, and avoid discussing substantive reforms that would redistribute power.

    At the risk of being blunt: The sentences you quote from Eagan are a perfect demonstration of the useless self-serving, self-congratulating, sophomoric platitudes that the “deliberative democracy” theorists produce. These allow the academics to wallow in their own wordage without risking upsetting anyone with power and without examining the basis for their own privileged (attained or aspired to). Specifically, you’d think that the pious appeal to the sacred power of “reason” – a power that belongs to the elite and to those parts of the masses that obey the elite – would have long lost its cachet since its heyday in the 17th or 18th century, but it appears it is still a useful tool in the deliberative democratic toolbox.

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  25. Sortitia’s,

    I just noticed that I didn’t answer your question:

    > why not have allotted bodies for signing off on any laws that Congress attempts to pass?

    I think such a body would be very weak. Blocking legislation would be a very blunt tool and would leave the elected with the initiative. Those drafting up the legislation would be able to design in it in a way that would split the allotted body in various ways and would discredit it in the eyes of the public.

    A better role for an allotted non-parliamentary body in my opinion would be an oversight role. Such a body could examine and produce critiques of government policy and conduct. More narrowly, it could set up laws and regulations for corruption and conflict of interests of elected officials, and have the power to also apply those laws and regulations to specific cases of conduct of elected officials (i.e., serve as a court for questions of corruption).

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  26. As demonstrated by the hundreds of citizens’ assemblies convened in recent years, deliberation is indeed a strength of every day people, and indeed evidence suggests it is superior in diverse groups than among elite “experts” (the opposite of your dismissive attitude that deliberation is a ruse to keep elites in power).

    The fact that we benefit from pre-established procedures (established democratically by allotted bodies, and constantly subject to improvement) to behave democratically can be demonstrated by a simple analogy. The past me and the future me wants the current me to not eat the left-over chocolate cake right now. But the current me is in control, so I eat the cake. It is not anti-democratic to advocate that a sortition assembly NOT have free rein to adopt their own rules that increase their power. The opposite is true… This principle with checks and balances is essential for democracy to survive — because power corrupts.

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  27. Terry,

    > As demonstrated by the hundreds of citizens’ assemblies convened in recent years […]

    I don’t see how those assemblies demonstrate much of value. Yes, people in those assemblies do not generally shout at each other. Other than that, what? How do we know they provide “reasoned arguments” or that they are swayed by “reasoned arguments”? Maybe they are just being manipulated into consenting to what the organizers wish them to consent to?

    To me it seems that generally those assemblies are structured in such a way that independent and well-considered ideas and proposals cannot be (and therefore are not) an outcome of the process.

    > evidence suggests it is superior in diverse groups than among elite “experts”

    Really, what evidence? If you have any systematic evidence of anything of interest about those bodies, I would be really interested. (But note that showing that people change the way they answer questions is hardly evidence of anything of value.)

    > (the opposite of your dismissive attitude that deliberation is a ruse to keep elites in power).

    I don’t understand your argument. How does the ability of people to “deliberate” have any bearing on the intentions or attempts of the elites?

    By the way, isn’t it funny how we habitually, instinctively, and without hesitation or reservation attribute “ruses” and oppressive intentions to foreign elites, but when it comes to our own elites we always assume that they are democratic at heart and have the best intentions, and fault those who suspect them with being less than noble for being “dismissive”?

    > we benefit from pre-established procedures

    I don’t understand your analogy, but in any case, some procedures must of course always exist, so it is not clear to me what you are trying to establish. As long as the initial procedures are not too bad, and as long as the allotted bodies themselves are empowered to redesign their own ways of working as they see fit, then there is good reason to expect to improve its democratic qualities over time. My objection is to what I understand to be an attempt on your side to impose unchangeable rules on the way the allotted organize themselves.

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  28. A wiser version of myself would follow my advice to give this blog up as a waste of time, but foolish me will dip one more toe in.

    Yorum, What is your definition of a “reasoned argument.”

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  29. Hi Lance,

    I don’t know why you feel our exchange has been a waste of time. It seems to me we discussed substantively the value of the liberal rules of deliberation for a democratic system. What’s not to like? Yes, maybe we have not yet been focused enough to challenge the fundamentals of our understandings, but that can be expected to take more time and effort – we have only exchanged a few comments so far.

    > What is your definition of a “reasoned argument.”

    As I wrote above, I see this term is reflecting subjective judgement about the persuasiveness of an argument. If I find an argument persuasive, I’ll call it reasoned. Others will disagree and call it “sophistry”, “manipulative”, “fallacious” or just “stupid”. (Of course, if we share enough background ideas, our assessment of arguments, whether they are reasoned or not, would tend to be similar.)

    I see the use of the term “reasoned” as a way to imply that while persuasiveness is subjective, reasoned-ness is not. I see the notion that there are universal standards for what makes an argument “reasoned” as a classic elitist idea that at bottom is a way to justify the elite’s way of thinking and to dismiss counter-ideas.

    (By the way, I see my understanding of the situation as being in line with Pragmatism, as promoted by Rorty.)

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  30. what causes you to find an argument persuasive?

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  31. This is really hard to say in a general way. Presumably, in a persuasive argument there would be referral to assumptions and “facts” that I accept, and application of “logical steps” that I accept that supposedly lead from those . But what makes those assumptions, “facts” and “logical steps” acceptable would be very difficult to specify in any general manner.

    Do you think you or anyone can be more specific than that?

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  32. This should have been: “lead from those to the desired conclusion”.

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  33. Well, let’s try these for specifics:

    Do you believe in Modus Ponens, and Modus Tollens as valid rules of logical inference, or do you believe they sometimes apply and sometimes not? Same for such logical rules as the excluded middle, law of contradiction, or more controversially, the identity of indiscernibles?

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  34. Sure. I am happy to grant that such rules are universally valid. But since no real-life disputes ever revolve around rejection of these rules or of their consequences, granting these rules does not move us perceptibly toward universally valid “reasoning”.

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  35. Au Contraire! I have encountered people that reject rules of logical inference when in debate. Establishing any objective standards does move us farther away from Rorty’s stance that justification is merely convention.

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  36. Ok. I’ve never seen those matters being part of a substantive dispute. Other than formal rules of logic, is there anything else that you see as being a universal basis for “reason”?

    BTW, I am not sure about Rorty’s position, but to me it seems that some discursive conventions are more “natural” to humans than others, so in that sense you could argue that some forms of justification are not just a social convention or a personal habit but a biological property of humans. (This is a Chomskyist view, I guess.)

    But first, even within the “natural” conventions there is room for endless variety. This is enough to make the idea of “reasoned argument” very, very weak, much weaker than Habermas et al. would be willing to admit.

    And secondly, maybe more radically, if someone, or some society, comes to adopt a less “natural” convention, then there is no objective sense in which they can be shown to be wrong. At most they can be shown to be wrong relative to some conventions, which they presumably reject. (This is true even with regard to rules of logic – these can be seen as being so “natural” that humans cannot doubt them. But if someone does come to doubt them – they use some kind of non-Boolean logic – then there is no way to “prove” them wrong, except within a particular logic, that they presumably reject.)

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  37. Ok. I’ve never seen those matters being part of a substantive dispute. Other than formal rules of logic, is there anything else that you see as being a universal basis for “reason”?

      Those would be the most important as far as establishing reason as the primary tool for debate. For there to be effective deliberation, using reason within the deliberative body, I think some of the formulations mentioned above are needed, such as no coercion and everyone able to speak their mind.

     As far as Rorty, even using his convention-dependent justificatory standards, deliberation would still be useful with sortition. Unless there are many representatives from many communities with widely disparate epistemic conventions, there is no reason they cannot deliberate together. I don’t think that is the case in the USA. There are always the obstinate, confused and contrary, of course, but a large enough body diffuses their effect. I once asked a friend of mine who was a professor of hyperbolic geometry how the very difficult, abstract proofs he worked on were accepted as proofs. It was through peer review, of course, and when no one could come up with a disproof, the proof was accepted. I pressed him, conjuring up an obstinate holdout who refused to relinquish a “disproof” that no one else agreed with. He said that this person would eventually get an office at the end of the hall where no one would have to pass by him on their way to and from classes. I imagine similar by-passing of those with extreme and stubbornly held views would occur in a sortition-selected deliberative body, and that may very well be one source of their much publicized moderating effect. With no base to perform for as elected officials have, they are forced into practicing cognitive empathy if they wish to be effective.

    Lance Hilt

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  38. > For there to be effective deliberation, using reason within the deliberative body, I think some of the formulations mentioned above are needed, such as no coercion and everyone able to speak their mind.

    “No coercion and everyone able to speak their mind” are at best necessary conditions for “reasoned” discussion and very far from being sufficient one. After all, these conditions hold in elected chambers where it seems obvious that all speech is for show and that power is distributed very unequally.

    Like you, I am not worried about obstinate people. I agree that there is good reason to believe that an allotted body using reasonable procedures would be able to deliberate effectively, improve its procedures over time, function democratically and by representing itself, it would represent the population from which it is drawn. But the point is that sortition is crucial for this. Platitudes like “deliberation”, “non-coercion” and “reason” as wielded by liberals like Habermas and the “deliberative democracy theorists” are in fact a deliberate distraction from substantive reforms, and specifically from discussing the elimination of the electoralist oligarchy and the need for a sortition-based system.

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  39. > For there to be effective deliberation, using reason within the deliberative body, I think some of the formulations mentioned above are needed, such as no coercion and everyone able to speak their mind.

    “No coercion and everyone able to speak their mind” are at best necessary conditions for “reasoned” discussion and very far from being sufficient ones.”

    Yes, necessary, or as I said,”needed.” What other conditions do you feel are necessary to ensure a reasoned discussion, and could you name a set of these that you would consider sufficient?

    I agree deliberation is not sufficient for truly democratic decision-making. I don’t believe sortition is either. Sortition without deliberation or education on the issues would be nothing more than an opinion poll, some improvement on the current system where the public is largely ignored, but the manipulative forces of the media,et al, we discussed earlier would only intensify. 

     I’m not sure sortition is even necessary. I’m keeping an eye on the Zapatistas to see how things develop with their “nested” election system. However, the verdict on that won’t be determined until I am long dead and gone. I suppose that the degree that they can avoid large-scale capitalism will determine it. Capitalism with elections is the death knell for democracy.

     Sortition without deliberation but expert testimony? Assuming the sortition members could ask to hear from experts of their choice to prevent manipulation would help. But merely receiving information is not as productive for coming to the best decision as deliberating over the information. People miss, misinterpret, and mishear information. Deliberating can ameliorate those errors. Furthermore, well known confirmation bias works to negate information that does not support the hearers beliefs. I believe the number of cognitive biases is now around 200. No individual can overcome them, it takes group scrutiny to do that. Even argumentative fallacies, of which there are an astounding number (see  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies), are most often only detected and pointed out by those that disagree with the position being supported via the fallacy.

     In short, the individual is inherently biased, which is why we need sortition to distribute bias more evenly, and inherently prone to mistaken interpretations and drawing incorrect conclusions, which is why groups make better decisions that any individual, even over merely technical matters. This requires deliberation.

    Lance Hilt

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  40. I refer any reader to chapter 11 of my book “The Trouble With Elections: Everything We Thought We Knew About Democracy is Wrong,” — available for free at https://democracycreative.substack.com/p/the-trouble-with-elections?r=cvh3h&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

    which deals with the distinction between active give-an-take deliberation, and independent internal deliberation, with the benefits and dangers of each. My conclusion is that democracy should use both, but that they must be used by separate bodies, because active deliberation taints independent deliberation (due to such things as groupthink).

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  41. That “anonymous” post above was from me… I was not logged in.

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  42. Yoram: “A better role for an allotted non-parliamentary body in my opinion would be an oversight role. Such a body could examine and produce critiques of government policy and conduct. More narrowly, it could set up laws and regulations for corruption and conflict of interests of elected officials, and have the power to also apply those laws and regulations to specific cases of conduct of elected officials (i.e., serve as a court for questions of corruption).”

    Fine, great…let’s try that, then. It seems like a reasonable jumping-off point, and might even end up leading to the evolution of a new system over time…possibly-maybe? Something which takes shape in organic stages and steps, if it’s (ultimately) perceived by the public as being equal parts beneficial and efficient.

    But if it were to go the other way? Meaning: if we ended up with a system that looked more like the one which Terry is describing…is there any part of you that believes, or even dares to hope, that we [“we” being the non-elites, the everyday Joe Schmos and Jane Schmanes] might not be observably/quantifiably better off than we are now with the current system?

    Yoram, it would be fascinating to see you in conversation with Michael Malice. Or to watch Malice referee/moderate a discussion/debate between you and Terry for a two- or three-hour podcast. I will contribute to that Kickstarter right now!

    Are you familiar with MM at all? He grew up in the Soviet Union and has authored several books about fascism; a self-professed anarchist, he now lives here in the States. He’s sharp and funny and a little bit mean…insightful and thoughtful and not afraid to tell it like it is. And I say this as someone who frequently disagrees with him. Your energy and his would be…intriguing.

    Terry: “But the current me is in control, so I eat the cake.” I am thoroughly enjoying your baked good analogies. Cookies and brownies and cakes…oh my! Keep them coming, please :-)

    Lance: Thank you for asking Yoram to clarify what he means by “reasoned arguments”. That is one of the things I highlighted in this week-long roundup since my last reply, but you beat me to it. And thank you for not giving up on the conversation or the blog.

    Yoram: “To me it seems that generally those assemblies are structured in such a way that independent and well-considered ideas and proposals cannot be (and therefore are not) an outcome of the process.”

    Do we know: is anyone keeping a comprehensive list or spreadsheet of all the assemblies which have been held to date? Ideally: it would be searchable by country, by topic, and by whether or not they reached consensus. Of these various assemblies, I am wondering if any of the proposals reached (or outcomes suggested) strike you as being independent or well-considered in their nature? And if not, why not? What are the parameters and metrics you would apply to such an analysis?

    Also Yoram: “I see the use of the term “reasoned” as a way to imply that while persuasiveness is subjective, reasoned-ness is not. I see the notion that there are universal standards for what makes an argument “reasoned” as a classic elitist idea that at bottom is a way to justify the elite’s way of thinking and to dismiss counter-ideas.”

    Can you think of any examples in which such “reasoning” could possibly-maybe be turned upon the elite and used against them effectively and efficiently? Some form of reversely-reasoned psychology? Or do you think it is impossible to employ such tactics without (in some sense) “becoming” the very thing you’ve set out to challenge and overcome?

    Back to Sir Lance-a-Lot: “He said that this person would eventually get an office at the end of the hall where no one would have to pass by him on their way to and from classes.” Jesus, that made me cackle…thanks for that :-)

    SLL: “I imagine similar by-passing of those with extreme and stubbornly held views would occur in a sortition-selected deliberative body, and that may very well be one source of their much publicized moderating effect.” In place of a thumbs-up emoji, I should like to symbolically insert Agent Mulder’s iconic “I Want to Believe” poster here :-)

    SLL: “I believe the number of cognitive biases is now around 200…the individual is inherently biased, which is why we need sortition to distribute bias more evenly” Two-hundred? Jesus :-( I agree, though, about distributing the biases. Hmm, you also mentioned The Zaps. What do you think about my idea: should Yoram engage with Mr Malice? #InquiringMinds

    Yoram, did you ever cover “America in One Room” here on EBL? I thought that’s where I heard about it, but can’t find anything when I search the blog. It was a nifty little experiment a few years ago, and this short video sums it up rather well: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FhNWKaLUWKw&t=1s

    In particular: the young woman of color who had never spoken to a seventy-year old white republican prior to this gathering, and the wavering emotion of the man in the final audio clip: “I have enjoyed this…beyond measure.” I need to believe that there is still some fucking hope. We can debate the details till the cows come home, but I hope we don’t talk past the point where it actually ends up mattering or making any meaningful difference.

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  43. Fuck :: it also loaded my comment as anonymous. It’s meant to be attributed to “Sortitia’s Calamitous and Care-Free Colonoscopy (you call that a probe? give me that thing!)”

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  44. Lance,

    > What other conditions do you feel are necessary to ensure a reasoned discussion, and could you name a set of these that you would consider sufficient?

    I think that the main conditions are that (1) the participants arrive at the discussion with the good will and motivation of listening to the others and attempting to find common ground and mutually beneficial agreement to the extent possible, (2) that the resources are available for the participants for developing a good understanding of the issues being discussed, including how their own values and interests, and those of others, are affected by possible actions.

    I guess (1) implies the liberal no-violence-no-censorship conditions, but of course it goes much farther. It is interesting, and revealing, that (2) is usually ignored almost altogether by the delibertionists. Their only nod in this direction is talk about “balanced advocacy”, as if such a thing could exist.

    (BTW, as I wrote, I find the term “reasoned” problematic, but let’s stick with it assuming it does not imply some sort of universally correct, elite approved, methodology of discussion, but rather a genre of discussion that participants find useful.)

    Regarding the role of deliberation: Again, the desirability of egalitarian and open discussion in small groups is noncontroversial and indeed rather banal. My point is that “deliberation” is wielded by Habermas et al. as a way to avoid addressing how decisions are being made in a large society, as if large-scale democracy somehow emerges from a mythical activity called “deliberation”. I see it as a deliberate attempt to avoid discussing power inequalities and meaningful reform.

    > “nested” election system […] Capitalism with elections is the death knell for democracy.

    Elections are an anti-democratic mechanism, nested or not, and whether or not the economy is capitalistic. Capitalism is a form of economy that serves the oligarchy, thus it is sometimes instituted by an oligarchy, and is an effect, rather than a cause, of oligarchy.

    > I believe the number of cognitive biases is now around 200

    Again, I see this kind of “deliberative” argument as an attempt to block certain ideas by asserting that they are caused by “fallacies” which the elite gets to enumerate, diagnose and design the institutions so that they are supposedly avoided. This gives those elites a privileged status in any reform proposal (not to mention serving to furnish lucrative careers for some members of the elite). Again, it is uncontroversial that small groups should practice egalitarian and free discussion and decision making processes. The question that is being studiously avoided by the liberals is how to avoid power inequalities in a large society. The answer to that – the only answer as far as I am aware – is sortition.

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  45. Sortitia’s,

    > a system that looked more like the one which Terry is describing […] might not be observably/quantifiably better off than we are now with the current system?

    It might, who knows. But the thing is that I see no reason to push for such a system rather than straight-up sortition based system (allotted parliament). It is more complex than the straight-up sortition-based system and it therefore has two clear disadvantages:

    1. It is more difficult to concentrate mass political energy behind such a proposal (compare “Down with elections! Sortition for the win!” with “What do we want? A multi-body sortition system!”).
    2. It is harder to predict what parts in it would be targets for elite manipulation, and it would be harder to diagnose and correct any failures.

    As I also pointed out to Terry, it is undemocratically presumptuous of him (or anyone) to set out a blueprint and expect that it would be imposed in an a-priori manner on the sortition system. Neither Terry nor any other person or non-allotted body has the legitimacy to impose designs on the sortition system. Only allotted bodies can have the legitimacy to determine how our politics work.

    > Michael Malice

    I haven’t heard of him, but I’ll look him up. In general I find that I tend to agree with Anarchists’ diagnoses of the problems, but much less with their proposed solutions (I am thinking here of Chomsky and the late David Graeber).

    > I am wondering if any of the proposals reached (or outcomes suggested) strike you as being independent or well-considered in their nature? And if not, why not? What are the parameters and metrics you would apply to such an analysis?

    The natural way to assess the value of allotted bodies is to either have the bodies evaluate themselves, drawing a report about what they think were the strengths and weaknesses of their structure and work, or have this evaluation done by another allotted body.

    I would emphasize that any body that does not reach a close-to-100% acceptance rate for proposed seats is a-priori unrepresentative and thus cannot be said to be democratic. By this criterion, all allotted bodies touted by the sortition-industry so far are useless as representing democratic decision-making.

    > “reasoning”

    I think we should insist on having enough resources and power for the allotted body to allow and motivate informed and considered discussion and decision making (and it is the allotted themselves who should feel that this is the case). That could be a useful definition of “reasoned”.

    > America in One Room

    There are some hits on EbL for America in One Room. I am not against it, but I am not that enthusiastic either. I am not sure what we are supposed to learn from such experiments/showcases. They feel too elite dominated to be useful. But maybe I am just being a negative-Ned. What do you feel is the value of such events?

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  46. Looks like I’ve fallen behind here but I will post my reply to Sortition post and what Terry posted.

    Sortitia: Thanks, glad you are enjoying my participation. The reason I was so despondent was I’d spent some time debating first, with someone who came across as certain of all his stated beliefs, and then with someone who appeared to be an epistemological nihilist. When Yorum said that, what I will characterize as, the power of reason was a tool of elite oppression, I decided I had to bail.  Gave it one final shot and fortunately, learned that his position was not that extreme,

    Terry: From your chapter on group-think. The famous Asch experiment; I’ve spent some time pondering it and the many ensuing replications. My favorite explanation for the results are the “spiral of silence” theory – that there is a first mover advantage, especially if reinforced like it was in the experiment – so that later voters are disinclined to go against their peers choices. A good facilitator in a deliberative discussion would prevent group-think due to this simply by asking for someone to speak who has a different view after hearing two similar opinions. If facilitation is not desired, a group process could be installed to alternate opinions as much as possible. It is an interesting experiment, but I don’t think it offers much elucidation as far as our endeavor is concerned. A better experiment would be to run it as is until the subject has cast his/her vote, then have an equal number of shills vote against the choice of the first group of shills. Then ask if anyone wants to change their mind. Better yet, have each voter explain why they are making their choice. That would more accurately represent a deliberative process.

      I am not familiar with the Sunstein experiment, so perhaps I’m just misunderstanding it, but it seems to me that all it shows is that people with limited information are vulnerable to making poor decisions. Like the Asch experiment, it does not mimic the conditions of a deliberative body as everyone would know what ball each person picked in order to make the best group decision. It does seem that experiments in deliberation have already been run, by Fishkin and the many CAs, and as you pointed out, group-think as a result of high stays participants  was not observed, nor was polarization. I am unfamiliar with the criteria for identifying group-think apart from agreement with high status members positions. 

     Nevertheless, I do believe group-think is an issue to be concerned about. I think high status members of the body are the biggest danger in distorting the decision. I am more afraid, however, of the mass media distortion and promotion of group-think. Harkening back to the Iraq War II, the suppression of voices of dissent was pervasive. Not only were the dissenters who questioned the validity of the “intelligence” indicating that Iraq had WMD given little air time, the argument that even if they did, a preemptive strike was a violation of international law was rarely heard. I’m afraid you non deliberative body would just echo that group-think. Perhaps, if balanced information could be provided to it that could be overcome. But then what is the point of the deliberative body? It seems like it would be nothing more than theater. I thought, perhaps, the non deliberators could listen in on the deliberation, but then, of course,they would be subject to the same group-think forces. Of course, the non deliberative body would be subject to all the misinterpretations, mishears, fallacies and biases of all human beings without the correctives of group correction. A good decisión would be reliant upon a large enough sample of opinions taken to smooth out individual error. Perhaps that is all it would take.

    Michael Malice – never heard of him – fierce moniker. A quick look at his Wikipedia bio and I think he is the opposite of a Zapatista.

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  47. That first line, obviously, was supposed to read, “ I will post my reply to Sortitia’s post…” My spell checker is obsessed with sortition.

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  48. > When Yorum said that, what I will characterize as, the power of reason was a tool of elite oppression

    If that’s what it came off as then I miscommunicated. That’s certainly not what I meant… I fancy myself as using reason as a tool for personal and social liberation.

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  49. Yoram,

    Which works of Habermas have you studied?

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  50. I wouldn’t say that I studied any work of Habermas. I mostly know him by reputation, such as through Landemore. I believe the only article of his that I ever read is “Three Normative Models of Democracy” (1994). None of this seems useful or encourages me to read more.

    But, indeed, I would be hard-pressed to come up with much of political theory that I do find useful. I tend to like Robert Dahl and I am a big fan of Manin’s “pure theory of elections”. Other than that, I am not sure, maybe I am forgetting something.

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  51. OK, that explains your distorted view of him. I’ve read different critiques of Habermas, but never that he was elitist. I’m not even sure what that word means for you as you use it in unexpected ways.

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  52. Sortitia’s,

    > Michael Malice

    I listened to this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkxSJlfqL2g. The guy is obviously intelligent and appears to be well-read, but it seems he adopted a nasty set of values: elitist, selfish, self-satisfied and explicitly anti-democratic.

    His analysis of “free speech” I found unconvincing, although I do agree with his initial point that this term is used to cover different things that should be considered separately (namely, speech to small audiences and speech to mass audiences – the latter is a privileged position and thus is inevitably managed by society in one way or another).

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  53. > Habermas

    So what do you find as his most useful ideas?

    > elitist

    I guess that by elitism I mean the notion that the ideas of some small group of people should count for more than of all the rest. Often this implies a gradation of “merit” with some very small group at the top and the masses at the bottom, rather than a binary split.

    Elitism usually takes the form of justifying (or accepting as justified) the already existing oligarchical structure of society, although it could take the form of Plato railing against the democratic aspects of the society he lived in, or the advocacy of the replacement of one oligarchy with another.

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  54. So what do you find as his most useful ideas?

    Given that Habermas has written thousands of pages and his thought is inclusive of numerous disciplines it would be difficult to answer your question succinctly, without creating misconceptions . His anti-elitism, his insistence that decisions need to be made by all members of society to be legitimate is one. Here is an article I came across recently that explains certain aspects of his thought well:

    https://cassandravoices.com/history/public-intellectuals-jurgen-habermas/

    Your definition of elitism makes me wonder why you think cognitive scientists are elitists. Their findings support group, inclusive decision-making as superior to individual or oligarchic ones.

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  55. Yoram:> I would be hard-pressed to come up with much of political theory that I do find useful.

    Well I suppose at least that’s honest (albeit a tad hubristic).

    >I guess that by elitism I mean the notion that the ideas of some small group of people should count for more than of all the rest. . . the replacement of one oligarchy with another.

    So the all-powerful groups selected by Gattian sortition are aleatory elites.

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  56. I will add that one interesting, if not useful, idea of Habermas is to ground morality within communication. Whether he succeeds in this or not is fiercely debated, but I appreciate the push back against the incoherent postmodern relativism of Foucault, Derrida, and the like.

    Again, the desirability of egalitarian and open discussion in small groups is noncontroversial and indeed rather banal.

    I don’t think they are either. There is a surprising amount of debate around them in political philosophical circles, but you have stated that that is not of much interest to you so naturally you would not be aware of that. As for them being banal. I am reminded of a story in the Chan literature where an old monk is asked the purpose of his practice. “To do good and avoid doing evil.” The response was that even a 5 year old child knows that. The monk responds that even though a child knows it, an eighty year old man has trouble practicing it.

    I have rarely been in a group of any size where Habermasian rules were not violated. Think of how many times you have interrupted a speaker, monopolized the time, engaged in name calling, character assassination, or derogatory labeling during a debate. Often in the background, or present, is a coercive authority limiting the field of what questions can be asked or proposals made.

    Your first requirement for ethical discourse, that the participants arrive at the discussion with the good will and motivation of listening to the others and attempting to find common ground and mutually beneficial agreement to the extent possible, is admirable advice, but good will and intentions are notoriously difficult to ascertain, and, as a result difficult to enforce. I do like the second requirement, that the resources be available for the participants for developing a good understanding, but that of course, opens the door within a capitalist society to the technocracy of democratic elites that Habermas, and I assume, you, oppose. Which brings us back to my earlier statement that capitalism, elections and democracy are incompatible. But I will save that for a later post.

    Finally, here is an article that sheds some light on the issues brought up in your post concerning Landemore:

    http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1518-44712008000100002

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  57. toothehilt:> capitalism, elections and democracy are incompatible.

    Alex Kovner and I attempt to refute this claim in this short paper: https://www.academia.edu/44790587/Some_Problems_of_Citizens_Assemblies

    A more developed version is published next month in Against Sortition? The Problem with Citizens Assemblies: https://www.imprint.co.uk/product/against/

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  58. Lance,

    > Given that Habermas has written thousands of pages and his thought is inclusive of numerous disciplines it would be difficult to answer your question succinctly

    That’s rather unfortunate. If we are to believe that this is the case, then as a practical matter, reading thousands of pages before understanding whether a certain writer has something of value to offer seems like a big investment for a very uncertain return. But to me it seems that if I cannot articulate succinctly the most important or useful ideas of an article, a book or a set of articles and books, then I may not have gotten much from them.

    > his insistence that decisions need to be made by all members of society to be legitimate

    Again, I find this statement by itself banal. Does Habermas give any indication of how decisions can “be made” by millions of people? Or at least how we know in retrospect whether a decision was made by millions? This seems like the root of the democratic difficulty in large societies.

    > Your definition of elitism makes me wonder why you think cognitive scientists are elitists. Their findings support group, inclusive decision-making as superior to individual or oligarchic ones.

    The notion that people need experts – cognitive scientists with their catalog of biases, or their recipes for the correct ways to deliberate and make decisions – to heal their muddled ways of thinking and organizing seems to fit neatly into my definition of elitism. (I did not assert that “cognitive scientists are elitists”, BTW.)

    Regarding the supposed findings of cognitive scientists, that “group, inclusive decision-making [is] superior to individual or oligarchic ones”, see the post I linked to above for why this claim is in fact an anti-democratic idea (under “Cognitive diversity, it turns out” with more elaboration in the comments below).

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  59. > The monk responds that even though a child knows it, an eighty year old man has trouble practicing it.

    I very much agree. It seems to me that this is the point I keep repeating.

    Saying that “decisions need to be made by all members of society” without saying how this is to be done is useless. From what I’ve read, and from the rules you offered, Habermas is no help at all in practicing democracy in a large society. At best he is creating a distraction from useful practice. At least implicitly, he is supporting the oligarchical status quo.

    (BTW, “decisions need to be made by all members of society” is somehow missing the “with equal impact of each member”. Is this a chance omission, or a deliberate one?)

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  60. Yoram,

    Your replies contain so many misunderstandings, simplifications and distortions of nuanced positions that it is impossible for anyone with limited time to unravel them. I’m just going to have to assume that you are unwilling to try to reach understanding and give up on you.

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  61. Hi Lance,

    The frustration is of course largely mutual. I feel like I’ve been repeatedly making fairly straightforward points, and asking fairly straightforward questions, and have not gotten substantive responses. Most prominently I think the crucial matter of scale has not been addressed.

    I understand that you claim that things are too complex to be laid out in this format. I don’t deny that complexity arises in political matters. But the complexity is in the details. If the notion that complexity is so prevalent that simple high-level descriptions of political problems and solutions cannot be usefully made is accepted, then this essentially rules out the possibility of democracy. If one needs to read thousands of pages before one understands politics, then most people will never understand politics, which means that they will not be able to represent themselves, and would have to be taken care of by the minority that does read those pages. This is a classic oligarchical position.

    In any case, I invite you to present your point of view in the way that you think is effective in posts on this blog, if you think this format would work better. If you are interested please let me know and I’ll send you an invitation to become a contributor to this blog.

    Also, thank you for the link to the paper by Marta Mendes da Rocha. I’ll have a look and see if I think it addresses my points.

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  62. “If one needs to read thousands of pages before one understands politics…”

    When did I ever say that?

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  63. Most prominently I think the crucial matter of scale has not been addressed.

    Research planning cells, a non-facilitated(!), method for breaking up any size group for deliberation.

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  64. To those interested in gaining an understanding of Habermas without reading thousands of pages, I’d recommend this work:

    https://academic.oup.com/book/263

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  65. From that work:

    Habermas has argued that only a decision-making process that is meaningfully open to all is capable of making decisions that we should regard as morally legitimate. He also argues that a system that routinely fails to make decisions pursuant to a process that meets his demanding criteria for moral decision-making will, in time, suffer from a crisis of legitimacy, leading either to reform or some form of repression.

    The deliberative democrats have rephrased that as everyone should have a consequential voice in decisions that affect them. Is that elitist?

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  66. More useful ideas I’ve found in Habermas:

    1. His distinction between Instrumental and communicative rationality. See this for a simple explanation: https://www.philosophytalk.org/blog/habermas-rationality-and-democracy
    2. Strategic action vs communicative action
    3. Manipulative and systematically distorted communication
    4. His concept of “performative contradiction.”

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  67. Also, a more difficult, but free synopsis of Habermas:

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/

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  68. The frustration is of course largely mutual. I feel like I’ve been repeatedly making fairly straightforward points, and asking fairly straightforward questions, and have not gotten substantive responses

    This is due to time constraints. By the time I clarify one misconception you all too often have posted three more.

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  69.  Thanks for the invitation to post, but my time is limited and I do not feel the world suffers from such a lack of content that I need to contribute still another essay. There is plenty of food for thought for those willing to find it.

     I did spend some of my time going back looking at previous discussions. I guess i wanted to reassure myself that it was not I alone that had difficulty having a fruitful dialogue here. I was struck by a remark by Keith, that he had took a year off, and upon his return saw that nothing had improved.

    I also looked back at my first comment on this Deliberation and Structure post. It was in response to an expressed confusion over what deliberation was. I mistook it for a sincere request and offered the Habermas rules of ethical discourse as one avenue toward understanding. The response was:

    Those rules are standard liberal dogma, but like so much of the standard liberal dogma, they are a fantasy (or a lie, if you are less charitable).

    Unfortunately, I took the bait and went down the rabbit hole, where I learned that Habermas rules were “non controversial and banal,” that he was an elitist, cognitive scientists are elitists, and pretty much anything I had to say would be challenged.

     Before I fell down the rabbit hole, there was something I wanted to say, concerning the value the original proposal could have. When I first discovered sortition I ran the idea in front of some Marxist acquaintances of mine. One was a professor of labor relations at Rutgers. I asked what objections one could see. Some of them gave the usual Marxist retort that this is just another reform and will still leave the current capitalist system intact. I believe that with some time I was able to convince them that it was more than a reform, as anything that affects the decision-making process and determines who makes decisions is revolutionary. The professor’s objection was that the average person does not have the communication skills needed to carry on fruitful debate. I didn’t respond but just let that percolate. I eventually came to the conclusion that that was not so much an argument against sortition but against democracy in general. Will, these same people have the ability to discern who will best represent them? Perhaps, though the current crop of representatives does not fulfill Madison’s hype of electing the most wise and patriotic.

     Now, after spending the time on this blog, I realize he may have a point. I had expected to find engaging cooperative dialogue here, since most of the contributors have similar values and purpose. Instead, I’ve found highly contentious debates where people set up straw-man arguments to knock down and otherwise distort the other’s position. On top of that, labeling the other’s position or people in disparaging terms – a form of name calling – and, surprisingly, a coercion violation – is a go to for some here. Now I see that the initial proposal for holding lottery based social (deliberative?) events would have merit if it improved the deliberative skills of the public.

     Despite your labeling of deliberative guidelines as banal, I think, if adhered to, they would be socially transformative. Far from not being controversial, I know very few places where they are agreed to. Certainly not the workplace, not classrooms other than at the university level and not always there, not most religious institutions, not unions, not the military. 

     There is also what Habermas refers to as the “distorted communication” that takes place between a subordinate and the superior. This is a covert coercion underlying such interactions that is nearly inescapable. Communicative rationality is not only transformative in its deployment, it calls for transformation to be fully employed.

    I was perusing the internet yesterday in search of some insights as to why social media dialogues are so often contentious. I will save that for later and after more thought. Perhaps this simply is not the venue for considered deliberation. I did read an article referencing David Bohm’s approach to dialogue, but now can’t retrieve it. I imagine you’d find it banal, so I gave up, but when I do find it I will put it in the comments. For now here is an excellent description of Daniel Dennett’s advice on how to criticize. I think if the members here followed this advice the debates would be much more illuminating and enjoyable:

    https://www.themarginalian.org/2014/03/28/daniel-dennett-rapoport-rules-criticism/

     I told myself I wasn’t going to spend any time on this site today, and instead have devoted most of the morning to it. I’m out tor now.

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  70. > planning cells, a non-facilitated(!), method for breaking up any size group for deliberation.

    Presumably this means that a population of a million people is broken into, say, 50,000 sub-groups of 20 people each. Let’s assume optimistically that each of those groups does a great job of deliberating democratically (a very questionable assumption since it’s not clear why most people would spend time and effort for a discussion that is just a drop in the discussion bucket, but let’s just assume this problem away for the sake of the argument).

    Now what? We have 50,000 outcomes from 50,000 discussions. How are these aggregated into a population-level policy?

    Until this question is answered, the problem of scale has not been addressed.

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  71. Yorum,

    If you look up planning cells as suggested, you will see they address this.

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  72. Keith,

    Alex Kovner and I attempt to refute this claim in this short paper: https://www.academia.edu/44790587/Some_Problems_of_Citizens_Assemblies

    Is the citizen jury in your scheme elected or allotted?

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  73. > only a decision-making process that is meaningfully open to all is capable of making decisions that we should regard as morally legitimate … Is that elitist?

    In fact, unless you are omitting a crucial part of his argument, it certainly is.

    The notion of “meaningfully open to all” is so vague that it is useless as a criterion for democracy. Surely the electoralists argue that a well-functioning electoral system is “meaningfully open to all”. They would say that in such a system everybody can come forward and offer themselves as a candidate and that this means that the system is meaningfully open to all. (Similarly, by the way, the Chinese would argue that their system gives everybody a chance to move up through the ranks of their administration into a position of influence, and it is thus meaningfully open to all.)

    I give Habermas credit that he is not naive enough not to understand this and therefore that this vagueness is deliberate. Unless he explicitly rejects the electoralist claims or provides some much more concrete criterion for what “meaningfully open to all” means, a criterion which excludes electoralism, then his criterion boils down to being deliberate implicit (if not explicit) support for the electoralist (i.e., oligarchical) status quo.

    Liked by 1 person

  74. The notion of “meaningfully open to all” is so vague that it is useless as a criterion for democracy. 

    Once again:

    https://www.themarginalian.org/2014/03/28/daniel-dennett-rapoport-rules-criticism/

    At least try.

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  75. OK, I’ll try to help:

    The notion of “meaningfully open to all” is so vague that it is useless as a criterion for democracy. Surely the electoralists argue that a well-functioning electoral system is “meaningfully open to all”. They would say that in such a system everybody can come forward and offer themselves as a candidate and that this means that the system is meaningfully open to all. (Similarly, by the way, the Chinese would argue that their system gives everybody a chance to move up through the ranks of their administration into a position of influence, and it is thus meaningfully open to all.)

    So what?

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  76. > Now I see that the initial proposal for holding lottery based social (deliberative?) events would have merit if it improved the deliberative skills of the public.

    Exactly. We “the public” do not yet possess the “deliberative skills” that would justify our opinions being part of the discussion. We need you, deliberative experts, to teach us how to have a conversation.

    How dare we, little loutish ignoramuses, call you elitists?

    > Despite your labeling of deliberative guidelines as banal, I think, if adhered to, they would be socially transformative.

    Interestingly, it seems that in fact you are quite disturbed by the discussion here, which does follow the liberal rules.

    > Far from not being controversial, I know very few places where they are agreed to.

    In fact, these rules are not uncommon – they are generally accepted in small groups of peers. They are uncommon in large groups (where all-to-all communication is impossible), and in situations where some sort of asymmetry is accepted a-priori (for better of for worse, usually for worse).

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  77. Exactly. We “the public” do not yet possess the “deliberative skills” that would justify our opinions being part of the discussion. We need you, deliberative experts, to teach us how to have a conversation.

    I think everyone could improve their communication skills, myself included. Also, I do not consider myself a deliberative expert. Also, no deliberative theorist I’ve ever come across believes one has to possess deliberative skills to be part of the discussion, quite the opposite. Where did you ever get that idea? Again, see Dennett, try to make a best case argument for the opponent, don’t serve up straw men.

    A tentative hypothesis I have on why social media produces such contentious discussions is the lack of investment any individual has in the group.

    How dare we, little loutish ignoramuses, call you elitists?

    I don’t think name calling is informative and so not helpful to a discussion. It’s also self-defeating as unlikely to promote cooperative understanding from its target. But this is an all too common tactic on SM.

    In fact, these rules are not uncommon – they are generally accepted in small groups of peers.

    I’ve only seen them accepted in one small group (although in different language) I’ve been in. Most commonly they are not even brought up. The only time I saw them brought up someone objected to rule 2)b. Not sure how you have arrived at your conclusion that they are generally accepted.

    They are uncommon in large groups (where all-to-all communication is impossible)…

    What is your definition of a large group? Again, see planning cells. BTW, I am not a planning cell advocate, at least not as yet, I just think it is an interesting idea.

    …and in situations where some sort of asymmetry is accepted a-priori (for better of for worse, usually for worse).

    Bingo! Places like work, school, religious communities, hierarchically-structured non profits and any other such structured group – which is the vast majority. Now is where the transformative aspect of this simple moral rule of communicative inclusiveness becomes apparent, because most of our institutions violate it.

    Interestingly, it seems that in fact you are quite disturbed by the discussion here, which does follow the liberal rules.

    Yes, I had too high expectations. In any case, Habermas criteria for ethical discourse (what you misappropriately label “liberal rules”), are considered necessary, not sufficient. Moreover, only the first two rules are followed here, I don’t believe the third is.

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  78. Oh, BTW, I’ve been meaning to ask you, what is your vision for a sortition body? Do you not want it to be deliberative? Are you also against expert information being made available or only against a separate body selecting those experts?

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  79. I found the table of Bohmian dialogue I was looking for. While I don’t think much of the study, and English not being their native language makes reading difficult, I did like the table.

    https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375614257_Online_Deliberation_on_Social_Media_Dialogue_or_Discussion

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  80. >> How dare we, little loutish ignoramuses, call you elitists?

    > I don’t think name calling is informative and so not helpful to a discussion.

    “Elitist” is a term with a substantive meaning that I wish to refer to. At your request, I even defined the term. Using it when it is appropriate for an argument being made is certainly helpful for the discussion. Avoiding it in a situation where it is appropriate would be detrimental to the discussion. (Yes, I agree that the term describes a morally reprehensible attitude, but I am using it to describe a state of affairs, not as an insult.)

    > Moreover, only the first two rules are followed here, I don’t believe the third is.

    Are you implying that on this blog people are somehow “prevented, by internal or external coercion, from taking part in the discourse, or from posing any question or any assertion whatever”? How so?

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  81. > what is your vision for a sortition body? Do you not want it to be deliberative? Are you also against expert information being made available or only against a separate body selecting those experts?

    As a starting point we could simply have a body that is very much like existing parliaments, but allotted. Such a body would be empowered to redesign the system on an ongoing basis, so the system would evolve according to the understanding of the allotted themselves. Such evolution could lead to having multiple allotted bodies, including for example one which is specifically tasked with recruiting experts for advisory positions. (Or not. Any pretension to setting a-priori detailed designs, or claims to knowing what the best designs would be, should be rejected.)

    The crucial thing is for the allotted body (or set of bodies) to be self-determining – they should determine their agendas, their sources of information, their procedures etc. (Much like parliaments do today.) If they draw on information provided by experts (as presumably they would, just as parliaments today do), it should be for the allotted to decide who those experts would be and how the information they provide would be used.

    Regarding the body being “deliberative”: Of course the allotted would talk to each other, of course they should treat each other as equals, of course they should all participate in the discussions and be allowed to make any point they wish. Presumably they would be motivated to cooperate and would have the resources to do so productively. So, yes, by all means, it should be a “deliberative” body if that is what you call this situation. I would call this an internally democratic body. (I take it for granted that this is the goal. The details for how to achieve this most effectively would be for the allotted themselves to set up.)

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  82. Lance,

    I’d like to add that am delighted (and relieved) that our exchange has taken a turn for the better and express my sincere hope that we would have productive, pleasant exchanges from now on (even when, and maybe especially when, we disagree).

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  83. Yorum,

    I will answer some of the questions you have raised when I find more time. First, one more definitional request. The word “liberal” has many interpretations. How are you using it?

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  84. Buckle up, kids! It’s that moment you’ve all been waiting for…don’t even try to deny it! It’s Sortitia’s Weekly Round-Up :-)

    “So, yes, by all means, it should be a “deliberative” body if that is what you call this situation. I would call this an internally democratic body.” Well, well. As conversations go, do you know what I call it? Progress :-) Alrighty then: moving forward!

    Keith, I am currently rather tickled and intrigued by the nifty little proposal you and Kovner* have put forth:

    “We call this the ‘superminority’ method; it simply involves lowering the threshold of acceptance to get more than one output. Want two outputs? Set the threshold at 1⁄3+1. Want three outputs? Set it at ¼+1. Want 99 outputs? Set is at one-hundredth + 1. We call these a superminority of n; i.e. a superminority of 2, 3, and 99 in these examples. (We anticipate that the number of political parties will closely approximate the output rule.) Notice that a majority becomes a superminority of one, indicating its monolithic and destructive nature. The superminority method must always be paired with a downstream decision making process, such as a citizens’ jury” […] “the consensus-based approach favours those who act in bad faith, by allowing them to shut down the process while blaming their adversaries. The superminority method eliminates this tactic. Once an agenda item is adopted, multiple options will be produced, those options will be advanced to a jury, and a winner will be chosen. There is no obstruction.”

    For Yoram and Lance and Terry (or anyone else who is still reading this thread) what do we all think of this super-minority suggestion? I would be happy/happier with any of the systems which have been described throughout this thread and see all of them as being significant improvements over the current oligarchic regimes.

    There will never be a perfect system, but what’s that old saying? Something about not letting the perfect become the enemy of the good? I think all of these systems have the potential for great good. My concern has always been: which version will be the most open to corruption, the most susceptible to tampering and/or influence? (And how do we insure the authenticity of the lottery selections themselves, though that’s probably a topic for a whole other thread…)

    Keith, I have not yet read the longer version of your article, just the three-page synopsis. But it’s compelling and fresh :-) This particular discussion would be an interesting test-run for your idea; perhaps it might even result in three super-minority outputs for different versions of a sorting system: one preferring Yoram’s; one in favor of Terry’s; and (what the hell, we’re having fun) one that leans in the direction of Sortitia’s No-Candidates Party.

    Yoram: if such a conversation were to take place at a national level and if Terry’s idea (for instance) ultimately won out over yours or (goddess forbid) mine…would you still consider it to be a victory for progress? A step in the right direction? Realistically: I suspect that different states and cities would be open to trying out different versions and seeing what works best or better for them or perhaps more importantly: what doesn’t and why.

    Yoram: “I would emphasize that any body that does not reach a close-to-100% acceptance rate for proposed seats is a-priori unrepresentative and thus cannot be said to be democratic.” But how realistic is it to expect such a high rate? Given how splintered the world appears to be at the moment…reaching near-100% consensus on anything seems like it would be extraordinarily challenging, if not downright impossible. Though I would love to be proven wrong on this point :-)

    Sir Lance: “A good facilitator in a deliberative discussion would prevent group-think due to this simply by asking for someone to speak who has a different view after hearing two similar opinions.” Yes! Dedication (above and beyond) to giving voice to as many ideas and perspectives as possible on any given spectrum for the topic at hand. Criticize, but do so constructively.

    And if there are no dissenting voices or opposing opinions? Then let the record state it, loud and suspiciously clear…ring a bell or have confetti drop from the ceiling. Mark it as a queer (ahem) occurrence, an outlandish occasion of highly improbable proportions. Or hire someone in a furry costume to come in and read off an obligatory list of opposing alternatives, just for flavor and context, thus proving the moderator’s commitment to insuring a space which is fair and balanced and nuanced.

    Sir Lance: “I thought, perhaps, the non deliberators could listen in on the deliberation, but then, of course, they would be subject to the same group-think forces” I am reminded of Iceland’s national assembly, when they were trying to construct a new constitution. The assemblies were not live-streamed but transcripts were made available to the public after each session, in order for non-selected citizens to review the proceedings and submit questions/feedback before the next scheduled meeting of the assembly. This struck me as a rather interesting idea; an additional layer of oversight and perspective and engagement.

    I am also reminded of The Advocates, that show which was on back in the late sixties and early seventies. One topic a week (ripped from the headlines!) with two lawyers [read: advocates] presenting each side of the argument and calling witnesses [read: experts in the field] to testify. They polled the audience before and after the show, and also asked the viewers at home to mail in their results. I always thought there should have been one additional segment of the show which allowed some of the audience members to ask questions.

    “Robert Dahl” At a quick glance, I thought this said “Roald Dahl” and I thought: “Oh my! This conversation is about to take a rather colorful and unexpected turn!” Sigh!

    Yoram: “Elitism usually takes the form of justifying (or accepting as justified) the already existing oligarchical structure of society” I was a bit taken aback when (in that clip you linked to) Malice described social contract theory as “rape culture” (yikes!) but that’s why I appreciate him…he’s willing to go to places I had not considered or would not always feel comfortable giving voice to. Even when I disagree. I still vote for a podcast with the two of you, or perhaps a debate between you and Keith (or you and Terry) but moderated by Malice :-)

    Keith: “So the all-powerful groups selected by Gattian sortition are aleatory elites.” Oh no she didn’t! [insert googly-eyed emoji here]

    Lance: “The monk responds that even though a child knows it, an eighty year old man has trouble practicing it.” Thank you for this. Why are the simplest truths the most difficult to lose sight of? Also: I printed out that piece you suggested on Habermas by Langwallner and hope to read it over the long weekend.

    Lance: “Perhaps, though the current crop of representatives does not fulfill Madison’s hype of electing the most wise and patriotic.” Understatement of the year :-(

    Signing Off for Now :: Sortitia’s Vivifying (Re-Animatronic) Menagerie and Medicine Show

    *Upon reading the name “Kovner”, my brain immediately heard it as such, with a full-blown Monthy Python accent: “Ello, kov’ner!”

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  85. I guess that by elitism I mean the notion that the ideas of some small group of people should count for more than of all the rest. Often this implies a gradation of “merit” with some very small group at the top and the masses at the bottom, rather than a binary split.

    Glad I asked. That is not disparaging. By that definition I would be an elitist. If my car is not working properly I’d ask an auto mechanic for advice, not my dentist, nor many other people.

    I thought you were referring to a ruling elite, and that elites believe that some small group should rule, i.e. make decisions that others must follow due to their superior expertise or status (by birthright or earned).

    Elitism usually takes the form of justifying (or accepting as justified) the already existing oligarchical structure of society, although it could take the form of Plato railing against the democratic aspects of the society he lived in, or the advocacy of the replacement of one oligarchy with another.

    By that definition I don’t think anyone on this board would be considered an elitist, nor any of their proposals, as far as I’ve seen.

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  86. Looks as if I was typing as you were commenting, Sortitia C&C-FC +. If not my comment would probably have been different. For now I just want to say how much I appreciate your comments. I love the light, humorous touch you bring. Believe it or not, in the non-cyber, but-still-simulated world I am most noted for my sense of humor. I will remind myself that what we are doing is too important to take seriously.

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  87. > liberal

    Yes, this is used in different ways. I use this rather broadly as the enlightenment/bourgeois ideology that was expounded by the US and French revolutionary leaders. As I see it this is an ideology that considers itself as liberating humanity from the oppression of aristocracy and its rules of tradition and privilege, and putting in charge instead the natural aristocracy of merit and the rules of reason and natural rights.

    (The liberal-vs.-republican distinction that is often made within this enlightenment/bourgeois ideology seems to me to be rather inconsequential. I don’t see much practical difference between those two.)

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  88. > By that definition I would be an elitist. If my car is not working properly I’d ask an auto mechanic for advice, not my dentist, nor many other people.

    As you are probably aware, your mechanic example is a very close paraphrase of Socrates’s argument against sortition (who talked about the fact that no one would use sortition to select a ship’s pilot and a flutist). But the fallacy of this argument is that the terms “mechanic”, “ship’s pilot” and “flutist” all assume that the authority or competence of the expert is universally recognized. If that is indeed the case, then there is no need to have the opinions of those experts “count for more”, since everybody would follow their advice in any case. It is only when the competence of the supposed experts is disputed, and there are those who would not follow their advice, that the question of whether the experts have a privileged position is of interest. The question is whether the opinions of the experts (or any other group of supposed merit) should count more than of those who oppose them.

    Note that this is not just a question of counting more at the final decision making stage (vote counting). It is also the question of whether the opinions of those of supposed merit should get a privileged position during the lead-up to the decision making stage, during deliberation and agenda-setting. In our society, and indeed in any society where sortition does not play a decisive role in politics, some sort of disproportional influence of an elite during those early stages is inevitable.

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  89. Sortitia’s,

    > what do we all think of this super-minority suggestion?

    I really have no idea what is the attraction of this system. To me this is just another elite-dominated system (with a marketing-oriented name). Other than out of abhorrence of democracy, why do we need elections as part of our political system? What do we expect the elected to do better than the allotted? It is inherent in elections that they select into power people who are unlike the population. (This is Bernard Manin’s principle of distinction.) Why do we want such people to have power over us? Don’t we all know that they would tend to promote their own ideas and interests rather than of those of the population?

    > But how realistic is it to expect such a high rate?

    This is something to check empirically rather than give up on in advance.

    I don’t see why anyone would turn down a 4 year position which pays very well, has high status, is very interesting, and has very high impact on the society in which one lives. Naturally, there would also be assistance with relocation and integration back into society after service is over, as well as accommodation of any personal legitimate constraints.

    One relevant piece of evidence is that “citizen assemblies” are reputed to have less than 5% acceptance rates. Yet, the French Climate Convention reportedly had 33% acceptance rate. This shows (as could be expected) that as the prominence of the allotted body increases, acceptance rates rise dramatically.

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  90. Yorum,

    Thank you for the detailed explanation. Unfortunately, I am now more confused. Perhaps it’s best to leave elite undefined for my purpose. I’m still taking my car, and the advice, of a mechanic rather than that of a dentist, even if an allotted body of 1000 advised I take it to the dentist.

    Maybe I should just ask if “elitist”, “elite,” or “elitism” are positive or negative descriptions. It seems you look upon them with disfavor, but your latest explanation makes it sound to me like they would be the rational choice for deciding complex questions.

    Maybe there is a conflation of two meanings of the word “elite.” One has to do with skill and expertise, elite 1 the other with decision-making power obtained legitimately or otherwise, elite 2. In the last possession of basketball game, l’m fine with giving the ball to an elite (elite 1) athlete like LeBron James, rather than the rookie at the bottom of the rotation. I’m even in favor of a meritocracy where he should have more say on the court than the rookie (elite 2).

     I think the problem with Plato’s argument is not that he begs the question by using the terms “mechanic”, “ship’s pilot” and “flutist”, but that there is no such thing as an expert when it comes to governance. There are people who have expertise in technical matters, but no one can be relied upon to determine what is best for a large population of diverse citizens. The only expert on what is best for you is you, and you are the best representative of yourself. This, of course, lies at the heart of the problem of representative democracy.

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  91. Sortitia,

    Let me take this opportunity to answer your question in regards to Keith’s proposal and to announce a rare agreement with Yoram! Actually, I believe we are in fundamental agreement on most matters as all of us here are. My disagreements with Yoram are mostly definitional and stylistic.

    In any case for elections has not yet been established to me. The arguments for them, that I have seen, are mostly based on personal opinion, or some quoted opinions of other’s beliefs, of what public opinion is, viz, that voting is believed by the public to be some sort of sacred, natural right. I have yet to see any data produced for this belief, perhaps there is some out there, but to be meaningful the question of no voting would need to be contrasted with a viable alternative such as sortition. The first article I ever saw on sortition quoted a poll, I believe it was by Pew, that asked the question whether better members of congress than we have now could be obtained by just picking people at random. The result was a whopping 65% for random selection.

    Still, I am not so much opposed to the super-minority idea as I don’t know enough about it, having only read the same short piece as you. How would the agenda setters be elected? Who determines the number of proposals required? I assume the allotted would determine that. If the agenda setters we’re elected by the same process we have now, with two dominant parties, I’d worry about the number of proposal required being satisfied by numerous, only slightly different proposals being submitted, not unlikely in the case of foreign policy. I realize that would be a blatant disregard for the spirit of the process, but blatant disregard seems to be the Zeitgeist of politicians today.

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  92. oops, that post was from me, forgot to sign name

    Lance

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  93. > I’m still taking my car, and the advice, of a mechanic rather than that of a dentist, even if an allotted body of 1000 advised I take it to the dentist.

    That’s fine as long as its your car. But the question is what if the car is shared equally among a group of people, a majority of whom truly believes that the car should be taken to the dentist. Should your “correct” opinion overrule the “wrong” opinion of the others? Should the decision-making mechanism be set up so that the opinions of some “more meritorious” people (those who are smart enough to go to the mechanic) count for more than those of others (those simpletons who would like to take the car to the dentist)? An elitist would say yes, a democrat would say no. (Yes, elitism is bad, I am a democrat.)

    And, no, this is not about car-vs.-politics. Disputed decisions can arise in any context, and claims to expertise can be made, and accepted or rejected for any issue.

    > The only expert on what is best for you is you

    Exactly. The notion that one is the best judge of one’s interests is a fundamental assumption of democratic ideology. But this is true for what to do with your broken down car as much as it is for the politics of a state. If you choose to go with your car to a supposed expert (“mechanic”), that’s great, but that’s up to you, not up to the expert. You may distrust a particular mechanic, or all mechanics, or simply decide that it is time to sell your car for scrap and use public transportation, or even that you want your dentist to attend to your car. No one imagines that the decision what to do with your car would be up to the mechanic. The mechanic has no decision making power.

    (Of course, saying that one is the best judge of one’s interests does not imply that one cannot make mistaken decisions (“wrong” in the narrow sense that these are mistakes that one comes to regret later). It only means that we expect that on average one is happier with one’s own decisions than with decisions being imposed by others, against one’s will.)

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  94. So I will attempt to distill what I think is a suitable definition of elitism.

    The belief that:

    1. A small group can legitimately make decisions for the whole.
    2. The small group bases their legitimacy on the possession of certain internal attributes (wealth, power, connections, intelligence, knowledge, etc.) not present in the ruled.
    3. The ruled should accept the rulers legitimacy based on those attributes they possess that the ruled do not possess.

    Number 3 is necessary to answer Keith’s objection. I suppose one could quibble about what an “internal” attribute is, but being allotted or even fairly elected (even more quibble room) wouldn’t be an internal attribute.

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  95. Lance,

    > internal

    Well, if being elected is considered a “non-internal” attribute, then how about being selected by God?

    No, the situation is simpler. Elitism is the notion that the group (or the person) has the right to impose their ideas even against the wishes of the population. Thus, the rule of a group (or even a single person) is non-elitist (i.e., is a democracy) if and only if they are believed by the population at large to be promoting the population’s interests and values (so the ideas of the rulers are not imposed but willingly accepted).

    Therefore, the method of selection of a body is not democratic or non-democratic by definition but only by its presumed or de-facto effects. The reason that elections are supposedly democratic is because supposedly they create a government that promotes the interests and values of the population. Since it turns out that it does not (as both theoretical analysis and empirical observations show), then it is not democratic. Analysis shows that sortition can be expected to generate democratic rule (if done properly, surely not every mechanism involving allotment would do), which is why democrats should promote this idea. But if it turns out that sortition does not result in democracy (for reasons we cannot foresee at this point), then it should not be used and different device should be sought. (Unfortunately I am not aware of any different promising devices, but who knows, maybe someone will think of something.)

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  96. Yoram,

    I thought you might get hung up on the word “internal.” I’m only trying to use it to distinguish character traits that a person possesses as oppossed to one’s bestowed upon them by the populace. I prefer to leave metaphysics out of the picture, but selected by God would be a belief by the public that the person has a character trait not bestowed by the populace that allows them to rule. That would be internal. “Intrinsic” could also be used. I’m not trying to write a philosophical paper here, just get a rough and ready definition we could agree on. Of course, I realize that may not be possible.

    Your new definition of elitism is too rambling and too contingent on results to be very useful. An allotted body would be elitist if it produced a result that the populace did agree with. An authoritarian, or military junta that seized power violently, without popular support, but then produced policy the populace agreed with would not be elitist. That is so far from the plain English understanding of the word that I’m afraid we will not be able to agree on a definition, and so have to let it remain undefined.

    Perhaps you could provide a three point definition, or something similarly succinct. Otherwise, we can leave it as an undefined term and when you use it, I will just make a mental note that it isn’t how I use it, and is a very complicated word that I don’t really understand, but it’s still a bad thing. That will be good enough, I suppose, for my purposes.

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  97. >> Your new definition of elitism is too rambling

    I don’t see how my definition is either new or rambling.

    Above I wrote that elitism is thinking that

    the ideas of some small group of people should count for more than of all the rest.

    I now wrote that elitism is thinking that

    a group has the right to impose their ideas even against the wishes of the population.

    This is simply clarifying what “count for more” means, since there seemed to be some confusion around this.

    > I’m only trying to use it [the notion of “internal” or “intrinsic”] to distinguish character traits that a person possesses as oppossed to one’s bestowed upon them by the populace.

    This distinction seems irrelevant and suspiciously suited for classifying elected government as non-elitist. But what about wealth? or nobility? Aren’t these “bestowed upon [the rich or the noble] by the populace”? (In any case, it seems to me that how the privileged group is defined is immaterial – thinking that a group should have the power to impose their opinions on the others is elitism regardless.)

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  98. (In any case, it seems to me that how the privileged group is defined is immaterial – thinking that a group should have the power to impose their opinions on the others is elitism regardless.)

    So the members of an allotted decision-making body would be ruling elites, and anyone supporting them would be elitists.

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  99. > So the members of an allotted decision-making body would be ruling elites, and anyone supporting them would be elitists.

    Only if they think that the allotted should be able to impose their opinions on the population against the population’s wishes.

    But the whole point of sortition is to set up a body whose opinions are aligned with those of the population, so that the decisions of the allotted body are willingly accepted by the population rather than imposed on it.

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  100. I’ve asked Alex to respond directly on the Superminority-related comments.

    >the whole point of sortition is to set up a body whose opinions are aligned with those of the population, so that the decisions of the allotted body are willingly accepted by the population rather than imposed on it.

    Yes that’s true, but extremely difficult to operationalise, in any non-tautological sense. The failure of the Irish constitution referendum should set alarm bells ringing.

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  101. Sortitia’s calamitous…: “My concern has always been: which version will be the most open to corruption,”

    The point of superminority is to make all decisions through citizen juries, which Keith and I believe is the most incorruptible institution possible. The question, then, is how do we get multiple options to the citizen jury for each agenda item? Superminority is our answer. It uses legislatures as they exist right now, forcing legislatures to compete to produce better legislation rather than obstructing. Most reform fails by never even getting a vote; in superminority, the agenda is carried forward inevitably.

    There is a lot of chatter on this blog about the fact that superminority uses election for the proposing body. But this is really just repurposing existing institutions. There’s really no way around this. Unless you’re going to overthrow the government by force, you’re going to have to work with existing institutions. Even the French Revolution built on the Estates General.

    By lowering the threshold, proposals that don’t see the light of day for decades will regularly go before citizen juries. Jury participation is also broader than participation in noisy assemblies; many people are able and willing to serve on a jury who would be scared off by the performative nature of noisy assemblies. There’s lots of talk about eliminating the “principle of distinction”. But self-selection also creates a principle of distinction, as people who are bolder and louder volunteer at much higher rates.

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  102. > So the members of an allotted decision-making body would be ruling elites, and anyone supporting them would be elitists.

    Only if they think that the allotted should be able to impose their opinions on the population against the population’s wishes.

    Which of course they would, since they have been empowered to do so. Certainly, not everyone, in the population is going to agree with a policy and so will have it imposed upon them.

    But the whole point of sortition is to set up a body whose opinions are aligned with those of the population, so that the decisions of the allotted body are willingly accepted by the population rather than imposed on it.

    I’m assuming when you say “aligned with those of the population” you mean the majority of the population, as 100% agreement/alignment is unrealistic.

    But if your aim is agreement with the majority of the population, why bother with a legislature — no mater how it’s chosen — at all? Why not just poll the population and determine policy from the results?

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  103. Alex and Keith,

    By lowering the threshold, proposals that don’t see the light of day for decades will regularly go before citizen juries.

    I think this would work well for many proposals, taxes, abortion, environmental issues, etc. Where I don’t see it working is in foreign policy, where there is near universal lockstep collusion by both parties. I could see three proposals, for example, being offered to fund Israel, each within one billion of the other, but no proposal to stop the funding entirely as long as the war on Gaza continues. Thoughts?

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  104. Also,

    There is a lot of chatter on this blog about the fact that superminority uses election for the proposing body. But this is really just repurposing existing institutions. There’s really no way around this. Unless you’re going to overthrow the government by force, you’re going to have to work with existing institutions. Even the French Revolution built on the Estates General.

    It seems to me that if you can get agreement on an allotted decision-making body without a revolution, then an allotted agenda-setting body would be a much easier reform. The current senate and house would probably want those roles reversed, but, of course, would oppose either.

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  105. […] My comments on the discussion at Deliberation and Structure. […]

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  106. Lance: “I think this would work well for many proposals, taxes, abortion, environmental issues, etc. Where I don’t see it working is in foreign policy,…”

    First of all, we expect there would be more political parties under our system. The two political parties are an artifact of winner-take-all control of the legislature. If we use 5 options per bill, the threshold becomes 17%. There’s no reason for parties to get much larger than that. Both parties contain factions that would love to split off the main party, but doing so would be suicidal in the current system. The left of the Democratic party (the squad and others) could probably find enough support to get to that threshold, IMHO. Keep in mind that some people vote to support Israel to go along with the party, because they know there is no point in taking a symbolic protest vote against their own leadership.

    But even if Superminority only works for domestic issues, it’s still a big advance. There is also the related issue of proportional representation, which for whatever reason is toxic in the U.S. Superminority with proportional representation would likely do better.

    “It seems to me that if you can get agreement on an allotted decision-making body without a revolution, then an allotted agenda-setting body would be a much easier reform. The current senate and house would probably want those roles reversed, but, of course, would oppose either.”

    Good point. Real reform is always path dependent. My point is, start with adding a citizen jury and Superminority. At that point, the proposing and agenda-setting body is much easier to change due to the much lower threshold.

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  107. Lance:> “It seems to me that if you can get agreement on an allotted decision-making body without a revolution, then an allotted agenda-setting body would be a much easier reform.

    The problem is ensuring that the agenda accurately reflects the beliefs and preferences of the target population. This is comparatively easy for allotted decision bodies, as all up/down votes carry the same weight. This is not the case with speech acts (notwithstanding the sterling efforts of deliberative democrats), as some animals are more equal than others, for a host of psychological and sociological reasons.

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  108. Lance,

    > Which of course they would, since they have been empowered to do so.

    This is like saying that a car mechanic must think that she is empowered to impose her views of what to do with their client’s car, against the client’s wishes.

    No, decision makers in a democratic society are empowered to design and implement policy that promotes the values and interests of the population, not to impose on it policy that it opposes.

    > I’m assuming when you say “aligned with those of the population” you mean the majority of the population, as 100% agreement/alignment is unrealistic.

    So far we have been talking very roughly as if the population either “approves” or “disapproves” of the way things are managed. Of course, in reality, this is a matter of degree. The higher the percentage of the population that supports the policy pursued by the rulers, and the more committed that support is, the more democratic the system is.

    And, yes, I presume that having a majority that supports the way things are being managed is a minimum requirement for a system to be considered democratic. A situation like we have in the West where majorities regularly disapprove of how things are managed.

    > But if your aim is agreement with the majority of the population, why bother with a legislature — no mater how it’s chosen — at all? Why not just poll the population and determine policy from the results?

    Of course, this idea of government by plebiscite is sometimes floated as a democratic ideal. People often bring up Switzerland as a place where this works, and others envision a system where technology is used to allow people to participate on a day-to-day basis by voting from home for or against proposals every evening.

    This however ignores two factors – availability of epistemic resources and agenda setting. For the first, clearly no one can achieve an informed and considered understanding of the myriad of problems associated with public policy on their own and in their spare time. So asking people to vote on a large number of proposals is a sham, not democracy.

    But even more fundamental is the question of agenda setting. If you are going to “poll the population”, you would have to formulate the poll questions. Where would these come from? Once the questions have been formulated, the agenda has been set and much of the decision making has been done. It is agenda setting, rather than final up-or-down voting, that is the indispensable function of the allotted body. It is only in a non-mass body, where all-to-all communication (“deliberation”) can be done, that agenda setting can take place on an egalitarian basis. (In Athens, for example, the allotted council would formulate proposals and these would get voted on by the assembly, which was supposed to encompass [at least symbolically] the entire population.)

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  109. Yoram>: It is only in a non-mass body, where all-to-all communication (“deliberation”) can be done, that agenda setting can take place on an egalitarian basis.

    That presupposes that a) the allotted body is truly representative (in the non-axiomatic sense) and b) that deliberation does not breach egalitarian norms.

    >In Athens, for example, the allotted council would formulate proposals and these would get voted on by the assembly.

    The Athenian council was an administrative body. It’s hard to imagine how deliberation (in the Habermasian sense) is possible between 500 people.

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  110. Alex,

    I don’t understand why 5 options would not have a threshold of 20%, but that’s a minor point, I get the idea. So what your saying is requiring multiple proposals will naturally splinter the cohesion of the two parties and result in a multi-party system? Failing that, there will always be some rebels within each party to produce enough support for alternative proposals. I agree for most domestic issues that is true, and it would be a big advance.

    This would require a constitutional amendment, no? Do you see citizen assemblies as a stepping stone to garner support for a allotted legislature, or as being harmful to that result? If the latter, what do you see as the being the most effective way forward?

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  111. Lance,

    In the UK we don’t have a constitution to amend and the majoritarian decision rule is a procedural matter. Superminority, per se, only requires a change in the proposal threshold. The allotted decision chamber is another matter, but there have been a number of proposals published to turn the House of Lords into a House of Lots. All we are proposing is an update of the existing bicameral principle.

    Alex and I are deeply concerned that the (statistically unrepresentative) citizens’ assemblies that are currently on offer will discredit the sortition movement. And the “end of politicians” rhetoric that dominates this forum is equally unhelpful.

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  112. Lance: “This would require a constitutional amendment, no?”

    The U.S. is an unlikely place to adopt Superminority. It’s an unlikely place to adopt any major political innovation, due to its ludicrously high threshold for constitutional amendment and near religious reverence for the Constitution. I think a more likely candidate would be a parliamentary system that finds itself perpetually unable to make decisions due to party fragmentation. Ironically, Israel is a pretty good candidate on those grounds, but it is also a national security state, which rules it out.

    Lance: “Do you see citizen assemblies as a stepping stone to garner support for a allotted legislature…”

    The main thing for me is getting a citizen jury to make political decisions from a menu of options that reflects the political spectrum of the country. Separating proposing and deciding is essential to that; I don’t think you can have the same body come up with proposals and go to final passage. The effects of ego and unrepresentative social dynamics are too great.

    Ultimately, I consider the citizen jury to be the allotted legislature. Under Superminority, the proposing body becomes subservient to the jury, because they want to win. If you’re a member of the proposing body, you spend 90% of your time just trying to figure out what the jury will support, and maybe 10% trying to insert your own agenda. Even the 10% isn’t wasted, however: it is what ensures that the jury gets real choices, not just five nearly identical options.

    Lance: “I don’t understand why 5 options would not have a threshold of 20%,…”

    The denominator is always one greater than the number of options. Want one option? use ½+1 or 50%+1. Two options? ⅓+1 or 33⅓%+1. For five options, this gives ⅙+1 or 16⅔%+1.

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  113. Alex:> Ultimately, I consider the citizen jury to be the allotted legislature. Under Superminority, the proposing body becomes subservient to the jury, because they want to win. If you’re a member of the proposing body, you spend 90% of your time just trying to figure out what the jury will support, and maybe 10% trying to insert your own agenda.

    The proto-cyberneticist James Harrington illustrated the relationship between the proposing and deciding chamber with the following parable:

    “Two [girls] have a cake yet undivided which was given between them that each of them therefore may have that which is due. ‘Divide,’ says one to the other, ‘and I will choose, or let me divide, and you shall choose.’ If this be but once agreed upon, it is enough, for the divider dividing unequally loses in regard that the other takes the better half. Wherefore, she divides equally and so both have right.”

    —James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, 1656

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  114. This is like saying that a car mechanic must think that she is empowered to impose her views of what to do with their client’s car, against the client’s wishes.

    No mechanic thinks that.

    No, decision makers in a democratic society are empowered to design and implement policy that promotes the values and interests of the population, not to impose on it policy that it opposes.

    They make laws, and yes, those laws are imposed upon the population. Just try not paying your taxes because you don’t believe in the increase that the legislature passed. Any legislator knows full well that laws they pass have the force of the state backing them up, unlike a mechanic, who can only make recommendations. But you know all this. It’s hard for me to believe this is a sincere argument.

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  115. Alex,

    The U.S. is an unlikely place to adopt Superminority. It’s an unlikely place to adopt any major political innovation, due to its ludicrously high threshold for constitutional amendment and near religious reverence for the Constitution.

    Well said! I envy you blokes across the pond. I also deplore the nonprofit organizations I’ve been in that require super majorities to change bylaws. The framers have bound us in chains and shackles.

    Keith,

    In the UK we don’t have a constitution to amend and the majoritarian decision rule is a procedural matter. Superminority, per se, only requires a change in the proposal threshold. The allotted decision chamber is another matter, but there have been a number of proposals published to turn the House of Lords into a House of Lots. All we are proposing is an update of the existing bicameral principle.

    It does look as if you are being provided a golden opportunity in the UK to introduce sortition, and your system does have the advantage of being somewhat familiar to the populace. Good luck to both of you, and the people of of the UK!

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  116. Lance:

    To clarify, I live in Indiana, and have never lived outside the U.S. I was lamenting the sorry state of my own government.

    Cheers, and thanks for a nice exchange.

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  117. Lance,

    > No mechanic thinks that.

    Indeed. That’s my point.

    > Just try not paying your taxes because you don’t believe in the increase that the legislature passed

    What I personally believe does not count for much in a community of millions. But a tax that is considered unfair or unjustified by the population, is a different matter. A situation in which such a tax is imposed on the population happens regularly in our societies, which is no more than an indication that our societies are not democratic. But if the ideas of a decision making group reflect those of the population, as can be expected to happen with an allotted chamber, then the decision makers would design the taxation system to meet with public approval.

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  118. >thanks for a nice exchange.

    Ditto

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  119. Alex and Keith,

    You are welcome. I appreciate being able to exchange ideas without it being combative.

    I hope the UK can set an example for other nations to follow. Not the US of course, we never need look beyond our shores, no matter what improvements are occurring elsewhere.

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  120. Yoram,

    < no mechanic thinks that

    Indeed, that’s my point.

    I understood your point, you did not understand mine. The point I was making was that your argument is disingenuous. This time I will copy and paste Dennett’s guidelines for criticism:

    1.      You should attempt to re-express your target’s position so clearly, vividly, and fairly that your target says, “Thanks, I wish I’d thought of putting it that way.

    2.      You should list any points of agreement (especially if they are not matters of general or widespread agreement).

    3.      You should mention anything you have learned from your target.

    4.      Only then are you permitted to say so much as a word of rebuttal or criticism.

    If you would follow these guidelines, it would save much time.

     You could have thought, “Obviously no mechanic thinks that, so that must not be what he means,” and then formulated a strong case for what I might be saying. Try it!

     Which finally brings me to the point where I can explain why I think the debates in the comments here do not fulfill the 3rd rule for an ethical discourse. Remember, basically, it is that no one should be prevented from expressing their view by means of internal or external coercion. I believe there is internal coercion, which takes place on nearly all unmoderated social media boards, so I am not singling this one out. When someone continues to make straw-men or disingenuous arguments (Habermas has a sincerity criteria mentioned in other descriptions of ethical discourse), the interlocutor eventually becomes exhausted in answering one such objection after another. Eventually they leave due to such behavior. It’s a form of coercion if they would like to participate but find it too exhausting or their time is limited and so they can’t. 

     You claimed that Habermas gives no method for arriving at his ethical discourse. He does, but it is not so concise as the 3 rules mentioned. I did give you David Bohm’s method and the Dennett guidelines. They both, if employed, would allow for more collaborative discourse. Your own formulation:

     (1) the participants arrive at the discussion with the good will and motivation of listening to the others and attempting to find common ground and mutually beneficial agreement to the extent possible,

     provides the intention but not the means, however it is still worth remembering and could result in someone making the effort to find the means.

    The other coercive language employed is the labeling and insults. They are mild forms of hate speech, not argumentative at all, not useful in promoting shared understanding, but only in shutting down and ostracizing one’s interlocutor. 

     You expressed uncertainty over the meaning of deliberation. I, and others, provided you with definitions, all of which you rejected. Mine was meant with derision and insults. Hardly the way to invite collaboration.

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  121. Lance:> the interlocutor eventually becomes exhausted in answering one such objection after another. Eventually they leave due to such behavior.

    Yes, I stuck it out for over ten years before throwing in the towel (Alex’s patience ran out much sooner). Regarding Dan Dennett’s guidelines for criticism, this was his verdict on a collection of essays that I co-edited in 2000 http://books.imprint.co.uk/book/?gcoi=71157103192430

    “This book is an unsurpassed paragon of open-mindedness, the proof of which is that it includes as its closing essay a trenchant review of itself.”

    This is why we are launching the Journal of Sortition https://www.imprint.co.uk/product/jos/ alongside Against Sortition? The Problem with Citizens’ Assemblies. http://books.imprint.co.uk/book/?gcoi=71157100175840

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  122. ”…an unsurpassed paragon of open-mindedness…” Would I love to get a review like that about anything I’d written or said, and by anyone, let alone Dennett.

    The free will problem came up in an online group I’m in several months ago. I tried to quash it to no avail. Mentioned the compatibilist view to the libertarian free will defender, but I’ve never understood it well enough to explain to anyone.

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  123. My favourite review was when another of our books was described as “A brainless slab of Leftist bigotry.” http://books.imprint.co.uk/book/?gcoi=71157108326430

    We’ve purloined Dan’s review to publicise our Sortition and Public Policy series:

    “In Freedom Evolves (2004), philosopher Daniel C. Dennett described a 1999 collection from Imprint Academic as ‘an unsurpassed paragon of open-mindedness, the proof of which is that it includes as it’s closing essay a trenchant review of itself, that incisively but fairly exposes all the major errors and many of the confusions in the essays that precede it.’ Imprint Academic’s collection Sortition and Public Policy continues this tradition of unfettered enquiry into what is becoming a key topic of public debate — the potential of random selection in politics and society.” http://books.imprint.co.uk/collection/?collection_id=3

    The trouble with trying to see both sides of an argument is that it can lead to accusations of disengenousness (especially on activist forums like this). People tend to be either for or against something, so another of our collections, Psi Wars, “fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots.” http://books.imprint.co.uk/book/?gcoi=71157107382730

    But Hume got there in the end, so hope springs eternal.

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  124. Lance,

    I think your latest response to me demonstrates extremely well the intellectual and moral failings of the Liberal-Habermassian position that you are staking. It therefore makes sense to leave things there.

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  125. People tend to be either for or against something

    Which reminds me of this passage at the end of Weil’s tract calling for the abolition of political parties:

    “Nearly everywhere — often even when dealing with purely technical problems — instead of thinking, one merely takes sides: for or against. Such a choice replaces the activity of the mind. This is an intellectual leprosy; it originated in the political world and then spread through the land, contaminating all forms of thinking. This leprosy is killing us; it is doubtful whether it can be cured without first starting with the abolition of all political parties.”

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  126. Lance,

    I’m more disposed to Rene Girard’s ethological perspective — all human conflict originates in acquisitive mimesis. Pace Weil, parties are an attempt to replace war-war with jaw-jaw, and it’s no coincidence that the two tribes in the House of Commons are separated by two swords’ lengths. Speaking as a poacher turned gamekeeper (my 2004 book The Party’s Over http://books.imprint.co.uk/book/?gcoi=71157102462780 should be consigned to the flames), the best we can hope for is to de-oligarchise the party system. Mercier and Landemore’ Argumentative Theory of Reasoning https://philpapers.org/rec/MERRIF is relevant, but Helene misunderstands the entailments for sortitioned democracy.

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  127. To expand on the latter, if reasoning involves two distinct cognitive modules and the first (persuasion) depends on confirmation bias, then it will obviously contaminate the second (judgment) module. If this is the case, then Habermasian deliberation cannot work, irrespective of the Herculean efforts of “impartial” facilitators (Jurgen himself acknowledges that “rational discourses have an improbable character and are like islands in the ocean of everyday practice.”)

    Much better to allocate the advocacy and judgment functions to separate bodies. Then (presupposing the Dahlian principle that the demos must have total control of the policy agenda), the task is to ensure that the parties (Madison’s term for policy advocates) better match the ideological spectrum of the electorate. The reason they don’t is the 51% policy threshold, not the Mosca/Pareto/Michels bogeyman (elitism).

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  128. Its getting close to a month since I posted to this thread… but I have now caught up. A few responses to various unrelated comments..

    On the Kovner-Sutherland hybrid system (elected parties propose and allotted jury decides). We agree that the body proposing/drafting/advocating laws should be distinct from the jury that adopts or rejects them. This is essential to avoid groupthink. Give and take deliberation among a diverse and representative sample taps the collective intelligence, while independent internal judging needs to happen by people independently to tap the wisdom of crowds. While their design is better than the status quo, maintaining elections with no plan for moving away from them is my problem with it. Giving elected politicians control over the agenda, likely perpetuates electoral tribalism forever. Also, as soon as some jury adopts some law that has bad unintended consequences (inevitable in any system), the politicians will opportunistically blame sortition and will propose eliminating the juries, with the next jury quite possibly concurring. I prefer a transition process based on peeling one policy domain at a time away from the politicians and vested full authority in a dual sortition process (proposing allotted body and separate deciding jury).

    On Yoram’s ideal model. On non-mandatory uptake of those allotted… Yoram says that “I don’t see why anyone would turn down a 4 year position which pays very well, has high status, is very interesting, and has very high impact on the society in which one lives.” II believe most people would be terrified, or avoid that sort of responsibility, not to mention that serving in a high pay, high status job would transform them into a group that is completely unlike the population. I agree that accurate representativeness for the deciding jury is essential, and so favor quasi-mandatory service like with existing court juries.

    Yoram’s idea that this body should have full power to make up the rules as they wish is very dangerous. All elected legislatures use some sort of committee process with a small subset (always unrepresentative) making proposals that the full body (or the party in the majority) adopts with little understanding. While Yoram allows that they MAY decide to dilute their own power by forming many large deliberative committees with additional people, I think this all power to the assembly design is a recipe for corruption. Should Yoram’s all-powerful body be allowed to increase their pay, increase their term of office? Should the majority faction in the body be allowed to limit expert witnesses to the one’s they favor? Should they be allowed to prohibit the minority groups from speaking? Clearly the majority of any body can’t be allowed to make up the rules that favor their power.

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