Demiocracy, Chapter 14b, Postscript: Reasons for Britain & France to Abhor DeMockery

WWI: Even if the analysis below can be disputed or disproved, it illustrates the common sort of situation where, when “the ruler’s imperative”—political survival—is threatened, it will take precedence over the common good.

I reminded my friends of the formidable domestic difficulties which the British regime was facing in 1914, and how [they] made it politically impracticable for it to declare its intentions until after the first gun had been fired.

[“Its intentions”—i.e., to declare war if Germany invaded Belgium; the Germans believed that Britain’s pre-war statements in support of Belgian neutrality were merely pro forma waffle. The Germans were amazed and felt betrayed when Britain entered the war. They thought they should have been clearly warned if Britain had really intended to do this.]

These difficulties were: the impending consolidation of labour into One Big Union; the pressure for home rule in Scotland and Wales, as well as for Ireland; and the pressure for land-value taxation. All these matters were due to come to a head simultaneously in the summer of 1914.

If in July 1914 Sir Edward Grey had served Prince Lichnowsky with a firm notice of the regime’s intentions, it is a hundred to one that the war would have been considerably deferred; but England would have been split up by convulsions far worse than those of the eighteen-forties, and the Liberal regime would be tossed to the dogs. —A.J. Nock, Memoirs of a Superfluous Man, 1943, p. 248.

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