Equality by lot

I recently finished a draft paper on sortition, arguing for three hybrid systems that use large, randomly selected juries to choose from among bills and appointees proposed by elected legislators.

The discussions on this forum have helped shape my ideas, and I would greatly appreciate any feedback.

Abstract: Randomly selected representative bodies have the potential to address seemingly intractable problems with electoral systems. However, existing designs are at risk of becoming polarized, insular, and corrupt like elected legislatures. I propose three systems based on short-term, evaluative, conclusive, and multi-choice juries, which are supported by contemporary and historical precedent. These large random juries choose between options proposed by elected legislators, reducing gridlock and polarization. This hybrid approach leverages the differing strengths of politicians and jurors, separating partisan proposers and dispassionate deciders to make both more effective. The three proposed designs address the limitations of both pure sortition and election, achieving the responsiveness and equality of sortition, while retaining the expertise and participation of election. First, deliberative law uses juries to choose agenda items and bills from among those proposed by legislators. Second, deliberative appointment uses juries to choose from among candidates nominated by legislators for judicial and independent executive positions. Finally, a deliberative senate is selected through deliberative appointment in each region. These designs of deliberative government provide a pragmatic pathway for testing and adoption by retaining existing systems while addressing their flaws.

Filed under: Academia, Proposals, Sortition | 73 Comments »