A favorite narrative of “deliberative democracy” is what may be called the “deliberative transformation”. According to this trope many people emerge from deliberative forums radically transformed. They become more enlightened, more tolerant, and consequently they hold “better” ideas and positions. Importantly, the change in positions is not merely that people who had been consciously uninformed and have not had a firm opinion on a certain matter have become informed and developed positions based on the newly acquired information. Such a change is unsurprising and is a natural occurrence in any process of study and consideration. Rather the phenomenon of “transformation” is that people who had held firm opinions going into the forum emerge from it newly and firmly holding contradictory opinions to those they had held.
In fact, it often appears (and may or may not be stated explicitly) that as far as deliberative democrats are concerned the deliberative transformation is the main objective of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy frees the unenlightened masses from their brutish shackles and allows them to adopt correct ideas whose veracity they were previously unable to perceive in their pre-deliberation situation.
There are various factual questions that may be asked with regard to the deliberative transformation phenomenon. The first is about its existence (or prevalence): do many people in fact change firmly held views as a result of participation in deliberations or is this a fairly rare phenomenon. At least as important are the questions about the nature of this transformation. Are the post-transformation ideas determined by the “deliberation” itself, as the deliberative democrats assert, rather than an artifact of certain parameters of the deliberative setup. Could different setups, different ways to arrange the discussion, different ways to present information, different ways to phrase the topic of discussion, generate different patterns of change in ideas?
Beyond the questions about the existence of deliberative transformation, their frequency and their nature, the potential existence of deliberative transformation also raises an important question about the desirability of such a phenomenon. The deliberative democrats see this (presumed) phenomenon as an unmitigated good. However, it is far from certain that this is the case, even on the (rather dubious) assumptions of the deliberative democrats themselves.
Specifically, a serious problem arises if a deliberative transformation occurs within a decision making-body. When such a transformation occurs, a chasm is opened between the firmly held views of the members of the decision-making body with their newly-enlightened world view, and the firmly held views of those who did not experience deliberation, and who thus remain non-transformed. Some deliberative democrats envision a society in which the entire population is engaged in deliberation and thus could be transformed en-masse. However, the notion that an entire population would busy itself in deliberation that mirrors that of a decision-making body is, at best, utopian (and quite possibly dystopian). Insisting that a democratic society must be organized in this way is in reality no more than a way to postpone democratization to an indefinite far-away future.
In the absence of such a mass-transformation, the non-transformed constitute the vast majority of the population. A transformation of the decision-making body thus results in a chasm between the decision-makers and that vast majority. Under this situation a majority that holds a certain idea may very well find out that decisions by an allotted deliberative body do not reflect this idea since of the majority of members of the decision-making body who initially held the widely-accepted idea a large proportion have come to reject it by the time the decision was made.
If the political system enjoys a high level of trust then the population might see the decisions of the allotted, which are contrary to their expectations, as being due to the allotted being enlightened. Such a view could be bolstered by testimonials in which the allotted who underwent the transformation explain how the deliberation made them change their minds. In such a situation the transformation may not be problematic.
However, unless transformations are rare, or are somehow frequently retrospectively vindicated in one way or another, it seems likely that the population would come to suspect some form of manipulation. It would be quite difficult to disprove such suspicions. If this were the case, the entire sortition-based decision-making system might soon become delegitimized leading to a collapse and a return to some form of mass politics. Thus, far from being a liberating force, the deliberative transformation may very well be a threat to a sortition-based system.
Filed under: Academia, Deliberation, Sortition |
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Equality by lot 
Yoram’s recent post sharpens a question that has long accompanied sortition: if allotted participants fundamentally change their views through deliberation, a chasm opens between the transformed assembly and the non-transformed majority. Cristina Lafont has framed the same concern differently: mini-publics decide on behalf of a population that has not itself undergone the same process — which undermines their democratic legitimacy.
Both objections apply to sortition where it is conceived as a replacement for electoral democracy. The model proposed below takes a different path. Formal decision-making legitimacy remains within the electoral system; allotted assemblies deliberate and recommend. The chain of democratic legitimacy stays intact — and the Irish example shows that it holds: the Citizens’ Assembly recommended, the people confirmed by referendum.
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(Translated excerpt from my book manuscript Die Flammenschrift an der Wand that I’m about to finish.)
P.S.: In Austria, such a party is in the making: https://plan-d.at (like their web site 😅)
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Oops – I forgot to log in before posting my reply.
Hanspeter Rosenlechner
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I’m in 100% agreement with Yoram’s post. James Fishkin, one of the principal advocates of mass deliberation, argues in the review symposium on his new book (forthcoming in JoS) that “we cannot just change the institutions; we must also change the voters”. Unfortunately Jurgen Habermas demonstrated (in 1962) how the (bourgeois) deliberative society was ‘transformed’ (i.e. destroyed) by the structural transformation of the public sphere (to mass democracy and consumer capitalism), so it’s hard to understand how a purely normative project can re-establish it.
Hanspeter> Formal decision-making legitimacy remains within the electoral system; allotted assemblies deliberate and recommend.
A forthcoming paper by Jordan Rose in JoS outlines a model that puts the division of labour the other way round.
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May I rephrase the statement? If elected participants hold different views from the majority, a chasm opens between the representatives and their constituents. I don’t see how this is a problem unique to a sortition-based system. At least in a lottocracy, “the transformed” lawmakers get thrown out at the end of their term, to be replaced by new blood that mirrors their constituents.
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>At least in a lottocracy, “the transformed” lawmakers get thrown out at the end of their term.
That is also the foundational principle of liberal democracy, and it’s voters who choose their replacements. With deliberative democracy it’s possibil that the transformation is engineered by those responsible for appointing and governing the citizens’ assembly. Some of the papers at https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jos/2026/00000002/00000001 discuss this problem.
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Factually, I don’t think there is any reason to believe that deliberation transforms people in the way envisaged by “deliberative democrats” (DDs). This is simply elitist wishful thinking by the DDs, who see the hoi polloi as living in a Platonic cave and believe that deliberation will lead them out of the cave and into the dazzling light where they will finally see things as the DDs (and affiliated liberal elites) see them. Thus the concern about the chasm between the allotted and the population is itself a reflection of an anti-democratic mindset rather than a sincere democratic concern.
(As I wrote, people do experience learning and reach better-informed and more considered decisions but that is a very different thing from a systematic shift in firmly held beliefs.)
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André Sauzeau
Some remarks.
*** The debate appears focused on choices about basic policies and legislation. But if you consider the overseeing of the state apparatus or the judicial functions, it is an impossible task for the citizen body collectively, and he must trust the allotted jury. We have now in France a big trial of former president Sarkozy. In a democracy he would be judged by an allotted jury, who could consider all the elements of the file, hear all the witnesses, and take the necessary time for that. The result could be different from what most citizens think. If the possibility of such discrepancies is a big flaw in a democratic system, the democracy idea has a problem.
*** In 4th century Athens, a decree taken by the Assembly could be crushed by a jury as contrary to the law, and a law crushed as contrary to the basic interests of the city, specially as contrary to the basic democratic values, well understood. These processes were grounded on the possibility of discrepancy between the choices of the overall demos in assembly and the choices of an allotted jury – and the allotted jury decided.
Actually that amounted to an interactive system with two poles, the Assembly and the Popular Courts. For a given subject, that could end with a kind of agreement, the Assembly taking into account the objections of the Popular Courts; but anyway the system implied the possibility of discrepancy, of “a chasm between the decision-makers and that vast majority” following Yoram’s words. And we do not know any objection to the system from any democrat orator, even on the defeated side.
*** Yoram thinks that when considering some mini-populus decisions the populus could “come to suspect some form of manipulation”. Actually, it is a basic problem with the mini-populus idea, and maybe the main factor against its acceptance by the majority.
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Andre,
In your comments on 4th century practice you mention the (silent) jury, but not the speakers. It’s interesting that the judgment was accepted by all parties and there was no suggestion of manipulation. Am I right in thinking that, for legislative trials, the (defence) advocates were elected by the Assembly? If this was an important legitimising factor, then designers of minipublics should incorporate the adversarial exchange into their model — especially in the light of Nadia Urbinati’s claim that the political party is the modern (representative) version of Athenian isegoria. Trials need competing advocates as much as juries, otherwise there is suspicion of manipulation (for the reasons that Yoram outlines).
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André Sauzeau
*** Answer to Keith Sutherland
In 4th century Athens, when a decree or law was attacked (and its proposer too) before a Popular Court, the accusation team was made of the attacker, and possible friendly co-orators, the defense team was made of the proposer with his possible co-orators and of syndikoi (public advocates) elected by the Assembly.
Why these elected syndikoi ? Because the Assembly was entitled to defend his choices.
And because the proposer, even if he was often a skilled politician, could be any citizen. With elected syndikoi, selected for their political, legal and rhetorical skills, the Assembly could trust a good defense of his choice.
Election was used in Athens whenever a specific expertise was considered necessary ; for generals, for treasurers, for ambassadors, and for syndikoi.
*** Yoram Gat in his post considers “deliberative forum with decision power”,- as criminal juries in some contemporary States. In Athens Popular Courts were not of this kind. But maybe some executive allotted “magistracies” and the Council (Boulê) did work this way, we don’t know really. Anyway they did not have part in sovereignty, the last word was for Popular Courts and the Assembly – for diplomacy, peace and war it was the Assembly. But maybe they had actually political weight, as some say now of the civil service.
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I think the most important concerns raised here are best considered not as considerations for and against sortition, but as an agenda for institution building. Electoral democracy consists of numerous institutions which have been developed over centuries. Sortition will need similar articulation and development over time.
On the Irish assemblies: the two most often cited by sortition advocates — on same-sex marriage and abortion — had features that made them unusually tractable: clear binary questions, strong civil society momentum, and a referendum as the outlet. Most other citizens’ assemblies — most climate assemblies, including the French and British ones, and several of the other Irish ones — produced recommendations that went nowhere.
And here’s the thing. That’s the system acting as designed. Politicians wouldn’t implement the more ambitious recommendations of the assemblies because they understood how it would prejudice their chances of reelection. We will be forever frustrated by this until we begin to constitutionalise the two forms of representation as checks and balances on each other.* My illustration of this principle in my videos gives the assembly the right to require any elected house with which it disagrees to take a second vote, this time by secret ballot. This changes the incentive structure without overriding parliamentary sovereignty. One could vary the balance further — a joint sitting in the event of disagreement, for instance — but the relationship between the two bodies needs to grow into a constitutional settlement which is accepted as democratically legitimate, not be left to the usual political moralising by opposing factions.
The concern that a people’s body might be manipulated by those running it looks like an objection to sortition, but again I think the better response is institution building. (I note parenthetically that manipulation is the very essence of virtually all political speech in an electoral democracy — something which I believe is a far bigger part of people’s growing contempt for their political system than is commonly understood, but, even if the point is conceded, it doesn’t address the substantive point.) The real answer is to build a people’s house that is self-governing and, in that sense, resistant to capture. Rotation and limited tenure within a people’s chamber are foundational. But we can still build institutional continuity and learning around those foundations. To illustrate, I’ve suggested a council of elders — chosen through the ‘brevia’ mechanism that combined sortition and election in the selection of Venetian officials. This could provide the continuity and accumulated wisdom to sustain that growth in a way that is true to the idea that the people’s house is self-governing and self-developing.
A final point, and to my mind the most important, “I want my say” feels like a democratic instinct worth defending. But I’d argue it’s actually a form of narcissism . Democracy is not about me. It’s about us. Insisting that democracy must be about me having my say retreats from the actual problem of social decision-making into a token of participation. In a system of social (as opposed to individual) decision-making, I can’t will my say for myself without willing it for others. But a true democracy built on everyone having their say logically entails voting as the foundationally democratic institution — it’s the only way for everyone to participate. Yet if everyone votes, unconsidered opinions overwhelm considered ones. I have willed, without intending it, a system in which considered opinions (mine and others) cannot make themselves heard. Moreover, my say — considered or ill-considered — has an infinitesimal impact on the outcome. Like Narcissus, I have been seduced not by the thing itself, but by its reflection. I express myself in my vote, as I do with my ‘likes’ and ‘shares’, but its impact is infinitesimal.
If we want people’s considered opinion into how they are governed, this necessarily requires just a sample of the population to participate — so they can be given the time and resources to deliberate properly. At which point “I want my say” dissolves into a more coherent preference: I want my considered opinion represented, and the only system that approximates that for everyone equally is sortition. I am almost certainly not going to be in the sample. But by the same token, my vote gives me infinitesimal influence. Turns out that, neither system is about me as an individual. But even if we think of nothing but our own self-interest, most of us would accept that we’re better off living in a community governed by the considered opinions of our peers than their aggregated snap judgements.
* Some will object to my suggestion that the two forms of representation, by election and by sampling, operate as checks and balances to each other because they are committed to sortition replacing elections. I’m not very interested in that debate for two reasons. I don’t know enough and believe no one knows enough to pronounce that one system is wholly better in all respects than the other. And more importantly, any realistic scenario involves introducing sortition to the existing system. So that’s the task that is before us. Philosophers and blowhards are welcome to pontificate about the superiority of sortition but that is not the practical or the intellectual situation in which we find ourselves.
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Hi André,
> judicial functions
This is indeed a different situation from that of public policy making. In a well functioning society, citizens are aware that they are not familiar with the facts of specific court cases and therefore avoid reaching their own judgments and accept decisions made by the court as long as there is no a-priori reason to suspect the court of bias. Of course this should be supported by having public proceedings and well laid out reasoning for decisions made.
> In 4th century Athens, a decree taken by the Assembly could be crushed by a jury
This seems to me no different from having a two-chamber legislative body where the upper body can reject a bill approved by the lower one. This is different from the hypothetical delibeative transformation scenario where people are fundamentally changed by the deliberations in which they take place.
That said, it would certainly be interesting to know how Athenian people felt and how they reacted when Assembly decisions were annulled by a jury. Is there any historical evidence about this?
> [Suspicion of manipulation] is a basic problem with the mini-populus idea, and maybe the main factor against its acceptance by the majority.
I don’t think it is inherently an issue for a sortition-based system any more than it is for any other system of government. Every system becomes suspect when it consistently produces poor outcomes, just as every system becomes legitimate and approved of when it consistently produces positive outcomes.
Yes, the potential for manipulation is always there – again, in every system. It is up to the system itself to constantly be on the lookout for manipulation and to quash it whereever it is found. The proof of success is in the system’s outcomes.
As a matter of fact, by the way, polls show that people are surprisingly open to decision making by allotted bodies (e.g., here). The obstacles to the adoption of a sortition-based system of government lie elsewhere.
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Andre,
It’s interesting to note that 4th century advocates were selected by a combination of ho boulomenos and election — sortition was only used to construct a large, silent jury to determine the outcome of the trial. Those of us seeking a rebirth of Athenian democracy need to explain how best to adapt such practices for large multicultural states. I think everyone on this forum agrees with the jury principle to determine the outcome, the only argument is over who performs the speech acts. To limit this to a tiny handful of randomly-selected citizens is, IMO, a serious breach of the equal speech rights of everyone excluded by lot, hence the need for advocates to be elected by the whole citizen body. If that was deemed necessary in a tiny ancient polis, then the case for election in large multicultural states is even stronger — hence Nadia Urbinati’s claim that the political party is essential for representative isegoria. Whilst all of us advocate sortition for representative isonomia, there is a strange reluctance in the case of isegoria. Deliberative democrats are aware of the problems involved, hence their reliance on “impartial” moderators, but that opens up another a can of worms, for all the reasons that Yoram outlines in this post.
Nick:> a true democracy built on everyone having their say logically entails voting as the foundationally democratic institution — it’s the only way for everyone to participate.
Yes indeed, and this involves voters judging the representative claims of competing advocates, rather than the narcissism involved in “having one’s say”. I agree that our principal task is to formulate the best combination of election and sortition, and that historical, pragmatic and theoretical factors have to be considered (alongside notions of perceived legitimacy).
Yoram:> Citizens accept decisions made by the court as long as there is no a-priori reason to suspect the court of bias.
Judging from Andre’s comments, the reasons for accepting the legitimacy of court decisions is the selection process for the advocates and the representativeness of the jury (that’s why they were so large). Deliberative democracy doesn’t provide a democratic mechanism for the former, leaving it to “impartial” expert bodies. This is antithetical to Anglo-American trial procedure.
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“Whilst all of us advocate sortition for representative isonomia, there is a strange reluctance in the case of isegoria.”
Sorry, I meant to say:
“Whilst all of us advocate sortition for representative isonomia, isegoria is a fundamentally different form of equality.”
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André Sauzeau
Answers to Yoram Gat
*** Yoram: “judicial functions [are] indeed a different situation from that of public policy making. In a well functioning society, citizens are aware that they are not familiar with the facts of specific court cases and therefore avoid reaching their own judgments and accept decisions made by the court as long as there is no a-priori reason to suspect the court of bias.”
Is that true when it is a trial with strong political overtones ? a trial linked to a hot ideological content ? a criminal trial of a known politician ? a key decision by a Constitutional Court ?
Anyway the gulf between judicial and political decisions is a very debatable idea. Law is what judges say it is. Punishing, or not punishing, implies a strong political power.
Aristotle , in the Athenian Constitution (9.1), attributes to Solon “what is said to have been the chief basis of the powers of the multitude, the right of appeal to the jury-court—for the people, having the power (kyrios) of the vote (psêphos, the “pebble”, the token used for judicial vote), becomes sovereign (kyrios) in the government.” (transl. Rackam).
*** Yoram: “[If in 4th century Athens, a decree taken by the Assembly could be crushed by a jury] this seems to me no different from having a two-chamber legislative body where the upper body can reject a bill approved by the lower one. This is different from the hypothetical deliberative transformation scenario where people are fundamentally changed by the deliberations in which they take place.”
OK, it is different. But the result is the same: discrepancy between the choices of the overall citizenry and the mini-populus.
*** Yoram: “it would certainly be interesting to know how Athenian people felt and how they reacted when Assembly decisions were annulled by a jury. Is there any historical evidence about this?”
No clear evidence. Our evidence comes only from speeches by famous orators which became part of the Greco-Roman literary tradition, The interpretation by modern historians and classicists gave many comments about the mental relationship between Assembly and Courts. Difficult matter. But at least there is no famous political clash grounded on a long chiasm between Assembly and Popular Courts.
For Aristotle they both embody the power of the lower classes. Actually the (anti-democrat) philosopher avoids the subject of “judicial review” by Courts (In the Politics, he mentions it only obliquely in connection with the debate on slavery: I, 6,2; 1255 a4-12), because it does not align well with his view of democracy as “tyranny by the lower classes disregarding the laws”.
*** Yoram about suspicion of manipulation: “I don’t think it is inherently an issue for a sortition-based system any more than it is for any other system of government.”
OK, on the long run. But a change of system is more easily seen as manipulation, as we can see when the subject is a change of the electoral law or of the electoral districts boundaries.
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André,
> Anyway the gulf between judicial and political decisions is a very debatable idea. Law is what judges say it is. Punishing, or not punishing, implies a strong political power.
I agree that application of the law to specific cases carries a lot of political power and therefore in a democratic society must be done by an allotted body. I also agree that there are some cases, such as the ones you listed, where a-priori suspicion of bias may exist. A persistent pattern of acquitting powerful people, for example, may very well result in growing distrust of the courts.
However, specific cases are determined not just by the principles as expressed in the applicable laws but also by various findings of fact that are specific to each case. Thus it is harder to determine whether a specific case was decided according to a certain principle or against it than it is in the case of laws. In a healthy society people are aware of this fact and take account of it when they assess the reliability of the court system.
> in 4th century Athens, a decree taken by the Assembly could be crushed by a jury [this would result in a] discrepancy between the choices of the overall citizenry and the mini-populus.
Do you really think this describes the situation well? I don’t think so. I don’t think decisions of the Assembly can be considered as having been some sort of a pure unmediated expression of popular beliefs. Just like the jury, the Assembly was a decision making body with a particular makeup and particular procedures. A specific decision of this body presumably carried with the Athenians no more legitimacy than a decision of a jury.
A situation where the Assembly was making repeated attempts to pass a certain decree only to have these attempts repeatedly annulled by juries would probably have resulted in some sort of crisis. I think it is safe to say that had this happened we would have heard about it from the primary sources (and I have it on your authority that we haven’t).
> But a change of system is more easily seen as manipulation
I agree. This is something of significant importance, and for this reason I think that the way the new system is set up has to be carefully thought out. (Not in terms of having a very detailed plan for the new system as some people offer, but in terms of the conditions that would allow such a system to get started and set it on a positive trajectory.)
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I say informed opinion is preferable to uninformed opinion, and am willing to die on that hill.
Might the masses feel disenfranchised? Compared to what?
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If Deepdark’s view is typical of deliberative “democrats”, this confirm’s Yoram’s fears that the deliberative transformation may very well be a threat to a sortition-based system.
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> I say informed opinion is preferable to uninformed opinion, and am willing to die on that hill.
Sure, informed is better (although it is important to emphasize that the main problem with the electoralist system is not a lack of information).
The deliberative transformation, however, goes beyond people becoming informed (at least in any normal sense of the word). People are supposed to be transformed so that fundamental things about their world view change: Their values change and/or their understanding of how the world works changes.
Such a transformation is in all probability very rare. But, beyond that, if it were a common occurrence such a phenommenon would destabilize any sort of democratic government.
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[…] In a previous post I discussed the “deliberative transformation”, a favorite trope within the theory of “deliberative democracy”. I pointed out that whereas the deliberative democrats see this hypothetical phenomenon as an ideal (maybe the central normative goal of their theory, more important than any policy outcomes), such a phenomenon, if it were really a widespread phenomenon as the deliberative democrats imagine, would be a major obstacle to an allotment-based democratic system (which, it is worth mentioning, is the only theoretically well-motivated schema of a democratic system). […]
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