This article by Professor Josine Blok (Utrecht University) is forthcoming in a theme-issue of the journal Representation, edited by Hugo Bonin and Henk te Velde, on Bernard Manin’s Principles of Representative Government. The article is available (open access) at https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2026.2688260
Professor Blok argues that Manin’s distinction between direct and representative government is in need of further refinement, based on Daniela Cammack’s analysis of the Athenian system using Frank Ankersmit’s distinction between synechdochical and metaphorical representation:
A governing body or office is representative either because its members are just a part of the whole citizenry, similar to and interchangeable with the other citizens (synecdoche) or they can stand for the whole citizeny by virtue of being different from them (metaphor) (p.5)
Professor Cammack identifies both forms of representation in the Athenian governmental system:
She finds synecdochical representation in the Assembly, which is practice always held about one-quarter of all male citizens, and the Council of 500 and the jury courts, en masse drawn by lot from all male citizens. These bodies were parts of the whole and interchangeable with the whole, for any male Athenian of the right age could participate in these bodies on the rules set by law and would do so sooner or later. (ibid.)
Metaphorical representation was embodied in the (elected) executive and military offices, the rhetores and (to a lesser extent) the minor magistracies (selected by lot). The distinction between the two categories of representation was not so much the selection method as the size of the body, along with the accounatability criteria. Synecdochical representatives were not accountable (by euthynai or graphe paranomon) simply because they were ‘parts of us’, whereas Athenians saw office holders as ‘them’.
Some of the Athenian bodies (including the Council) involved a mix of the two forms of representation, and the emphasis changed over time, however two bodies in Athens were and remained fully synecdochical: the Assembly and the jury courts:
According to Cammack, the fact that the switch to metaphorical representation did not happen here was due to the large numbers of both bodies. The power of the demos was, by definition, that of a mass in the Athenian demokratia instituted in the constitution. (p. 8).
If this is the case, then the attempt by deliberative democrats and the designers of small citizens’ assemblies to claim Athenian provenance is dubious.
Filed under: Academia, Athens, Books, Elections, History, Sortition, Theory |
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Equality by lot 
Thanks for alerting us to the article, Keith.
For a long time I have been speaking about representative democracy as if it comprehends both mechanisms of selecting representatives sampling and elections, so it’s nice to see this getting some play in the literature. I haven’t read the piece yet, but at least from your summary, the distinction doesn’t seem that compelling to me. The size of the representative body and the manner of its selection seem to be conceptually different things, not to be confused with one another.
I also think it’s quite useful to use terms that are as close to people’s normal language as possible. I do this as a matter of course in all my communications with the outside world. But doing so where it is about democracy seems to have a double dividend. It doesn’t alienate the very audience you would hope to be attracting to the cause. People know what elections and sampling and metaphors are. They don’t know what ‘epistocracy’ and ‘lottocracy’ are and I always have to reach for my dictionary when I run into the word ‘synecdoche’.
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Both Josine and Daniela’s papers are aimed at a specialist scholarly audience. I adopt the synecdochical argument in defence of my claim that decision making by large quasi-mandatory juries would not contravene Rousseauian strictures on popular sovereignty (Daniela disagrees, preferring referenda instead):
https://sortition-agora.co.uk/post/citizen-jury-or-referendum-a-rousseauian-perspective
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Daniela’s response:
Yes, “part for whole” is preferable to synecdoche as a label for teaching purposes – I agree with Nicholas on that – and am really grateful to Josine for this paper, as it targets facets and tensions within the Athenian system that I find very interesting and am definitely still thinking about.
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The energy academics spend and the mental contortions they go through in their efforts to justify whatever power structure they are a part of are a marvel.
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I’m disappointed that Yoram still makes the case that ideology is epiphenomenal — beliefs (academic or whatever) being simply a reflection of socio-economic and other power structures. This (Marxian) doctrine is well past its sell-by date and will only lead to people who have devoted their lives to studying these matters boycotting sites like this.
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Heh. I did not realize that it was none other than Marx who was the inventor of the revolutionary and offensive idea that people tend to be self-serving. I naively thought that this idea is a basic tenet of liberalism. It is a shame that such commonplaces can embarass seasoned academics to such an extent that they fail to show up to offer their wares at the venerated marketplace of ideas.
It is interesting to note that when considering that Aristotle justified slavery, Hobbes justified absolute monarchy, Locke justified private property, Soviet academics justified the Soviet system, Western academics justify electoralism, and Chinese academics justify the Chinese system, as well as a myriad similar examples, it does seem like a curious pattern emerges.
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Yoram,
Historians are acutely aware of the dangers of anachronism and parochialism, but why do you claim they are “self-serving”, in any sense other than doing the job that they are paid for? My experience of humanities and social science departments over the last fifty years is that they are the polar opposite of establishment lickspittles. My own department at Exeter University is facing 200 redundancies, partly on account of the failure of academics to pursue the government’s utilitarian agenda. As for the unwillingness of academics to contribute to sites like this, why would anyone bother if they are just going to be insulted by the convenor?
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” …ideology is epiphenomenal — beliefs (academic or whatever) being simply a reflection of socio-economic and other power structures. This (Marxian) doctrine is well past its sell-by date…”
You won’t find such a simple, unidirectional cause/effect relationship stated by Marx. Dialectical analysis implies that forces are acting in both direction on each other in myriad complex ways.
The Marxist scholar Gabriel Rockhill does point out that ideas, like all productions are shaped, supported, and enacted by the whoever controls the means of production. He talks of a “theory industry” whereby certain ideas are promoted, others repressed. This happens through tenure, barriers to publication, Overton windows, etc. Marx is rarely referenced without a mention of his incorrectness, or obsolescence, as you just did. Locke, Hume, Kant are not given the same treatment.
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I have also been surprised to have not seen it pointed out, either by detractors or defenders of elections, that one of the elected bodies, the military generals, had an outsized role in bringing about the the downfall of Athens by their overly aggressive military action. Elected officials, for various reasons, have incentives to start wars. Currently in the US we see that clearly in effect, with a range of 60%-70% opposed to the presidents attack on Iran.
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Yes that’s true. What I was taking issue is Yoram’s suggestion that historians find evidence of electoral practices in classical Athens as they are acting in the interests of their paymasters.
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Yes that’s true. What I was taking issue is Yoram’s suggestion that historians find evidence of electoral practices in classical Athens as they are acting in the interests of their paymasters.
Fair enough, I don’t think it works that way either, unless under the direct pay of corporate or government sponsors. It’s more of what appears as a worthwhile subject of study and what is ignored. Although, in the US, the federal government is taking an ever-increasing role in dictating to academia.
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Agree. And I think Collingwood’s notion of absolute presuppositions tells us more about the factors that shape the Overton window than dialectical materialism.
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I am not familiar with Collingwood. A brief investigation reminds me of Paul Katsafanas, notion of core, or sacred, invulnerable to reason. I believe tht is certainly at play in many ideological disputes. It is one reason assemblies perform better than forums such as this. There is more opportunity to establish trust that others whom one disagrees with share still share one’s core values.
As far as explaining history as the progression of thought, ignoreng material forces of production, that is too ethereal and Hegelian for me. I am fine to leave Hegel standing on his head.
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My apologies for all the typos. Is there an edit feature?
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Yes, Collingwood was a Hegelian, so he prioritised ideational factors. Absolute presuppositions are the unexamined and (largely) unconscious preconditions of thought. They do change over time and space, but they are not determined by material considerations like the means of production. There is a better fit with Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm change (which has a dialectical relationship with scientific experimentation).
I don’t think there is any way of editing the comments — don’t worry, nobody bothers to read them.
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André Sauzeau
A subject is lacking in Blok’s article : dokimasia, i.e. clearance of magistrates (arkai); only a passing reference in a footnote. Yet this is an important point, whether from a practical standpoint or in terms of principle.
Any magistrate, elected or allotted, was subject to a process of dokimasia/clearance before taking the function. For elected magistrates, we have a famous example : Theramenes, elected by the Assembly as stratêgos, was rejected by dokimasia in the spring of 406 (Lysias, Against Agoratus, §10) —and quite rightly so, given the individual’s subsequent actions against the democracy. But the same was possible for an allotied magistrate, including a councillor. We have an interesting example in the speech “For Mantitheos” by Lysias ; Mantitheos, having been selected by lot to serve on the Council, must defend himself during the clearance process (dokimasia) against accusations of oligarchic leanings. He acknowledges his intention to pursue a political career; the speech is likely aimed less at securing his seat on the Council than at officially clearing his name of any oligarchic associations, thereby paving the way for a career as a political orator. This illustrates the indirect role played by the clearance process in the lives of orators who aspire to advise the people.
The clearance process is a kind of selection, not of ability or of political views (if democratic), but of personal morality and trustworthiness about pro-democracy orientation. Clearly this second point was important after the oligarchic revolution which followed the defeat of Athens. There was amnesty, therefore no selection of citizens for assembly or juries, but as it appears from Lysias speeches in attack or defense it was legitimate to subject magistrates, including allotted magistrates, to clearance (dokimasia) with reference to their behaviour during oligarchy and their supposed oligarchic leanings.
Therefore the dokimasia/clearance process confirms the essential distinction between magistracies and the venues where sovereign power was exercised—the assembly and the popular courts — where there was no selection process.
We have three levels in the Athenian system
The level 1 corresponds to the essence of democracy: the absence of selection regarding the exercise of sovereign power (the final say on important matters), the “blind equality” of citizens in sovereignty.
The level 3 corresponds to the exercise of power through public ministers well selected: the sovereign dêmos chooses them, as any sovereign, as an absolute king for instance.
The level 2 is more specific; the dêmos is not able to rule all the executive details, and not able to control closely a myriad of elected magistrates; thus the dêmos gives power to allotted magistrates with a very limited selection, and may reasonably trust them to rule their limited areas in conformity with the socio-political sensitivity of the whole dêmos.
This is a superiority of the dêmokratia system if we compare it to absolute monarchy, where the king has no good equivalent of level 2.
In dêmokratia, the level 2 is an approximate synecdochical representation.
We may understand that the level 2 could be conflated with level 1 of “perfect” synecdochical representation, notwithstanding the strong theorical difference. Actually, Theseus, mythical founder of the Athenian democracy, conflated them in which is one of the very few ancient texts of democratic theory that have come down to us (Euripides’ The Suppliants , verses 404-408):
“This city is not ruled by a one man, it is free. The People reigns (ho dêmos anassei) according to alternating annual successions.” This general formula could include the allotted magistracies and the allotted courts.
PS The main parameter in Blok’s article is accountability, mine is selection. But we see that levels 2 and 3 we have both selection through dokimasia and accountability. And actually accountability implies a kind of self-selection: if I have bad moral reputation or if I had oligarchic associations, the account step will be more dangerous, it is better not to be candidate.
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Andre:> The assembly and the courts . . . corresponds to the essence of democracy: the absence of selection regarding the exercise of sovereign power (the final say on important matters), the “blind equality” of citizens in sovereignty.
Regarding modern analogues for Athenian democracy, If sampling theory is correct, a large quasi-mandatory legislative jury would comprise a synecdochical representation of the full demos, so the absence of dokimasia/euthynai would not contravene democratic norms. (Daniela resists this argument, as her Rousseauian perspective requires every citizen to choose whether to participate).
But the same would not apply to smaller panels and citizens’ assemblies with a longer-term remit, especially if any form of sovereignty were involved.
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“They do change over time and space, but they are not determined by material considerations like the means of production.”
Yes, and Marx would agree, he was not a determinist.
“I don’t think there is any way of editing the comments — don’t worry, nobody bothers to read them.”
LOL!
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but everyone SHOULD read Andre’s comment.
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Message from Josine Blok:
I find André’s comment very interesting and useful. A few points, though:
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Josine:> on the euthynai side, I would always prefer any citizen assembly or jury to be accountable to some other body.
But the jury courts were not accountable, and this is why you included them (with the assembly) as an example of pure synecdochical representation. Those of us who based our modern sortition model on Hansen’s understanding of 4th century nomothesia were disappointed to learn that this was a translation error — the sovereign lawmaker was in fact the whole assembly wearing a different hat. But modern probability theory (the Greeks had no mathematical model) would suggest that a sample of 500 is a reasonable synecdoche for the whole.
One of the reasons for thinking a citizens’ jury should be accountable (and therefore not sovereign) is the failure to view it as a singular entity — a better word than minipublic would be minidemos. How to turn a random sample of citizens into a single entity requires demanding constraints (that designers of citizens’ assemblies overlook on account of the methodological individualism perspective assumed by deliberative democracy.) One of the best things of Terry Bouricius’s new book is his observation that the term “a representative” (singular) isn’t even an appropriate term for a member of a minipublic.
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André Sauzeau
Answer to Josine Blok
I am sorry, I used bad wording by writing “political views”, it would have been better to write “policy views”.
*** By “political orientation,” I mean the choice of the sovereign—or the system of sovereignty—accepted as best in the long run, regardless of policy debates on specific issues; the sovereign, in that sense, being “legitimate.”
*** By “policy views,” I mean the various options for political action in different areas, from which the sovereign must choose.
Let’s imagine a modern dêmokratia. Supporters of the political system may have very different views about how to manage the climate/energy problem, how to manage the economy, how to act in the face of dangerous foreign powers…etc. As democrats, their aim will be to convince the sovereign dêmos.
Among the contributors to this blog who favor some form of modern dêmokratia, I am certain there is a wide range of policy views.
When selecting a minister, the sovereign dêmos must first be sure that he accepts the sovereign’s legitimacy, and then determine which statesman is best suited to implement the policy the sovereign dêmos has chosen.
For an allotted magistrate body, the dokimasia/clearance will be useful to prevent chance from giving too much weight to people who don’t recognize legitimacy – this hazard was Isocrates’ (disingenuous) argument against lot (Areopagiticus §23). In fact, for a big enough body, you can skip dokimasia by setting a threshold where the majority will be significant (accepting a given risk). The difference in Athens between juries and magistrate colleges can be eliminated in a modern dêmokratia for large bodies by applying probability calculations – something that ancient Greek civilization ignored.
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Andre:> The difference in Athens between juries and magistrate colleges can be eliminated in a modern dêmokratia for large bodies by applying probability calculations – something that ancient Greek civilization ignored.
Can you give an example of a (large) modern magistrate college?
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