Once our “allotteds” have had their names drawn, what role should they play? I suggest that of elector rather than officeholder, for these reasons.
Most importantly, imposing a low burden on the participating-allotteds means that many of them will be available to oversee officeholders for the entirety of their terms, not just at Election Day. (Electors will see, over a private Internet channel, monthly reports from “their” officeholders and their critics. For which they will be well paid.)
Electors can throw their weight around during inter-election periods by signaling to their officeholders, e.g. via straw votes, their preference regarding bills up for debate. So there is not much real loss of power in being an elector.
Perhaps the most important advantage of elevating the allotteds only to electorhood is that it leaves existing officeholders in place, at least until the next election. This will arouse less opposition from members of the status quo, and make for a smoother transition.
Not only that, but opening up or democratizing access to legislative seats through low-cost elections will be very attractive to many members of the political class, and even to inactive political observers, who likely have many unfulfilled “bees in their bonnets” that they would like to promote. Including their belief that they could be a better legislator than those now in office. Especially if it involves only a subset of political concerns (see later).
Thus we see, I hope, how offering a more modest office to allotteds actually enables more extensive random citizen oversight and control of the entire governmental apparatus.
I have one more major-modesty step in mind, with a similar goal: Demi-legislatures. There would be about 20 of these per legislative house, each one corresponding to a currently existing “standing committee” devoted to 5% of the legislative workload, in the form of such specific topics as health, education, commerce, etc. Nearly all electors would oversee only members of these Demi-legislatures. Thus their mental workload would be manageable by All. Making permanent and extensive representative random-citizen rule more feasible.

Link to Demiocracy, the book:
https://1drv.ms/w/c/80e697e38b9451de/Ed5RlIvjl-YggIA2AQAAAAABYL7yDj3XHPxOzRp3xRr35w
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>Once our “allotteds” have had their names drawn, what role should they play? I suggest that of elector rather than officeholder,
Thereby fulfilling Madison’s ideal:
“the total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity, from any share in” governing directly
I’m sure that will go down well.
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Anonymous wrote: “>Once our “allotteds” have had their names drawn, what role should they play? I suggest that of elector rather than officeholder,
Thereby fulfilling Madison’s ideal: “the total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity, from any share in” governing directly
I’m sure that will go down well.”
Google’s AI explains:
Madison was concerned that if the people were allowed to directly govern, a large majority could you easily oppress minority groups.
Importance of representation:
He believed that a system of elected representatives would filter and refine the public will, leading to more thoughtful and stable governance.”
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Roger: we know that Madison was opposed to popular sovereignty but you also made an approving reference to Rousseau (for whom it was sine qua non). Rousseau regarded the election of parliamentary representatives as the arrogation of natural sovereign right, but at least Englishmen were free at the moment of election (before returning to slavery). Your proposal limits that momentary freedom to a tiny self-selected sample.
>That should go down well enough.
As the well-known philosopher John McEnroe put it “You cannot be serious”.
Anon [Keith Sutherland]
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I view the ability of the whole public to spontaneously generate a representative self that incarnates the general will instead of the will of all via mass approval voting as an innovation Rousseau would have favored.
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Madison’s proposal for the American republic was predicated upon “the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity” (Federalist, 63). And Rousseau would have totally rejected the election of representatives by a self-selecting sample as a variant of popular sovereignty. His rejection of English parliamentarianism was on principle (the alienation of sovereign will), not the limitations of the franchise. By all means make your own case for Demiocracy, but your claims for intellectual provenance are unfounded.
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I’m sure Madison would approve, as his goal was rule by an elected aristocracy of merit. Rousseau insisted on popular sovereignty by direct democracy. My claim is that this can be achieved via allotted juries (under certain demanding constraints), but I’ve yet to find a Rousseau scholar who agrees.
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