Stratified sortition

One of Dahl’s objections to an allotted parliament is that “as anyone familiar with the laws of probability knows”,

the chances are by no means negligible that a sample of five hundred might deviate by a considerable margin from the mean of the whole population, occasionally we might find ourselves with a highly unrepresentative legislature subject to no authority except the next lottery.

He adds: “I cannot think of a better way to discredit the idea and democracy itself.”

Joel Parker, following Peter Stone, points out that, in reality, the laws of probability show quite the opposite. In fact, when using simple random sampling, the chance that a sample of 500 people will have a majority of members from a group that makes up 45% of the population is merely 1%. If the group makes 40% of the population, that chance drops to less than 3 in a million. That group can be defined geographically, ethnically, ideologically, or by any other characteristic – it is still very unlikely to command a majority in an allotted parliament unless it has a majority in the population, or is very close to having such a majority.

Still, one could ask for more, and find one’s request fulfilled. By using a stratified sample – i.e., a sample which allocates a fixed number of seats to pre-identified groups – one can assure exact representation of those groups (that is, having their proportion in the sample be identical, up to rounding, to their proportion in the population). This can be done without giving up the requirement of equiprobability (i.e., the requirement that each person has the same chance of being picked). For example, if representation of geographical areas is considered important, the country can be divided into geographical units, each containing the same number of people, and have one person allotted from each unit. In a similar way, exact representation by any characteristic – whether objective or self-identified – can be obtained.

It is interesting to note that, unlike a majoritarian system, stratification in a sortition system is not prone to gerrymandering. No group can expect to increase its representation by changing the stratification units. The only effect of such a system is to reduce the variation along a certain characteristic of the sample – the expected proportion in the sample is always the same.

A New Experimental Study

Here’s a paper that uses experiments to understand popular attitudes towards coin tossing–

“Decisions by coin toss: Inappropriate but fair” by Gideon Keren & Karl Teigen. Judgment and Decision Making, April 2010, Pages 83-101.

Abstract: In many situations of indeterminacy, where people agree that no decisive arguments favor one alternative to another, they are still strongly opposed to resolving the dilemma by a coin toss. The robustness of this judgment-decision discrepancy is demonstrated in several experiments, where factors like the importance of consequences, similarity of alternatives, conflicts of opinion, outcome certainty, type of randomizer, and fairness considerations are systematically explored. Coin toss is particularly inappropriate in cases of life and death, even when participants agree that the protagonists should have the same chance of being saved. Using a randomizer may seem to conflict with traditional ideas about argument-based rationality and personal responsibility of the decision maker. Moreover, a concrete randomizer like a coin appears more repulsive than the abstract principle of using a random device. Concrete randomizers may, however, be admissible to counteract potential partiality. Implications of the aversion to use randomizers, even under circumstances in which there are compelling reasons to do so, are briefly discussed.

A government composed of fledgling lawmakers

Gordon S. Wood, a professor emeritus of history at Brown, writes at the New York Times to warn the displeased U.S. voters about the dangers of booting out the incumbents.

The article is quite interesting for the elitist conception of “democracy” it presents. The couching of this conception in democratic terms produces unintended irony at several points in the article, such as:

[T]he men who led the revolution against the British crown and created our political institutions were very used to governing themselves.

The author sums his message in the last sentence of the article:

[P]recisely because we are such a rambunctious and democratic people, as the framers of 1787 appreciated, we have learned that a government made up of rotating amateurs cannot maintain the steadiness and continuity that our expansive Republic requires.

Lotteries in Chicago

Just got back last night from Chicago, where I attended the latest meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Always an interesting conference, although they have expanded in recent years, which frankly means a lot more sub-par papers. It also means more flake-outs–I was supposed to present a paper on a panel with 2 other papers, but one of them was withdrawn in advance of the conference, and the authors of the other simply never showed up. (Needless to say, neither one was a Kleroterian…)

My paper was not directly on lotteries; rather, it dealt with non-reasoned decision-making more broadly. Some Kleroterians have probably seen an earlier version of it. There was also, however, a paper presented critiquing James Fishkin’s work, as well as the broader idea of “deliberative mini-publics” achieved through random selection. The author, Anna Drake, teaches at Queen’s University, in Canada. I spoke to her after the panel, and she might be interested in sharing her work with our group.

Athenian Democracy in the British Museum

I recently visited the British Museum and found that among the hundreds of displays devoted to the ancient Greek world and specifically to ancient Athens, there is one display box titled “Democracy”.

The box contains, among other items, a storage jar dated 490-480 depicting Theseus (“credited with the invention of democracy”), a drinking cup dated 490-480 depicting Athena watching over the Greeks at Troy as they vote to decide whether Ajax or Odysseus should receive the arms of the dead Achilles, and several jurymen pinakia, such as the one below, which belonged to one Archilochos of Phaleron and is dated 370-362.

The box carries the following description:

Classical Athens was the world’s first democracy. The tyrants who had ruled the city for some 50 years were expelled at the end of the 6th century BC and, from 460 onwards, all male Athenian citizens governed law and politics by debating and voting in a popular assembly. State offices and legal juries were filled by drawing lots. Not everyone, however, was included in this democracy, and women, resident foreigners and slaves were excluded. Nevertheless, Athenian democracy was a starting point for the development of modern democracies.

It is interesting that despite the mention of the practice of sortition in Athens, the text endorses the conventional modern view of equating democracy with elections and equating democratic progress with  the widening of electoral rights.

Lottery Voting

I’m reading Allan Gibbard’s paper on Lottery Voting, i.e., the “Random Dictator” rule. According to this rule, people vote for candidates the same way they normally would, but instead of the votes being counted, one vote is selected at random, and the outcome of that vote implemented. (“Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance,” Econometrica 45, April 1977). There have been a number of philosophical discussions of the idea over the years–most notable Akhil Reed Amar’s paper in the Yale Law Journal (1984)–but Gibbard’s paper is the central paper on the mathematics of the rule. Unhappily, the paper is very technical, and I find myself stuck at one point in the argument. Does anyone know the paper particularly well? I could use some guidance here.

Allotted Lamas

It turns out that allotting lamas has been a state sanctioned system since 1792, and the modern day Chinese are adherents:

As the Dalai Lama ages, speculation swirls around the mystery of his reincarnation – and the question of who will assume religious and political leadership of the Tibetan diaspora after he dies.

The Dalai Lama has played with the idea of controlling his reincarnation and possibly designating his successor before he dies, in order to pre-empt Chinese efforts to control the selection of the next Dalai Lama, as they did for the current Panchen Lama.

Regardless of what novel methods the Dalai Lama adopts, conflict instigated by China – and divisions that dilute the authority and prestige of the exile religious establishment headquartered in Dharmsala, India – are inevitable.

The new governor of the Tibetan Autonomous Region declared that designation of the next Dalai Lama would strictly adhere to the state-controlled model dating to the Qing Dynasty: selection by lot from a golden urn under government supervision.

The Dalai Lama has apparently been grooming the young leader of the Kagyu or Black Hat sect – the Karmapa – as the leader of Tibetan Buddhism in exile.

Kleroterians at the WPSA

This weekend, the Western Political Science Association (WPSA) held its annual meeting at the Hyatt Regency in San Francisco. A panel held yesterday (Saturday, April 3) featured two Kleroterians, Joel Parker and myself. No pics got taken but trust us–it happened.

I plugged the blog at the meeting. If you’re reading this blog for the first time as a result, welcome. And don’t forget–we have a Facebook page as well :)

Luck of the Draw – a screenplay

Posted as a comment by Ronald Mercer (coach1640280)

Narrative description:

Time: Not too distant future.
Setting: America after the second democratic revolution.
America has undergone a second democratic revolution where the constitution was significantly altered to adjust to new global economic, climate, and security (terrorism) conditions.
A constitutional convention was held. A new congress was formed, among other things, keeping the basic congressional house structure and reforming the senate by making it a chamber of 300 sortitioned senators serving 5 year terms.
Continue reading

Women’s seat reservation lottery in India

India, the ‘world’s largest democracy’ proposes lottery-cum-rotation to encourage women’s representation: Rajya Sabha (upper house of India) passes Women’s Reservation Bill  Mar 9, 2010

 NEW DELHI: The controversial yet historic Women’s Reservation Bill, ensuring 33% reservation to women in Parliament and state legislative bodies, was passed in the Rajya Sabha on Tuesday after two days of high drama that saw suspension of seven members who violently disrupted proceedings.

 The bill seeks to reserve for women 181 of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha and 1,370 out of a total of 4,109 seats in the 28 State Assemblies. 

(It seems that the 1/3 of constituencies to be reserved for women will be decided by a (one-off?) lottery; after that the ‘reserved’ constituencies will be rotated.) Continue reading