Books | Equality by lot

Make believe participation

Posted on April 28, 2024 by Yoram Gat

The French discussion of “participative democracy” has recently produced several texts expressing suspicion of the way “participative devices” are being used by government to produce supposedly democratic outcomes.

Guillaume Gourgues writes in la vie des idées:

By setting up citizen consultations that it selects and organizes itself, the State sidesteps democratic procedures and institutions. There is the risk of a gradual drift towards a form of “participatory authoritarianism”.

On March 22, 2023, as he began his speech in the face of protests over pension reform, Emmanuel Macron defended the legitimacy of his reform by affirming that it followed a “democratic path” which began with “months of consultation”.

The claim of having followed a “democratic path” by the President, punctuated by regular reminders of “consultation” and “participation” mechanisms, is perplexing, as the political conduct of pension reform is obviously marked by the choice to reduce democratic debate to its strict minimum.

[This choice is highlighted when,] in the shadow of the pension reform, the citizens’ convention on the end of life, convened by the government, delivered its final opinion on April 2, 2023, after three months of deliberation.

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Filed under: Academia, Books, Elections, Participation, Press, Sortition | 1 Comment »

Demiocracy, Chapter 19: Advantages of this army-of-Davids (multiple-Demi-legislature) arrangement

Posted on April 23, 2024 by Roger Knights

1. There would be less susceptibility to emotional proposals too motivated by fear or hope. Proxy electorates, which are specialized (expert on some topic), seasoned (from years of semi-monthly oversight sessions), and “select” (sifted upward through multiple ballotteries) at the state and national levels, would have more information, and would have acquired greater insight through discussion and debate. So they would more realistically assess what is possible (including adventurous proposals that just might work but affront conventional wisdom) and be less likely to divert down false trails and garden paths, and to ignore possible second-order effects. Their lesser credulity would insulate them from panics and propaganda. Their greater experience would simultaneously deliver aspiring politicians from the temptation to take advantage of their immaturity—of the virtual standing invitation that big-electorate, big-arena voters present to be played for Suckers. This inbuilt temptation of mass susceptibility eternally fuels the demonic dynamic—the co-dependent tragedy and farce—of DeMockery. (Its hidden “root,” to repeat, is its seemingly righteous, too-“wide,” electorate.)

2. Demiocracy’s decentralization would make a putsch more difficult, especially if it includes decentralization of the executive branch. (I.e., substantial independence of the executive departments from the chief executive, via PE-election of their heads.) Thus making tyranny less likely, a big concern of the Founders. Also insulating the government from a potty (barmy) POTUS. (“There is, of course, no such thing as a harmlessly mad emperor.” —Gore Vidal, Julian, Ch. 19.)

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Democracy an unknown system of government

Posted on April 16, 2024 by theodorestathis

My comments on the discussion at Deliberation and Structure.

Democracy is defined by its axiomatic principles. These to be satisfied one must invent appropriate instruments. This has been and still is the problem. From the discussion that is going on I get the impression that the method of constructing a citizens’ assembly is the use of lot. This tells me, that those who use this method of constructing citizens’ assemblies have no idea about the workings of democracy. Citizens’ assemblies are formed by all citizens of certain age in a region, in a city, in a state, in a nation. Meanwhile, in order for the citizens’ assembly to be operational we segment the entire population into small groups. A citizens’ assembly for an organization is made up of all its members. If the organization is large then the citizens’ assembly is segmented into smaller once. In those assemblies the participants pinpoint problems concerning their living standards or problems of a different nature. Which problems and in what order are to be solved the participants of the citizens’ assembly vote. The solving of these problems is what we call the development program of the region. The approved problems are being assigned to an infrastructure or infrastructures for solving them in the best possible way. These infrastructures are constructed in certain ways so as to make sure that the problems will be solved within the set timetable and as agreed.
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Filed under: Athens, Books, Sortition | 1 Comment »

Sortition in the New Testament

Posted on April 15, 2024 by Roger Knights

A notable example [of cleromancy] in the New Testament occurs in the Acts of the Apostles 1:23-26 where the eleven remaining apostles cast lots to determine whether to select Matthias, or Barsabbas (surnamed Justus) to replace Judas.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cleromancy

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Demiocracy, Chapter 17: Initial adoption & procedural details

Posted on March 23, 2024 by Roger Knights

Experiments in oversight-only IVEs (i.e., IVEs that don’t elect legislators) of governmental bodies could start small, at the local level, and work upward, to the county, state, and national levels, if justified by prior success.

Then the power of electing a portion of the legislators under their supervision could be phased in, as experience warrants, and as voters approve, and IVEs would become PEs (Proxy Electorates).

Voters might be glad to delegate the election of certain low-level officeholders, like dogcatchers, sewer commissioners, and comptrollers to Proxy Electorates. Voters know little of their qualifications and characters—and don’t want to know. Let George Do It is their unspoken attitude.

New PE members would be given a crash course on their assigned topic, and on the rules and customs of being a Proxy Elector.

PEs would gather, usually online, at regular intervals (more frequently at high levels) to hear their officeholders—and their critics—speak, and to interrogate them. They would not gather only at election time.

In the intervals between these gatherings, Proxies would have a private cyberspace forum and a Zoom site in which they could converse among themselves about what had occurred at those gatherings.

A Secretariat’s personnel would preside at meetings, take minutes, schedule speakers, maintain a library, do background checks on candidates, provide orientation sessions for newcomers, etc.

Training would include inside-look “documentaries” of the deliberations of good-outcome PEs of the past, to serve as models for how to behave. There should also be documentaries about bad-outcome PEs, as object-lessons in what not to do.

The control of important political knowledge by leaders constitutes, of course, a very basic element in perpetuating power politics. —Robert J. Pranger, The Eclipse of Citizenship, 1968, p. 46.

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Demiocracy, Chapter 16: Sortition, i.e., a purely lottery-chosen, randomized Proxy electorate, isn’t sufficiently legitimate; Democracy requires mass electoral input, ideally of a “sifting” sort

Posted on March 16, 2024 by Roger Knights

Drawing a statistical microcosm out of the mass population, regardless of its abstract attractiveness, isn’t enough to make a Proxy Electorate seem legitimate in the eyes of the populace. Democracy, the populace generally and strongly believes, allows it to express itself by balloting, the outcome of which will never be a microcosm.

The most severe drawback to government lottery … is that it cuts people off from the opportunity to vote for their congressional representatives.… It is this specific citizen endorsement—and not any abstract idea of democratic representation—that gives the government is legitimacy and insures citizen, acceptance of the government decisions. —Malcolm Margolin, in Ernest Callenbach & Michael Phillips, A Citizen Legislature, 1985, p. 74.

Advocates of sortition should therefore somehow incorporate balloting.

If you want to change someone’s mind about a moral or political issue, talk to the elephant [their intuitional “priors”] first. If you ask people to believe something that violates their intuitions, they will devote their efforts to finding an escape hatch—a reason to doubt your argument or conclusion. They will almost always succeed. —Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 2012.

Ordinary people don’t want randomly chosen noxious and/or numbskull neighbors making decisions for them. Instead, they wish to elevate persons whom they respect.

It is at least worth considering whether people in electing the kinds of congressional candidates they do have deliberately chosen not to be governed by their barber, their accountant, the unemployed derelict who hangs aound the neighborhood liquor store, or the nice lady who runs the cosmetic counter at Woolworth’s … but because they want to be ruled by people whom they perceive (however, mistakenly) as successful, powerful and capable … often with a background in law. —Malcolm Margolin, in Ernest Callenbach & Michael Phillips, A Citizen Legislature, 1985, p. 77.

Demiocracy will satisfy this yearning to elect “the best man.”

If balloting were finagled away somehow, sortition might not be robust enough to weather political storms. A non-negligible minority might not accept the new system as legitimate in a crisis, leading to disorder and collapse. Only if there is regular “buy-in” to the system—by balloting—will it have strong enough legitimacy.

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Filed under: Books, Sortition | 27 Comments »

Demiocracy, Chapter 14b, Postscript: Reasons for Britain & France to Abhor DeMockery

Posted on March 6, 2024 by Roger Knights

WWI: Even if the analysis below can be disputed or disproved, it illustrates the common sort of situation where, when “the ruler’s imperative”—political survival—is threatened, it will take precedence over the common good.

I reminded my friends of the formidable domestic difficulties which the British regime was facing in 1914, and how [they] made it politically impracticable for it to declare its intentions until after the first gun had been fired.

[“Its intentions”—i.e., to declare war if Germany invaded Belgium; the Germans believed that Britain’s pre-war statements in support of Belgian neutrality were merely pro forma waffle. The Germans were amazed and felt betrayed when Britain entered the war. They thought they should have been clearly warned if Britain had really intended to do this.]

These difficulties were: the impending consolidation of labour into One Big Union; the pressure for home rule in Scotland and Wales, as well as for Ireland; and the pressure for land-value taxation. All these matters were due to come to a head simultaneously in the summer of 1914.

If in July 1914 Sir Edward Grey had served Prince Lichnowsky with a firm notice of the regime’s intentions, it is a hundred to one that the war would have been considerably deferred; but England would have been split up by convulsions far worse than those of the eighteen-forties, and the Liberal regime would be tossed to the dogs. —A.J. Nock, Memoirs of a Superfluous Man, 1943, p. 248.

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Demiocracy, Chapter 12: Common-man (Demos) Overseers of, and Electorates for, governmental officials

Posted on February 27, 2024 by Roger Knights

A bal-lottery procedure would, by the use of the public’s self-selected Proxy Electors, put the common man (a.k.a. Everyman) in the catbird seat, where he/she belongs, overseeing, critiquing, recalling, and even electing congresscritters.

This arrangement would resemble the previously described IVE-Proxy oversight of student council representatives in Chapter 9. (IVE = Inner Voice Entity.) Such a commanding-heights IVE could also, like its collegiate counterpart (see Chapter 10), elect some portion of the body it oversees (e.g., a city council or legislature)—say a quarter, as a start.

How would it have the legitimacy to do that? Answer: By referendums and (where necessary) constitutional amendments.

And why should it have such power? Because:

1. Its alternative, DeMockery, has lost much of its legitimacy. It is no longer a popular incarnation of democracy. (For example, see the next Chapter 13 [previously posted on Equality-by-Lot as Is Greece ripe for sortition?], on the Greeks’ disaffection with DeMockery, and the growing menace there of authoritarianism and extremism.) As a result, democracy is being supplanted or threatened by authoritarian or totalitarian regimes and forces. It would be, to put it mildly, “A Bad Thing” if democracy were to shrivel and die. This is the main reason for empowering Demiocracy.

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Demiocracy, Chapter 11: Proxy Electors should also partially choose the elected officials of non-governmental social groups

Posted on February 18, 2024 by Roger Knights

A similar sort of governance-sharing arrangement—i.e., one that incorporates IVES (Inner Voice Entities) as electors—could and should be adopted by so-called “voluntary”, or non-governmental, social groups that elect officeholders. E.g.,

union officials,
boards of directors,
political-party officials,
activist/movement NGOs,
charitable-organization functionaries,
fraternal association officers,
homeowner association officials,
co-op-building boards,
delegates to professional societies, and
some hobbyist and special interest groups.

There isn’t much real bottom-up control of or influence over many of these organizations. Cronyism rules, with new directors and top officials being effectively co-opted by an entrenched leadership clique. The members are mere outsiders and have little sense of what’s really going on inside, in the “executive suite”. So elections amount usually to rubber stamping, maybe with some grousing around the edges.

All the difficulties of democratic government in general are reproduced in the labor union, and in exaggerated forms. It would be as hard for the organized slaves of the United States to get rid of such incompetent leaders … as it would for the whole people to get rid of such mountebanks as Calvin Coolidge. —H.L. Mencken, “The Slave and His Ways”, 1924.

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Demiocracy, Chapter 5: History’s Hints — The Venetian Republic’s Electoral Procedures

Posted on January 25, 2024 by Roger Knights

[In Venice,] to prevent tensions between the ruling families, sortition was introduced as way of appointing a new doge, but in order to ensure only a competent person could become ruler, the procedure was combined with elections. The result was an unbelievably roundabout system that took place in ten phases over a period of five days….

The Venetian system seems absurdly cumbersome, but recently several computer scientists have shown that this leader election protocol is interesting in that it ensured the more popular candidates actually won, while nevertheless giving minorities a chance and neutralizing corrupt voting behavior. Furthermore, it helped to bring compromise candidates to the fore by amplifying small advantages…. In any case, historians agree, that the extraordinary, lasting stability of the Venetian republic, which endured more than five centuries, until ended by Napoleon, can be attributed in part to the ingenious selection of ballotte. Without sortition the republic would undoubtedly have fallen prey far sooner to disputes between ruling families. (You do quietly wonder whether today’s governments are not similarly falling prey to the bickering between parties.) —David van Reybrouck, Against Elections, 2018, p. 70-71.

My “take” is that what is worth copying from Venice are: a small electorate, a mix of sortition and election, and an indirect, multi-stage process of electing electors.

We compensate, we reconcile, we balance. … From hence arises, not an excellence in simplicity but one far superior, an excellence in composition. —Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790.

These made the office tend to seek the man, baffling the “presuming” ambitions of would-be “Kings of the Mountain.” That’s good, because such persons are often overbearing and blunder-prone once ensconced in office.

We can work up to these commanding heights of politics modestly, step-by-step from below, as follows in Chapters 6 & 7.

Filed under: Books, Elections, History, Sortition | 6 Comments »