Demiocracy: Less is more

Once our “allotteds” have had their names drawn, what role should they play? I suggest that of elector rather than officeholder, for these reasons.

Most importantly, imposing a low burden on the participating-allotteds means that many of them will be available to oversee officeholders for the entirety of their terms, not just at Election Day. (Electors will see, over a private Internet channel, monthly reports from “their” officeholders and their critics. For which they will be well paid.)

Electors can throw their weight around during inter-election periods by signaling to their officeholders, e.g. via straw votes, their preference regarding bills up for debate. So there is not much real loss of power in being an elector.

Perhaps the most important advantage of elevating the allotteds only to electorhood is that it leaves existing officeholders in place, at least until the next election. This will arouse less opposition from members of the status quo, and make for a smoother transition.

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Ballotocracy: A step beyond lottocracy

We all know what lottocracy means: Sample Sovereignty. In other words, the elevation of a representative sample of the whole community to legislative seats, replacing elected legislators.

The case for this replacement seems strong:

Per Rousseau, there is less of a “representative” interference between the whole body and the legislators, meaning the General Will is more truly ensconced, and its actions more democratically legitimate.

Democracy means the rule of the considered common sense of the community. But a mass-electoral system gives each voter such a tiny influence on election results that most pay little consideration to political affairs. And an electoral system implies party government, which roils the waters and impairs considered consideration of the issues. And the influence of professional party politicians, pelf (money), propaganda, and the press (more generally, the media) further shapes and restricts the democratic dialogue. This is only a partial list of the demerits of what I call DeMockery (a mockery of democracy). Many others have noted them too.

The public, according to polling, seems disillusioned to an unprecedented level with DeMockery and ready for a change.

And yet there have been no powerful movements toward full lottocracy. Only randomly chosen advisory entities have been created. (And even they have shown flaws, as in Ireland recently.) The public and public intellectuals apparently need a strong inducement to move beyond today’s mass-electoral system.

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Alexander Guerrero’s new book: Lottocracy

Alex Guerrero, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and a longtime sortition advocate, has written to announce that his book Lottocracy: Democracy Without Elections (Oxford Press) is now out. It is available now in the UK from the publisher, and available for pre-order everywhere on Amazon.

The book, which has been more than a decade in the making, also has a website, https://www.lottocracy.org/, where highlights, excerpts and other information can be found.

I asked Alex what was new or different about his book compared to previous books advocating sortition. He called out 5 points:

  1. I provide a more detailed and empirically informed set of concerns about electoral representative democracy and a more detailed and multidimensional diagnosis for why electoral democracy isn’t performing well. In doing this, I make the case that there are no straightforward “fixes” for what ails electoral democracy. Chapters 2-6 raise these empirically informed concerns; Chapter 7 considers possible solutions and suggests they will be inadequate.
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Opening the People’s House: A New Vision for Executive Leadership in the United States

By Nick Coccoma, Max Goodman, and Dr. Paul Zeitz off #unifyUSA


The Imperial Presidency

As we approach the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States, it’s time for some straight talk. Our presidential system, once the envy of the world, now struggles to meet the complex challenges of the 21st century. The concentration of power in a single president has led to executive orders on steroids, whiplash between administrations, and a growing disconnect between the American people and their leadership. And with the Supreme Court recently declaring the president above the law, the threat of tyranny looms larger than ever.

But what if there was a way to reinvigorate our democracy, tapping into the collective wisdom of everyday Americans while preserving the efficiency needed for effective governance? What if—just like the legislature and judiciary—we could create an executive branch that truly embodies the spirit of “We the People?”

Today, we propose just that: a bold reimagining of the executive, one that draws on our deepest American values of freedom, community, and service to create a more responsive, accountable, and effective government. Once again, our vision hinges on one bold idea: empowering everyday Americans through democratic lotteries.

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Benching the Ref: Democratizing Constitutional Review

By Nick Coccoma, Max Goodman, and Dr. Paul Zeitz of #unifyUSA

The Evil Umpire

The whole idea of a constitution has one fundamental weakness: Who decides what it means?  In the United States, this subtle but immense power is given to the Supreme Court, and the results have been…anything but subtle. Through its long history, the court has exercised near-absolute power through repressive, sweeping, and downright dangerous rulings. A sampling: “Black people aren’t people.” “Corporations are people.” “You have an unenumerated right to abortion—just kidding, no you don’t.” Most recently: “The ban on insurrectionists holding public office doesn’t actually mean what it says,” and, “The president is above the law—even in cases of treason.”  

These interpretations serve as binding national policy, despite the justices’ total lack of accountability to the people.  The court’s insulation from public sentiment, originally intended to help keep their rulings objective and apolitical, has backfired spectacularly. Instead, lifetime tenure and concentrated power have made appointing justices a partisan dream. And that’s not to mention the luxurious gifts, bribes, and perks lavished on them by billionaires—you know, just for being friends.  No longer can we legitimately claim that the Supreme Court simply “calls balls and strikes.” The umpire has become the most dominant player on the field—the apotheosis of a judicial tyrant. As a result, the whole game of democracy is in jeopardy.

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Betting on Real Democracy

By Nick Coccoma, Max Goodman, and Dr. Paul Zeitz of #unifyUSA

During the March on Washington a crowd stretches from the Lincoln Memorial to the Washington Monument
Photo by Unseen Histories on Unsplash

The Problem with Elections

As of July 2024, only 16% of Americans approve of Congress.  Think about what that means – more than 4 in 5 US citizens disapprove of the main institution of our democracy – a legislature of their own representatives.  Many aspects of our elections are transparently broken. Through the machinations of entrenched partisanship, gerrymandering, and dark money, only 30 (~7%) of the 435 seats in the House remain competitive in 2024. It’s no wonder so many of us feel deprived of a voice in government.  But it doesn’t need to be this way.  Effective reforms are well-studied, and there’s a bold, practical toolkit available to help defeat our democratic demons. In many cases we can scrap electoral politics entirely while still advancing our sacred democratic experiment.

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The Case for a People’s Convention in the U.S.

Moral, Legal, and Practical Imperatives to Restore the American Republic

By Nick Coccoma, Max Goodman, and Dr. Paul Zeitz of #unifyUSA.

American democracy is falling apart, a slow-motion car wreck we’ve been watching for years. But this crash wasn’t caused by an outside force. We’ve been run off the road by our own founding document: the U.S. Constitution. We know—sacrilege! Yet it must be said. And as legal scholar Rosa Brooks puts it, it’s our collective worship of the document that’s tying us down: 

How did it happen that the United States, which was born in a moment of bloody revolution out of a conviction that every generation had the right to change its form of government, developed a culture that so many years later is weirdly hidebound when it comes to its form of government, reveres this piece of paper as if it had been handed by God out of a burning bush, and treats the Constitution as more or less sacred? Is it really such a good thing to have a document written almost 250 years ago still be viewed as binding us in some way? How would we feel if our neurosurgeon used the world’s oldest neurosurgery guide, or if NASA used the world’s oldest astronomical chart to plan space-shuttle flights?

She’s right. The Constitution’s like a Macintosh computer from 1984. Innovative when it first came out; painfully inadequate for the tasks of today. We’ve tried to keep it running with patches and workarounds, but there’s only so much you can do with outdated hardware. 

Many people know this, yet they despair of making updates. Along with being the oldest on earth, the Constitution’s also the most difficult to change. Article V presents an absurdly high bar to clear. Since 1791, we’ve revised it only 17 times. 

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Sortition for Hong Kong

David Cottam is a British historian and former principal of Sha Tin College, an international secondary school in Hong Kong, and a columnist in the China Daily Hong Kong Edition. In a recent column he writes about sortition.

Hong Kong, currently a hybrid of democratic and meritocratic government, is ideally placed for developing [a system with an element of sortition]. Like ancient Athens, its compact size and well-educated population would readily facilitate such a move. Introducing an element of sortition into the Legislative Council would answer the call for greater representation of the people without risking a return to the sort of partisan conflict and obstructionism that previously characterized the legislature. This would establish Hong Kong as a model of modern government, truly representing the people but without the vested interests and divisiveness of warring political parties. Such a system would also reflect Hong Kong’s unique amalgam of Western and Chinese influences, combining democratic values with the nonpartisan Confucian values of harmony and social cohesion. Indeed, this could provide an excellent model of government, not just for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, but for any place wanting to enhance political participation, reduce partisan division, and ensure that the common good rather than party interests always prevails.

The Demos citizen assemblies report. Part 2

The first post regarding the recently released report by the UK think tank Demos proposing the use of allotted bodies as part of the British political system is here.

In this part of the post, I highlight some quotes collected by the authors of the Demos “Citizens’ white paper“, from their interviews with former and present ministers and civil servants as well as interviews with members of the public at large. The picture which emerges from those interviews is not new: the elites are frustrated that public is too unruly, and that they are making unreasonable demands on the political system. Some of them hope that allotted bodies could be a tool for getting the people in line.

The people, on the other hand, feel that the elites are self serving at their expense. While the idea of giving decision power to allotted bodies is seen favorably, there is a lot of suspicion that this would be just another elite ploy. A member of the public expresses this attitude so:

Overall, no, I don’t think we’ve got a say. You give your vote to one party. And that’s the end of it, basically, you probably like to believe that you’re doing the right thing by voting for that party. But the proof is in the pudding, and I’ve never seen it happen yet.

A civil servant offers an the explanation for this:

Policymakers, be they the politicians and their advisors or the civil servants, do not look like the country either in all of its entirety, and quite a lot of them will not have had to go to the Jobcentre Plus, or many of them, given the age profile, and particularly younger ones will probably have not had to interact with the social care system yet.

This explanation hints at the principle of distinction – the decision makers are different from the public at large. However, the civil servant does not clarify whether they see this difference as resulting in decision makers lacking necessary knowledge, or a in having different interests and world views. A lack of knowledge can presumably be fixed relatively easily, while the second effect is much more stable.

Naturally, an elected politician thinks this difference between decision makers and the public applies to civil servants but the elected are not like this at all. He or she says:

But if you think about it, [civil servants] don’t engage with people day in day out, having discussions with constituents.

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Democracy Without Shortcuts, A Critique. #2:  Deference to a lottocracy needn’t be “blind”

Christina Lafont, in her 2020 book, Democracy Without Shortcuts, routinely asserts that, because a minipublic excludes the mass public, the mass public must “blindly defer” to its decisions. Those words at face value imply that the mass public would be blindsided by its decisions. That is not her full meaning, but I’ll criticize that part of it first.

There are four mechanisms by which the public could descry and/or influence the machinations of a lottocracy.

1a. By pairing and “checking” any lottocratic legislative chamber with an elected House.

Any legislation considered in, or passed by, a lottocratic House would be subject to public scrutiny when it reached the elected House, and even before that, during election campaigns for that House. The public would not be taken unawares (for what it is worth). The majority of lottocratic reformers, as far as I know, are only asking for this single-House, or half-a-loaf, power, so Lafont is not justified in insinuating that any empowered lottocratic legislature would be scarily secretive and all-powerful. It would only be influential, and it would have to negotiate openly in compromise-seeking conference committees with its elected counterpart.

1b. By allowing the mass public to veto, by referendum, objectionable minipublic measures. Or by requiring their endorsement, by referendums, by the public.
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