Who speaks for Iran?

Posted on March 10, 2026 by Hanspeter Rosenlechner

An open letter to the Iran diaspora

The Islamic Republic is collapsing. What comes next will be determined not only by what happens inside Iran, but by whether those outside it can demonstrate something the regime never could: the ability to put Iran before themselves.

What is currently visible in the diaspora is not encouraging. Monarchists and republicans, MEK supporters and secular leftists, Kurdish federalists and Persian nationalists — each group convinced of its own mandate, each dismissing the others’ legitimacy. Reza Pahlavi draws on popular acclaim. Maryam Rajavi draws on decades of organization and international recognition. Others draw on ideology, on exile networks, on foreign backing. All claim to represent the Iranian people.

None of them do. Not because their intentions are wrong, but because representation cannot be claimed. It must be demonstrated.

This is precisely where the Arab Spring failed. In Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria — every transition collapsed not because of the old regime, but because the legitimacy vacuum was filled by competing factions fighting for power, each convinced its mandate was sufficient. The result was not democracy but a new cycle of authoritarianism, civil war, or chaos. Iran faces the same structural danger. And the diaspora’s current fragmentation is not a preview of Iranian democracy. It is a preview of its failure.

There is one question that cuts through every claim to legitimacy: Would you accept an outcome you did not shape?

A temporary Citizen Assembly — selected by stratified random sampling across gender, age, region, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and urban/rural residence — is the only body that can answer this question institutionally.* Not a party body. Not a leadership body. A descriptive mirror of Iranian society itself: the only body that no faction, foreign power, or dynastic claim can credibly dismiss as partisan.

Such an Assembly would not replace elections, parties, or constitutional processes. Its mandate would be limited: to articulate the core principles of the transition and define minimum conditions for free elections. Its authority would derive from the one source no competitor can replicate: it would actually look like Iran.

Any transitional actor — individual or organization — who publicly commits to convening such an Assembly and to respecting its conclusions unconditionally would demonstrate something no poll, no organization, and no foreign endorsement can provide: the willingness to relinquish control before knowing the outcome. That is what legitimacy is made of. It is within reach. The question is who will choose it.

*) I am convinced that representative democracy rests on an assumption that no longer holds: that elections produce legitimate representation. They do not. Elections produce power-seekers. The structural logic is simple: whoever wants to be elected must prioritize electoral success above all else. Policy follows power, not the other way around. This “power-first” dynamic is precisely what destroyed the Arab Spring transitions. Factions did not compete for Iran’s future. They competed for power. The result was not democracy but a new cycle of authoritarian capture.

A Citizens’ Assembly selected by stratified random sampling is structurally immune to this dynamic. Its members are not chosen because they sought power. They are chosen because they represent Iran — across gender, age, region, ethnicity, and religious affiliation — in the same proportions as Iranian society itself. They have no electoral incentive. No faction owns them. No foreign power appointed them. They are, for the first time, actually Iran.

The critical distinction from all previous citizens’ assemblies in Europe and elsewhere: their mandate would be binding. Not advisory. Not recommendatory. The Assembly’s decisions on the principles and minimum conditions of the transition would be final — not subject to override, reinterpretation, or selective implementation by any transitional authority, including the one that convened it.

This binding character is not a weakness of the arrangement. It is its entire strength. It is the only credible answer to the question every Iranian faction is asking of every other: How do we know you will not simply take power once you have it?
A leader who convenes a binding Citizens’ Assembly — and publicly, unconditionally surrenders the right to override it — has answered that question. No other gesture can.

Hanspeter Rosenlechner :: kairos.social