Betting on Real Democracy

By Nick Coccoma, Max Goodman, and Dr. Paul Zeitz of #unifyUSA

During the March on Washington a crowd stretches from the Lincoln Memorial to the Washington Monument
Photo by Unseen Histories on Unsplash

The Problem with Elections

As of July 2024, only 16% of Americans approve of Congress.  Think about what that means – more than 4 in 5 US citizens disapprove of the main institution of our democracy – a legislature of their own representatives.  Many aspects of our elections are transparently broken. Through the machinations of entrenched partisanship, gerrymandering, and dark money, only 30 (~7%) of the 435 seats in the House remain competitive in 2024. It’s no wonder so many of us feel deprived of a voice in government.  But it doesn’t need to be this way.  Effective reforms are well-studied, and there’s a bold, practical toolkit available to help defeat our democratic demons. In many cases we can scrap electoral politics entirely while still advancing our sacred democratic experiment.

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The Case for a People’s Convention in the U.S.

Moral, Legal, and Practical Imperatives to Restore the American Republic

By Nick Coccoma, Max Goodman, and Dr. Paul Zeitz of #unifyUSA.

American democracy is falling apart, a slow-motion car wreck we’ve been watching for years. But this crash wasn’t caused by an outside force. We’ve been run off the road by our own founding document: the U.S. Constitution. We know—sacrilege! Yet it must be said. And as legal scholar Rosa Brooks puts it, it’s our collective worship of the document that’s tying us down: 

How did it happen that the United States, which was born in a moment of bloody revolution out of a conviction that every generation had the right to change its form of government, developed a culture that so many years later is weirdly hidebound when it comes to its form of government, reveres this piece of paper as if it had been handed by God out of a burning bush, and treats the Constitution as more or less sacred? Is it really such a good thing to have a document written almost 250 years ago still be viewed as binding us in some way? How would we feel if our neurosurgeon used the world’s oldest neurosurgery guide, or if NASA used the world’s oldest astronomical chart to plan space-shuttle flights?

She’s right. The Constitution’s like a Macintosh computer from 1984. Innovative when it first came out; painfully inadequate for the tasks of today. We’ve tried to keep it running with patches and workarounds, but there’s only so much you can do with outdated hardware. 

Many people know this, yet they despair of making updates. Along with being the oldest on earth, the Constitution’s also the most difficult to change. Article V presents an absurdly high bar to clear. Since 1791, we’ve revised it only 17 times. 

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Sortition for Hong Kong

David Cottam is a British historian and former principal of Sha Tin College, an international secondary school in Hong Kong, and a columnist in the China Daily Hong Kong Edition. In a recent column he writes about sortition.

Hong Kong, currently a hybrid of democratic and meritocratic government, is ideally placed for developing [a system with an element of sortition]. Like ancient Athens, its compact size and well-educated population would readily facilitate such a move. Introducing an element of sortition into the Legislative Council would answer the call for greater representation of the people without risking a return to the sort of partisan conflict and obstructionism that previously characterized the legislature. This would establish Hong Kong as a model of modern government, truly representing the people but without the vested interests and divisiveness of warring political parties. Such a system would also reflect Hong Kong’s unique amalgam of Western and Chinese influences, combining democratic values with the nonpartisan Confucian values of harmony and social cohesion. Indeed, this could provide an excellent model of government, not just for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, but for any place wanting to enhance political participation, reduce partisan division, and ensure that the common good rather than party interests always prevails.

The Demos citizen assemblies report. Part 2

The first post regarding the recently released report by the UK think tank Demos proposing the use of allotted bodies as part of the British political system is here.

In this part of the post, I highlight some quotes collected by the authors of the Demos “Citizens’ white paper“, from their interviews with former and present ministers and civil servants as well as interviews with members of the public at large. The picture which emerges from those interviews is not new: the elites are frustrated that public is too unruly, and that they are making unreasonable demands on the political system. Some of them hope that allotted bodies could be a tool for getting the people in line.

The people, on the other hand, feel that the elites are self serving at their expense. While the idea of giving decision power to allotted bodies is seen favorably, there is a lot of suspicion that this would be just another elite ploy. A member of the public expresses this attitude so:

Overall, no, I don’t think we’ve got a say. You give your vote to one party. And that’s the end of it, basically, you probably like to believe that you’re doing the right thing by voting for that party. But the proof is in the pudding, and I’ve never seen it happen yet.

A civil servant offers an the explanation for this:

Policymakers, be they the politicians and their advisors or the civil servants, do not look like the country either in all of its entirety, and quite a lot of them will not have had to go to the Jobcentre Plus, or many of them, given the age profile, and particularly younger ones will probably have not had to interact with the social care system yet.

This explanation hints at the principle of distinction – the decision makers are different from the public at large. However, the civil servant does not clarify whether they see this difference as resulting in decision makers lacking necessary knowledge, or a in having different interests and world views. A lack of knowledge can presumably be fixed relatively easily, while the second effect is much more stable.

Naturally, an elected politician thinks this difference between decision makers and the public applies to civil servants but the elected are not like this at all. He or she says:

But if you think about it, [civil servants] don’t engage with people day in day out, having discussions with constituents.

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Democracy Without Shortcuts, A Critique. #2:  Deference to a lottocracy needn’t be “blind”

Christina Lafont, in her 2020 book, Democracy Without Shortcuts, routinely asserts that, because a minipublic excludes the mass public, the mass public must “blindly defer” to its decisions. Those words at face value imply that the mass public would be blindsided by its decisions. That is not her full meaning, but I’ll criticize that part of it first.

There are four mechanisms by which the public could descry and/or influence the machinations of a lottocracy.

1a. By pairing and “checking” any lottocratic legislative chamber with an elected House.

Any legislation considered in, or passed by, a lottocratic House would be subject to public scrutiny when it reached the elected House, and even before that, during election campaigns for that House. The public would not be taken unawares (for what it is worth). The majority of lottocratic reformers, as far as I know, are only asking for this single-House, or half-a-loaf, power, so Lafont is not justified in insinuating that any empowered lottocratic legislature would be scarily secretive and all-powerful. It would only be influential, and it would have to negotiate openly in compromise-seeking conference committees with its elected counterpart.

1b. By allowing the mass public to veto, by referendum, objectionable minipublic measures. Or by requiring their endorsement, by referendums, by the public.
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The Demos institute tries to sell allotted citizen assemblies to the Labour government

The UK institute Demos describes itself as follows:

Founded in 1993 in response to a shortage of new ideas in British politics, we’ve spent three decades cementing our place as a trusted expert on democratic renewal, public service reform and digital rights. As movements, ideologies and governments have come and gone, our commitment to collaborative politics has remained a constant at the heart of the British political landscape.

The institute has a recently published a report titled a “Citizens’ white paper”, written by four authors: Miriam Levin, Polly Curtis, Sarah Castell, and Hana Kapetanovic. The policy proposals revolve around introducing randomly selected citizen bodies of various flavors into the UK political system. For example:

RECOMMENDATION 1: Announcement of five flagship Citizens’ Panels to feed into new Mission Boards

Showcase a new partnership between government and the public by announcing a role for citizens in the Mission Boards: a Citizens’ Panel of 100 randomly selected and demographically representative people for each Mission Board. These Citizens’ Panels will help to refine the priorities within each mission, work through trade-offs and choices inherent in actions considered by Mission Boards, and inform the Missions’ policies to give people a stake in meeting the challenges ahead.

The report suffers from much the same weakness as most of the sortition-related work of academics and institution-related experts. The authors address themselves to established powers in the UK – elected politicians and the civil service. The report is aimed to convince this audience that setting up allotted bodies would be useful them – increasing legitimacy for their decisions, reducing public resistance and distrust.
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International Network for Sortition Advocates presents

The Jury Trust Model: Nationalised Industries Without the Corruption

Presented by Oliver Milne, PhD.Independent scholar and game designer based in Galway, Ireland. PhD in Philosophy from the University of Galway in 2024.

The control of capital is among the most potent of powers: the power to make or break people’s livelihoods, landscapes, and governments. There are limitless ways this power can be abused, and vast amounts of it can be amassed by its abuser. In this talk, Oliver will propose a novel model of capital ownership, the jury trust, in which allotted juries are entrusted with the stewardship of large firms, and make the case that this model can address the problems inherent to state and private ownership.


Date: Thursday, 27 June · (Friday, 28 June in Asia & Australia)

Time: 20:00 – 21:00 Time zone: Europe/Copenhagen

Google Meet link: https://meet.google.com/kfs-vatf-jnu

Or dial: ‪(DK) +45 70 71 45 70 PIN: ‪247 732 930# More phone numbers: https://tel.meet/kfs-vatf-jnu?pin=6887037700703


INSA is a volunteer organisation aimed at connecting pro-sortition academics, advocates, and activists around the world, to share resources and tactics and advance the theoretical understanding of sortition. Join the conversation!

Discord invitation https://discord.gg/6sgnrphp6w


Demiocracy, Chapter 19: Advantages of this army-of-Davids (multiple-Demi-legislature) arrangement

1. There would be less susceptibility to emotional proposals too motivated by fear or hope. Proxy electorates, which are specialized (expert on some topic), seasoned (from years of semi-monthly oversight sessions), and “select” (sifted upward through multiple ballotteries) at the state and national levels, would have more information, and would have acquired greater insight through discussion and debate. So they would more realistically assess what is possible (including adventurous proposals that just might work but affront conventional wisdom) and be less likely to divert down false trails and garden paths, and to ignore possible second-order effects. Their lesser credulity would insulate them from panics and propaganda. Their greater experience would simultaneously deliver aspiring politicians from the temptation to take advantage of their immaturity—of the virtual standing invitation that big-electorate, big-arena voters present to be played for Suckers. This inbuilt temptation of mass susceptibility eternally fuels the demonic dynamic—the co-dependent tragedy and farce—of DeMockery. (Its hidden “root,” to repeat, is its seemingly righteous, too-“wide,” electorate.)

2. Demiocracy’s decentralization would make a putsch more difficult, especially if it includes decentralization of the executive branch. (I.e., substantial independence of the executive departments from the chief executive, via PE-election of their heads.) Thus making tyranny less likely, a big concern of the Founders. Also insulating the government from a potty (barmy) POTUS. (“There is, of course, no such thing as a harmlessly mad emperor.” —Gore Vidal, Julian, Ch. 19.)

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Trends in Theorizing Sortition

Delighted to see my new review essay (co-authored with Audrey Plan, one of our department’s former Ph.D. students) appear in print. The essay deals with recent theoretical work on sortition. You can check it out here: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00208345241247492.

I should add that Yanina Welp, a friend of mine, is publishing shortly a similar paper in the same journal focused more on the empirical literature on sortition. Not sure when that will appear.

Sortition, “a beacon for billions”

A few days ago, the Portland Press Herald published a bold, “completely original” plan for city government, about which “political philosophers will be writing for millennia”. Sortition is an important part of this plan.

First, competitive elections will be abolished. No more “vote for me.” No more sloganeering. No more name recognition. Instead of popularity contests, members of every representative office in our city will be elected by sortition, or through a lottery system, with officials chosen at random for a term of one year. We will have 66 districts, each containing roughly 1,000 people. This will make our city a true government of the people. The mechanics of election-by-sortition are simple: An algorithm will randomly select a name from the city’s draft rolls.

Next, we are proposing a tricameral system of government: a 66-person Popular Assembly of Legislative Supremacy (“PALS”), a House of Landlords and Yeomanry (“HOLY”) and a three-person Supreme High-most Unlimited Council of Knowledge Systems (“SHUCKS Troika”). Our nine-person City Council will be gone. So will be our city manager. All three new branches have key roles, but the PALS shall be our chief lawmaking and deliberative body.

Sortition shall select the members of the 66-person PALS branch. The idea is simple: It could be you. PALS will be a raucous parliament made up of average citizens, all chosen at random.